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 Recent conceptualizations of procrastination suggest that procrastination is akin to 
self-regulatory failure wherein the effect of good intentions is attenuated for individuals 
who tend to procrastinate.  Some researchers speculate that this effect is due to subtle 
neurological deficits that make it more difficult for procrastinators to follow through with 
completing tasks.  The present work examines this claim while also investigating two 
factors that should theoretically weaken the effect of intentions for engaging unpleasant, 
but important, tasks – namely habitual avoidance and the executive function of inhibition.   
Study 1 investigated the question of whether chronic avoidance patterns may 
become so entrenched that they take on the qualities of a habit.  This is important because 
habits are known to be less reliant on intentions because they are triggered in a relatively 
automatic fashion.  Habit indices were created which assessed the degree to which the 
experience of avoiding particular tasks was automatic and self-descriptive in nature 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).  The results confirmed the expectation that more frequent 
avoidance patterns are experienced as occurring relatively automatically.  Habit-like 
avoidance can be measured reliably and is related to other constructs in expected ways.  
For example, habit-level predicts reduced task quality and lower rates of task completion 
above-and-beyond motivational variables (e.g. intentions). Finally, habit-like avoidance 
patterns were more often associated with stable features identified by participants as 
being present in the environment.   
Using a prospective design, Study 2 assessed the degree to which existing 
habitual-avoidance patterns weakened the effect of good intentions to carry out 




used to assess inhibitory control or the degree to which participants could inhibit 
prepotent responses.  In addition to personality traits which purportedly moderate the 
intention-behaviour relation (e.g. trait procrastination), the moderating effects of habitual 
avoidance and inhibitory control were also tested.  Trait-level procrastination did not 
weaken the effect of one’s intentions to carry out unpleasant tasks.  However, habitual 
avoidance and inhibitory control jointly moderated the effect of intentions on behaviour 
such that poor inhibitors had difficulty overcoming previous avoidance habits in order to 
complete unpleasant tasks during the week.  In contrast, good inhibitors were able to 
behave according to their intentions irrespective of habit-like avoidance patterns.  These 
findings point to the importance of recognizing the joint influence of avoidance patterns 
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 Many psychological terms are part of our everyday vernacular.  The term procrastinate is no 
exception.   Intuitively speaking, we may associate procrastination with purposefully avoiding tasks 
that, at some level, we are simultaneously motivated to work on or complete.  These conflicting 
forces are evident in modern conceptualizations of the term.  For example, contemporary definitions 
indicates that to procrastinate is, “to put off intentionally the doing of something that should be done” 
(Merrian-Webster Dictionary, 2008).  However, the study of procrastination has produced a variety 
of construct definitions. These include the notion that procrastination is not intentional, but is rather a 
failure to carry out our previous intentions to complete a task.  Some commentators have noted that 
the definitions that have been put forward in the psychological research are almost as numerous as 
the authors proposing them (e.g., see Ferrari, Johnson & McCown, 1995). Some authors have 
endorsed relatively strict definitions of what it means to procrastinate. For example, Milgram (1991) 
described how, to be considered ‘procrastination,’ a behaviour must meet several criteria including 
that it be postponed to some degree, result in substandard performance, and that the task be important 
enough that delaying it  produces the experience of emotional upset.  By comparison, more liberal 
definitions suggest that procrastination may manifest itself in a number of different ways including 
postponing the initiation of the behaviour, postponing the intended time of the behavioural 
performance, the presence of an intention-behaviour discrepancy, or doing activities other than the 
behaviour of interest (e.g., Schouwenburg, 1995).  
 Although there is no general consensus in the literature, it is clear that the delaying, 
postponing or putting off of tasks is a central feature of procrastination. Further, what is clear from 
the literature is that procrastination often involves the counter-intentional delay of actions whose 




1991; Silver & Sabini, 1981).  As pointed out by Steel (2007) in a recent review, it is important to 
distinguish intentional from non-intentional task delay given that it is difficult to think about the 
myriad of tasks that one is not doing at any given time.  Defining procrastination as the delay of 
previously intended tasks also allows for a distinction to be made between procrastination behaviour 
and decisional avoidance (i.e., intentionally delaying the performance of a task; Anderson, 2003).  
This is similar to the definition provided by van Eerde (2003; p. 1402) who has commented that, 
“procrastination pertains to intentions that do not result in actions.”  Owens, Bowan, and Dill (2008), 
believe that procrastination may best be understood as two separate processes which are involved in 
behavioural enactment.  Following Gollwitzer (1999), these authors understand behavioural 
processes as distinct phases that consist of motivational and volitional components.  Whereas the first 
phase involves the selection of a behaviour that will (ideally) lead to certain goals, the second phase 
involves the actual execution of the selected action. Owens et al. (2008) described how both of these 
processes are likely involved in procrastination.  The volitional process of behavioural enactment 
will be emphasized in the present work.  Therefore, procrastination is defined here as the delay of 
executing important tasks that one had previously intended to perform. In other words, 
procrastination is defined here as the failure to carry out, “the implementation of an intention” (van 
Eerde, 2000; p. 372).  
As will be reviewed below, procrastination often involves a failure to perform important tasks 
that serve long-term goals because of more immediate contingencies in the short-term.  For example, 
procrastination behaviour increases when tasks are not implemented because they are boring, 
difficult or unpleasant to perform. Despite previous intentions, the aversive quality of tasks can 
ultimately hinder task execution.  Some have suggested (e.g., Steel, 2007) that the inability to 




In addition to defining what it means to procrastinate on intended tasks, it is also important to 
outline what is not considered procrastination behaviour. Since the present definition of 
procrastination involves the absence of an intended behaviour it is necessary to outline factors that 
may lead to the absence of intended behaviour which do not involve procrastination per se.  As 
mentioned above, behaviour that is never seriously intended should not be considered procrastination 
since there is no potential for motivational conflict (e.g., short- vs. long-term goals) or an intention-
behaviour discrepancy.  Finally, not included in the present definition of procrastination is a failure 
to complete intended tasks due to poor planning. This is an especially important consideration for the 
present work since there is some evidence that high trait-procrastinators tend to underestimate the 
time it will take to complete tasks (e.g., time to read a brief passage) whereas non-procrastinators 
actually overestimate time for task completion (e.g., Aitken, 1982).   
Prevalence 
 Avoiding the completion of important tasks or “procrastinating” is a relatively common 
phenomenon. Nearly everyone has been guilty of “dilly dallying” with unpleasant tasks. However, 
for some individuals the act of putting off aversive tasks becomes a hazardous pastime.  This may be 
especially true for students pursuing post-secondary education.  Much of the research investigating 
procrastination has involved academic procrastination in which college students put off the 
completion of a number of academic-related tasks. Estimated prevalence rates in student populations 
have ranged anywhere from 50% to 95% (e.g., Day, Mensink, & O’Sullivan, 2000; Pychyl, Lee, 
Thibodeau, & Blunt, 2000; Aitken, 1982; Ellis & Knaus, 1977).  Astonishingly, almost half of 
college students spend half their day procrastinating (Hill, Hill, Chabot, & Barrall, 1976), and nearly 
50% of students report consistently putting off tasks in such a way that it causes difficulties (Day, et 
al., 2000; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984).  In absolute terms, the average student spends over one-third 




or watching television (Pychyl, Lee, Thibodeau, & Blunt, 2000).  Although specific estimates of the 
negative impact of procrastination vary greatly, what has become clear is that these effects are both 
common and debilitating.   
 However, to assume that the tendency to procrastinate is confined to the college campus 
would be a mistake. For example, some estimates indicate that somewhere between 15-25% of adults 
procrastinate chronically (e.g., Harriott & Ferrari, 1996; McCown & Johnson, 1989).  A recent 
international study has provided further evidence that procrastination is also problematic for non-
student, adult populations.  Using two established measures of procrastination, Ferrari, Díaz-Morales, 
O’Callaghan, Díaz, and Argumendo (2007) surveyed individuals from six countries (Spain, Peru, 
Venezuala, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States) about their tendency to put off 
tasks.  The results were consistent with the existing student data indicating that the tendency towards 
delaying tasks was a common feature for adults in all six countries. 
Consequences 
 Whereas evading important tasks can appeal to our short-term experience of side-stepping the 
unpleasant (e.g. bring temporary relief), the act of putting off tasks is not without consequence.  In a 
recent review of the psychological literature on procrastination, Steel (2007) reported a small 
negative correlation (average r = -.19; K = 41)1 between trait procrastination and academic success.  
Overall GPA, course GPA, final exam scores and assignment grades are generally worse when one 
tends to procrastinate.   It is important to highlight the fact that negative outcomes are not restricted 
to tasks that are germane only to student populations. For example, Sirosis’ (2007) examination of 
trait-procrastination and health behaviours using a large adult population demonstrated that 
procrastination is associated with the practice of fewer self-care behaviours and a lower frequency of 




using student samples, our knowledge about how procrastination affects non-student populations is 
limited in scope.  
 In addition to readily observable outcomes, procrastination may also have a number of 
psychological consequences.  For example, Pychyl (1995) observed a moderate relation between 
procrastinating on personal projects (e.g., academic manuscripts) and feelings of guilt (r = .46). 
Currently there is some debate about whether procrastination is strongly associated with other mood-
related variables. Whereas one meta-analytic review of the literature reported moderate correlations 
between procrastination and state anxiety (r = .22) and depression (r = .30; van Eerde, 2003), a more 
recent review of the same body of work commented on how the evidence supporting the relation 
between procrastination and mood is less than definitive (Steel, 2007). One speculation is that 
transient variables (e.g. mood) tend to fluctuate over time making their presence difficult to detect 
(Steel, 2007).   
Some carefully considered attempts to capture the affective experience of procrastinators 
have been made. Using an experience-sampling method, Pychyl et al. (2000) examined the relation 
between procrastination and positive and negative affect. Participants in this study were given 
electronic pagers that signalled them randomly eight times per day for five consecutive days. For 
each signal they completed a number of items about the task they were performing, tasks they would 
rather be performing, and rated a number of adjectives that represented their positive and negative 
affect at the time of the signal.  Despite the fact that participants reported engaging in procrastination 
over one-third (36.2%) of the time, the data provided no evidence that either overall positive or 
negative affect were related to procrastination. Consistent with the findings of Pychyl (1995), 
however, the level of procrastination was positively correlated with guilt (r = .42) experienced at the 




 Notably, the impact of procrastinating can depend on objective criteria like deadlines.  In a 
seminal study, Tice and Baumeister (1997) demonstrated that the act of procrastinating may bring 
temporary relief at the cost of longer-term outcomes. Using a longitudinal approach over the course 
of an academic semester, these researchers observed the relation between procrastination (measured 
by self-report and behaviour) and a number of outcome variables including paper and exam grades, 
subjective stress, and physical complaints.  Unsurprisingly, the results indicated that high trait-
procrastinators submitted assignments later and received lower grades than low trait-procrastinators.  
Interestingly, early in the semester high procrastinators reported experiencing less stress, fewer 
physical ailments and fewer visits to a health-center than low procrastinators.  As deadlines loomed 
late in the semester, however, this pattern reversed and high procrastinators reported more stress and 
health-related complaints than those low in trait-procrastination.  This led the authors to conclude 
that despite, “its short-term benefits, procrastination cannot be regarded as either adaptive or 
innocuous. Procrastinators end up suffering more and performing worse than other people” (Tice & 
Baumeister, 1997; p. 458). 
 Finally, there is some evidence that trait-like worry and depression are moderately related to 
trait procrastination. For example, Flett, Blankstein and Martin (1995) describe that depression and 
worrying in a number of domains correlate significantly with a number of procrastination measures.  
These correlations with procrastination range from .30 to .40 for depression and from .28 to .47 for 
worry.  However, as van Eerde (2003) points out, there is no evidence to verify the causal direction 
of these relations. Thus, it is difficult to know whether procrastination behaviour is the result of 
depression and/or anxiety or whether the act of procrastinating plays a role in producing these 
conditions.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that avoidance behaviour is a central component in 
conceptualizing and treating depression and anxiety disorders.  For example, a main goal of the 




of maladaptive task-avoidance in order for clients to more fully engage in and positively affect their 
environment.  Similarly, the gradual removal of avoidance behaviour is essential for the effective use 
of exposure strategies in the treatment of anxiety disorders (e.g., Barlow, 2002).  Furthermore, the 
fact that avoidance plays a large role in both depression and anxiety has suggested to some that 
avoidance may be a common factor that accounts for the observed comorbidity between the two 
types of condition (e.g., Mazer & Cloninger, 1990; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004). 
Two Types of Trait Procrastination  
 There is some reason to believe that trait-like tendencies to procrastinate may differ 
depending on the motivating forces behind the task avoidance (e.g., see Burka & Yuen, 1983; Ellis & 
Knaus, 1977; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984).  Two forms of trait-procrastination that appear 
frequently in the literature have motivational roots in arousal and avoidance.   
  Ferrari (1992a) suggested that people who are high on arousal procrastination are thrill-
seekers who like to perform tasks at the last minute in order to ward off boredom.  These individuals 
delay tasks in order to experience the “rush” of working against a deadline – effectively adding a 
form of excitement to their lives.  Not only is this type of procrastination correlated with sensation-
seeking (Ferrari, 1992a), but there is evidence that these procrastinators demonstrate poorer 
performance when arousal caused by task deadlines is heightened by environmental situations that 
may cause an overload of arousal (Ferrari, 2001).  The General Behavioural Procrastination (GPS) 
Scale developed by Lay (1986) is a reliable and valid measure of arousal procrastination (Ferrari et 
al., 1995).   
 Whereas some procrastinate to generate sufficient arousal for task performance, avoidant 
procrastination appears to be driven by the tendency to delay tasks in order to avoid the unpleasant 
nature of a task and/or the risk of failure.  This is supported by the observation that this type of 




individuals the act of delaying tasks may reflect an inclination to prevent perceived inadequacies 
from being revealed.  The Adult Inventory of Procrastination (AIP; McCown & Johnson, 1989; items 
found in Ferrari et al., 1995) has been identified as a good measure of avoidant procrastination 
(Ferrari et al., 1995).  
  Despite how both forms of trait procrastination predict behaviour (e.g., the time to return 
completed inventories; Ferrari, 1992a), there is conflicting evidence that these conceptualizations of 
procrastination are distinct. Across a series of samples of both traditionally and non-traditionally-
aged college students, Ferrari (1992a) found no significant correlations between the two constructs 
using the GPS scale and AIP as indicators of arousal and avoidant procrastination, respectively.  
However, in a more recent international study of procrastination using the same measures, Ferrari, et 
al. (2007) found considerable overlap between these two forms of procrastination (r = .72) in a large 
(N = 1347) adult population.  Unfortunately, Ferrari et al. (2007) did not provide any speculations 
that may explain these discrepant findings.  More recent evidence from Simpson and Pychyl (2009; 
cf. Steel, 2010) has examined whether the GPS measures procrastination motivated by arousal.  
These authors administered the GPS along with several indices of arousal-based personality.  The 
results demonstrated no relation between sensation seeking and the GPS.  Further, although 
participants often believe they procrastinate for arousal-based reasons, there was little evidence that 
individuals scoring high on the GPS have an increased need for heightened arousal.  Taken together, 
evidence from the literature suggests that arousal and avoidant motivations may be similar constructs 
and may not represent distinctive subtypes of procrastination.     
Measurement of Procrastination 
 Attempts have been made to measure procrastination in different ways.  There is clear 
evidence that procrastination is stable across both time and situations (see Steel, 2007 for a brief 




one study demonstrated considerably stability (r = .77) over that period of time (Elliot, 2002 as cited 
in Steel, 2007).  Given the observed stability of the construct, procrastination is most often measured 
as a personality style or trait.  The most common method of assessing procrastination in this manner 
is by self-report. Self-reported procrastination has been investigated across a number of domains.  
For example, academic procrastination has been gauged using instruments like the Aitken 
Procrastination Inventory (API; Aitken, 1982) which is a scale designed to differentiate between high 
and low procrastination in undergraduate students (sample items include, “When I have a test 
scheduled soon, I often find myself working on other jobs when a deadline is near”).  More 
generalized scales of procrastination have also been developed.  For example the General 
Procrastination Scale (GPS; Lay, 1986) measures the tendency to put off tasks in a number of non-
academic domains (participants rate their agreement to statements such as, “A letter may sit for days 
after I write it before I mail it.”).   
 In addition to the measurement of retrospective, self-reported task avoidance, behavioural 
manifestations of procrastination have also been measured. The validity of many of the self-report 
scales, for example, has been tested against whether or not the scale could predict real-world task 
avoidance.  Here there are many instances in which trait-procrastination has been found to be related 
to a number of task-delay behaviours, including the time to complete self-paced quizzes (Solomon & 
Rothblum, 1984), to turn in assignments (e.g., Beswick, Rothblum, & Mann, 1988), to return 
questionnaires (e.g., Lay, 1986), to redeem gift certificates or begin shopping for the holidays 
(Ferrari, 1993a).    
As mentioned above, a more recent study by Pychyl et al. (2000) used an experience-
sampling method to explore the immediate affective experience of procrastinating at random time-
points during the day.  Since participants reported on their experience during the task avoidance 




their results.  The methods used in two studies reported by Ferrari and Scher (Ferrari & Scher, 2000; 
Scher & Ferrari, 2000) are perhaps most germane to the present conceptualization of procrastination 
as a failure to follow through with previous intentions.  Participants in this sample (N = 37) reported 
on daily tasks and activities. These data were then submitted to a task-level analysis.  On five 
consecutive days, participants reported on tasks that they intended to complete in the next day (i.e., 
24 hours) as well as the percentage of each task they intended to achieve. On each of the following 
days, they then reported on each of the previous day’s tasks indicating, among other things, what 
percentage of their original intention they accomplished for each task. Task procrastination was then 
defined as not completing at least 80% of the task-intention from the previous day. Among other 
findings, the results of the Ferrari and Scher (2000) study replicated the work of others in the 
demonstration that college students procrastinate on both academic (e.g., daily homework) and non-
academic (e.g., household chores) tasks at a fairly high rate.  As the authors mention, however, this 
work extends previous findings because it used an idiosyncratic approach to task avoidance in that 
the tasks measured were selected by each participant for each day.  Of course, this allows for higher 
ecological validity in studying the nature of real-world procrastination. Further, the fact that 
intentions and task-execution were measured at separate time-points (i.e., intentions were measured 
before task performance) eliminates the need for participants to recall their original level of intention 
for each task.  
Nomological Network of Procrastination 
 The examination of the constructs associated with chronic task avoidance is an important first 
step toward understanding the factors that negatively impact whether one follows through with the 
intention to complete unpleasant tasks. To this aim, the nomological network of constructs associated 
with procrastination is reviewed at both the task and individual difference level. The focus of this 




overcoming the immediate contingencies of unpleasant tasks in the service of intentions that 
represent longer-term goals.  The following review consists mainly of findings reported by Steel 
(2007) and van Eerde (2003) in recent meta-analyses on procrastination. 
Task Characteristics 
There is little doubt that task avoidance is associated with the type of task to be performed.  
One consistent finding is that aversive tasks produce task delay or avoidance.  More aversive tasks 
produce higher levels of procrastination behaviour (average r = .40, K = 8; Steel, 2007).  This 
includes more task avoidance for unpleasant, boring or uninteresting tasks. The majority of this 
research stems from self-reported reasons for procrastinating (e.g., Solomon & Rothblum, 1984; 
Anderson, 2001). However, in their daily logs study, Ferrari and Scher (2000) also demonstrated that 
early in the semester, the more effortful and/or anxiety provoking a task was perceived to be, the less 
often the task was completed.  This is also consistent with the event-sampling data collected by 
Pychyl et al. (2000). In this study, when participants were procrastinating they rated the task they 
should be doing as more unpleasant than their current task (e.g., watching television).   
Individual Differences 
A number of individual-difference variables have demonstrated empirical associations with 
procrastination. As reviewed by Steel (2007) and van Eerde (2003), some of these variables (e.g., 
neuroticism) show only a small association with task-avoidance tendencies. However, there are a 
number of individual-difference variables that are strongly predictive of the tendency to 
procrastinate. For example, individuals with low self-efficacy, high impulsivity, and who are less 
conscientious tend to procrastinate more than those with high self-efficacy, low impulsivity and who 







 From the general finding that aversive tasks tend to be avoided, it follows that the disposition 
to experience events as negative (e.g., as stressful or as a threat) may increase the avoidance of 
unpleasant tasks.  However, the correlational evidence suggests that neuroticism is only weakly 
associated with procrastination (average r = .24, K = 59; Steel, 2007; average r = .26; K = 10; van 
Eerde, 2003), and that this association is driven largely by the fact that the construct of neuroticism 
often contains items that tap impulsiveness.  Steel (2007) pointed out that the relation between 
procrastination and neuroticism that does not contain items about impulsivity is less than half 
(average r = .16, K = 10) of that observed when impulsivity is considered part of neuroticism 
(average r = .33, K = 10).  The observed relation between procrastination and impulsivity is further 
described below. 
Rebelliousness 
 Some clinical writers have proposed that a tendency to rebel against external control may 
create the impetus for procrastination behaviour (e.g., Burka & Yuen, 1983; Knaus, 1979).  From this 
framework, rebellious individuals likely avoid the completion of tasks that are imposed by others 
because these tasks impede one’s autonomy and are therefore experienced as aversive.  However, the 
observed correlation between procrastination and agreeableness (i.e., the tendency to be pleasant and 
socially accommodating) is very small (average r = -.12, K = 24; Steel, 2007). 
Self-efficacy 
 One variable that has demonstrated strong associations with procrastination across a number 
of tasks is self-efficacy, or the belief in one’s capabilities to control important events that affect one’s 
life (average r = -.38, K = 39; Steel, 2007; average r = -.44, K = 11; van Eerde, 2003).  Individuals 
tend to procrastinate when they have little confidence that they can effectively perform the tasks 




which then lowers one’s beliefs about efficacy.  However, the direction of this relation is 
questionable, as it seems equally plausible that beliefs about task failure may increase the aversive 
nature of tasks. From this perspective, increased task aversion may increase the tendency to 
procrastinate.  
Impulsiveness 
 From a review of the literature, it is clear that a tendency to be impulsive is predictive of 
procrastination behaviour (average r = .41, K = 22; Steel, 2007). One speculation about why this 
relation is present is based on the observation that chronic procrastinators also tend to be low 
stimulus screeners (Lay, 1987).  Whereas high stimulus screeners are able to disregard distracting 
and irrelevant cues, low stimulus screeners are likely overwhelmed in situations that involve higher 
levels of information, suggesting that the degree to which attention can be controlled may affect how 
we guide our own behaviour.  Moreover, there is evidence that low screeners are also more sensitive 
to whether a task is pleasant or not (Mehrabian & West, 1977), which may produce impulsive 
behaviour.  This is consistent with Lay’s (1986) observation that chronic procrastinators worked on 
tasks longer if the tasks were pleasant, despite the fact that task pleasantness had no effect on 
individuals low in procrastination.  In combination, these findings suggest that procrastinators may 
impulsively favour more immediately gratifying tasks over previous goals or intentions.  This 
account resonates with part of Costa and McCrae’s (1992) definition of impulsiveness as an inability 
to resist urges or temptations – in this case selecting pleasant over aversive tasks.  Results of a study 
examining procrastination and self-control (Ferrari & Emmons, 1995) are consistent with this 
interpretation.  In this sample of college students, procrastination levels were negatively related to 
self-control tendencies. The authors attribute this relation to an inability on the part of the 
procrastinator to inhibit the desire to perform tasks that are more pleasurable in the short-term.  An 




forward by Ferrari (1993b).  He suggests that dysfunctional impulsivity is a consequence of 
procrastination behaviour. According to this account, individuals that tend to delay tasks are often 
required to speed up the when they eventually get around to completing tasks (i.e., work more 
impulsively), which may explain the observed relation between the two constructs.  
Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness has been defined as a tendency for high self-control, including a tendency 
to enact active processes of, “planning, organizing, and carrying out tasks” (Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
p. 16). Given this definition, it should be unsurprising that both Steel (average r = -.62, K = 20; 2007) 
and van Eerde (average r = -.63, K = 10; 2003) reported large negative correlations between 
procrastination and the personality trait of conscientiousness. 
Also unsurprising is that the facet of conscientiousness that has demonstrated the largest 
association with procrastination is self-discipline (average r = -.58, K = 21; Steel, 2007). Costa and 
McCrae (1992) define self-discipline as, “the ability to begin tasks and carry them through to 
completion despite boredom and other distractions” (p. 18). These authors also emphasize that there 
is an empirical distinction between high impulsivity and low self-discipline.  Both of these constructs 
are associated with one’s level of self-control over behaviour.  Yet, whereas the impulsive individual 
has difficulty resisting unintended tasks, the individual lacking self-discipline has difficulty 
compelling him- or herself to carry out intended tasks (Costa & McCrae, 1992).   
Steel (2007) also reported that other components of conscientiousness were related to 
procrastination including the facets of distractibility (i.e., poor management of distracting cues; 
average r = .45, K = 13), organization (i.e., planning and structuring one’s life; average r = -.36, K = 







 Given the results demonstrating gender differences in self-control, Steel (2007) predicted that 
males may procrastinate slightly more than females.  In his review of the procrastination literature 
there was a small correlation across studies (r = .08).  This is consistent with the small correlation 
between procrastination and gender observed by vanEerde (2003; r = .05) indicating that men 




The Present Research 
 Many procrastination researchers consider task avoidance to be a failure to implement 
previous intentions (e.g., van Eerde, 2000; Silver & Sabini, 1981).  Therefore, one imperative of 
future research should be to investigate variables that moderate the intention-behaviour relation with 
respect to task completion.  Although formidable, this is a worthwhile endeavour for further 
investigation because of the fundamental nature of the problem:  
 
“Given this consistency of opinion, stretching thousands of years, procrastination must be 
considered an almost archetypal human failing. Therefore it is rather surprising and ironic that 
science did not address procrastination sooner” (Steel, 2007; p. 67). 
 
An interesting question that arises from this line of thinking surrounds factors that may 
impede one’s ability to behave in a way that is consistent with previous intentions.  Procrastination 
has been discussed as a variable that weakens the effect of intentions.  The present work is an 
investigation of two factors that may moderate the intention-behaviour relation for completing 
unpleasant tasks.  Both factors will be outlined in detail after exploring potential theories for 
explaining the intention-behaviour gap observed in procrastinators. 
Explaining Procrastination 
 Under a framework that understands procrastination to be a failure to complete previous 
intentions, theories that speak to the relation between intentions and behaviour may be best suited to 
understanding procrastination. In addition, because both impulsivity and conscientiousness 
demonstrate strong correlations with procrastination, theories involving the construct of self-control 




Theory of Planned Behavior. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen & Madden, 
1986) and its predecessor the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) are among 
the most popular theories for explaining planned behaviour. Both theories consider behavioural 
decisions to be based on subjectively-made expected utilities for each choice option.  Germane to the 
present work, the single best predictor of behaviour, according to the TPB, is one’s intention to 
behave – a construct that is itself determined by attitudes about the behaviour, beliefs about whether 
that behaviour will bring social pressure from significant others, and perceptions about how much the 
individual can control outcomes associated with that behaviour.  Although perceived behavioural 
control can directly affect behaviour, according to TPB, intentions are the most important 
determinant of behaviour.  In a meta-analysis of ten correlational meta-analyses, Sheeran (2002) 
reported that intentions have a large effect on actual behaviour (average r = .53).  However, since 
much of these data are based on correlational studies using cross-sectional designs, it is difficult to 
determine whether this is an accurate estimate of the relation between intention and behaviour.  As 
pointed out by Webb and Sheeran (2006), it is difficult to infer whether or not intentions cause 
behaviour from this type of data because of (1) self-report biases that may inflate the observed 
relation and (2) the possibility that behaviour is reported as intentional simply because it has already 
been performed (i.e., the level of intention is inferred by the action taken).  Further, in their meta-
analysis of the experimental data on the intention-behaviour relation, Webb and Sheeran (2006) 
reviewed how manipulated changes in intention of a medium-to-large magnitude produced only 
small-to-medium changes in actual behaviour.  These authors have also indicated that the intention-
behaviour relation is often moderated by other variables. In addition to having perceived control, the 
relation is stronger when (1) one’s social context is conducive to the original intention and (2) when 
the environment does not evoke habitual control of behaviour.  As an aside, the latter is especially 




frequently in stable environmental-contexts promote the formation of habit-like behaviour (see Neal, 
Wood, & Quinn, 2006 for a review).  Further, when behaviour becomes habitual, the behaviour is 
often prompted by environmental cues irrespective of one’s original intentions.  Therefore, particular 
tasks that are often avoided may continue to be avoided despite one’s intentions to begin the task.  
More about this issue below.  In summary, despite the early promise of TPB, there is reason to 
believe that intentions alone are not sufficient for predicting future behaviour.   
 In addition, given that the main predictor of behaviour of the TPB is intention to act, it is 
doubtful that this theory will provide a solid ground on which to build an understanding of 
procrastination behaviour. By definition, procrastination is the failure to complete previous intentions 
– a statement that is antithetical to a theory whose most proximal predictor is intention proper. 
Empirical work has also demonstrated that work intentions are uncorrelated with procrastination 
(average r = -.03, K = 8; Steel, 2007), suggesting that procrastinators’ intentions to complete tasks 
are as strong as those held by non-procrastinators. Additionally, it is clear from reviewing the 
literature that chronic task avoidance also involves a relative inability to self-regulate – that is to 
control one’s behaviour at the time of task execution – despite previous intentions.  It is less than 
clear how this observation would fit in the framework proposed by the TPB. Further, the TPB 
neglects the temporal dimensions that appear to be important.  For example, Steel, Brothen and 
Wambach (2001) observed that at the beginning of an academic course, procrastinators tended to do 
less work than they intended.  However, nearing the end of the course the pattern reversed, and 
procrastinators tended to do more work than they indicated by their intentions.  Taken together, task 
avoidance may optimally be modeled using a theory that accounts for procrastination as a failure to 
overcome the negative impact of immediate contingencies of performing a task in the service of 




Temporal Self-Regulation Theory. The main focus of Temporal Self-Regulation Theory 
(TST; Hall & Fong, 2007) is the explanation of how we engage in behaviour that serves long-term 
goals in spite of the fact that, on average, humans are hypersensitive to the immediate contingencies 
in our environment (e.g., Loewenstein, Read, & Baumeister, 2003).  According to the TST 
framework, time-sensitive behaviour stems from a number of distinct factors that are biological, 
cognitive and social in nature.  The first consideration is that individuals have varying levels of self-
regulatory capacity that is partially determined by their neuro-biological make-up.   Inherent in this 
construct is one’s executive functioning abilities and the physiological energy required to exert these 
abilities. Second, two social-cognitive variables are primarily involved in determining one’s intention 
to act.  These include whether one believes that current behaviour will lead to predicted outcomes 
(i.e., connectedness beliefs) and the values one assigns to short- versus long-term outcomes for each 
behavioural option (i.e., temporal valuations).  Consistent with the TPB (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), 
intentions are then posited to have direct effects on behaviour. The third factor identified in this 
model is behavioural prepotency, which is a behaviour-level variable that represents relatively 
reflexive behaviour that may be triggered by past behaviour or environmental cues to action. Figure 1 







Figure 1:  A Schematic Representation of TST as Described by Hall and Fong (2007). 
 
 
One aspect of TST that makes it particularly well suited to understanding procrastination is 
that moderators of the intention-behaviour relation are explicitly incorporated into the model.  As 
depicted in Figure 1, behavioural prepotency and self-regulatory capacity both moderate the strength 
of the relation between intention and action.   Hall and Fong (2007) describe how a prepotent 
response, or reflexive behaviour, may be largely determined by biological drives, salient 
environmental cues, or past behaviour.  According to the theory, the more a response is prepotent in 
its nature, the less effect previous intentions should exert on behaviour. Further, many future-oriented 
behaviours require that we inhibit responses that are more immediately reinforcing.  From this 
framework, the model predicts that individuals with greater self-regulatory capacity are better 
equipped to inhibit those responses.  This includes brain operations like executive functioning which 
are responsible for exerting top-down control over behaviour (Norman & Shallice, 1986).  Therefore, 




weak executive abilities should predict weak intention-behaviour relations.  Thus, the TST model 
presents two classes of moderators that may affect the intention-behaviour relation with respect to 
procrastination or task avoidance: (1) behaviour-level prepotent responding and (2) person-level 
executive functioning abilities.  Therefore, the main goal of the present work is to investigate one 
potential variable from each of the respective classes: (1) at the behaviour-level, habitual avoidance 
as a form of prepotent responding and (2) at the person-level, one’s ability to inhibit prepotent 
responding as one operationalization of executive functioning abilities.  Each of these potentially-
moderating variables is further specified below.  However, before this exposition, one last theoretical 
model of procrastination is considered.  
Temporal Motivation Theory.  The Temporal Motivational Theory (TMT) proposed by Steel 
(Steel & König, 2006; Steel, 2007; see Figure 2) is another good candidate for explaining 
procrastination behaviour.  Similar to the TST, this account is founded on expected utility theory.  In 
addition, TMT also incorporates the fact that we often discount long-term consequences in favour of 
more immediate contingencies. Based on principles of hyperbolic discounting, or discounting more 
distal consequences over more proximal ones (e.g., Ainslie, 2001), TMT posits that procrastination 
behaviour is governed by the following basic mathematical formulation:  
 
Utility =   E x V 
    ΓD 
 
Figure 2:  The Simplest Formulation of TMT as Described by Steel (2007). 
 
 
 This description of behaviour posits that the behaviour that currently has the highest utility is 
enacted.  As described by other utility theories, expectancy (E) is defined as the belief that an 
outcome is contingent on the current behaviour, and value (V) is the worth assigned to the expected 




formula.  Here delay (D), represents the actual time between behaviour and consequence, whereas Γ 
represents a person’s sensitivity to the specified delay.  Whereas behaviours that are associated with 
immediately realizable rewards (e.g., watching television) produce a constant utility over time, 
immediately-unrewarding tasks are believed to take on a hyperbolic function.  Tasks like school 
assignments that have a deadline far into the future have very low current utility according to TMT, 
especially compared to more immediately rewarding activities.  However, as time passes and a 
deadline approaches, the utility of the unrewarding task grows in a hyperbolic manner until it reaches 
a level that surpasses other activities.  This preference reversal is believed to describe the process of 
procrastination.  Namely, despite original intentions to work, procrastinators often “change their 
minds and fail to act on their plans” (Steel & König, 2006; p. 899). The Γ variable in the formula is 
largely affected by differences among individuals.  Individuals who are highly sensitive to delay will 
have lower utilities for aversive tasks early on.  These individuals will put off or excessively delay 
starting tasks until the deadline is very near.  However, as the deadline approaches, the value 
associated with the unpleasant task will grow at an accelerated rate, indicating that task completion is 
extremely valued – but only for the short period of time directly before the deadline.  Presumably, 
this will result in frantic behaviour often observed when procrastinators feverishly work towards a 
goal at the last minute.    
 Steel (2007) described how each of the four variables outlined by TMT are empirically 
related to procrastination. For example, equating self-efficacy with expectancy (i.e., E), he notes the 
strong negative correlation between efficacy and procrastination in the literature.  He also suggests 
that the observed correlations between procrastination and variables like task-aversion and boredom-
proneness represent how procrastination is more likely if a task is not highly valued at the present 
time (i.e., low V).  Further, there is evidence that procrastination often involves tasks that are delayed 




impulsiveness, and lack of self-control) lend evidence to the idea that procrastinators are very 
sensitive to the task delays (i.e., high Γ).  
 A more general and complete version of TMT was originally put forward by Steel and König 
(2006). From this perspective, behaviour is driven by current utilities which are analogous to the 
intensity of needs of the organism.  In addition to our primary biological needs (e.g. for food), these 
authors suggest that behaviour is largely driven by one’s psychogenic needs for (1) achievement, (2) 
affiliation, and (3) power, which can be thought of as preferences for how to behave (Winter, 1996). 
Once a need has become salient, the utilities of behaviours that could satisfy that need increase (e.g., 
because the potential outcome associated with that particular action becomes more valued).  Similar 
to the simplified form of this account (see Figure 2), the full version of TMT purports that we carry 







Figure 3:  A Complete Representation of the TMT model as Described by Steel & König (2006). 
 
Figure 3 depicts the utility associated with a single behaviour based on all possible (i.e., n) outcomes 
for that action. Notably, the utility for each action is separated into outcomes associated with gains 
and losses.  All of the possible outcomes for each respective category are summed into two main 
terms. The first term represents the positive expected-value associated with k gains taking into 
account both delay (T) and the individual’s sensitivity to gains (i.e., Γ+).  The second term represents 
the negative expected-value associated with n – k losses where Γ- indexes the individual’s sensitivity 
to losses.  The Z is a constant which prevents the denominator of either term from reaching zero 




(see Kahneman, 1992) which reflect how we tend to overestimate low-probability events and 
underestimate high-probability events.  Similarly, both value terms are transformations which reflect 
how we tend to undervalue future events (e.g., Ainslie, 2001). 
 One clear advantage of TMT over basic expectancy models (e.g., the TPB) is that TMT 
explicitly considers the timing of consequences on procrastination behaviour.  This concept is central 
because the definition of procrastination is temporally related in that it is often defined as the 
avoidance of unpleasant tasks that were previously intended.  Another benefit of using TMT to 
understand procrastination is that self-regulation has also been incorporated into the theory, albeit 
indirectly.  Sensitivity to delay is related to personality constructs such as impulsivity, self-control 
and distractibility, all tendencies which are presumably related to the capacity to act according to 
one’s own intentions.  
Temporal Self-Regulation Theory, Temporal Motivation Theory and Procrastination  
Steel and König (2006) point out that any theory of procrastination should simultaneously 
account for three main correlates of procrastination, including variables related to expectancy, value, 
and one’s sensitivity to delay.  Both the TST and TMT models accomplish this, albeit in different 
ways with respect to how procrastination is defined here.  A consideration of expected-values 
provides the foundation of both approaches.  The two models are also similar in that both take the 
temporal nature of gains and losses into account (e.g., considering the hyperbolic discounting of 
distal rewards).   
Despite their similarity, however, the models differ in some respects.  The main focus here is 
on failing to complete previously intended tasks.  Whereas TST is clear about how behaviour can 
ultimately be counter-intentional in this respect (e.g., one can intend to exercise, but not follow 
through because of poor executive-functioning abilities), procrastination in TMT is clearly framed in 




whereas procrastination may be understood as counter-intentional self-regulation failure in TST, 
TMT describes procrastinators as avoiding previously intended tasks because they “change their 
minds” about engaging in the previously intended behaviour (Steel & König, 2006; p. 899).  
However this difference appears to be largely semantic.  Whereas Hall and colleagues (e.g., Hall & 
Fong, 2007) define self-regulatory failure as previous intentions that do not translate into behaviour, 
Steel (e.g., Steel 2007) considers intentions for completing aversive tasks (i.e., utilities) to be weak 
(but present) initially.  From this perspective, there is always some intention for task completion, but 
the task is not seriously considered in the face of more immediately-reinforcing alternatives (i.e., 
until the deadline draws near).  The most salient difference between the two models is that the TMT 
does not allow for the consideration of prepotent responding.  The relevance of this omission 
becomes apparent as the potential moderators of the intention-behaviour relation in procrastination 
are reviewed below.   
Potential Moderators of the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
As mentioned previously, TST provides two classes of variables that suggest potential 
moderators for the intention-behaviour failures often seen when an individual procrastinates.  The 
first class involves behavioural prepotency, which reflects, “frequency or past performance and/or 
the presence of cues to action in the environment” (Hall & Fong, 2007; p. 14).  This class of 
behaviours consist of prepotent responses (or ‘default’ scripts) that are typically carried out in 
situations where the response is common.  These kinds of behaviours are likely to be performed 
unless inhibited by higher-order executive functions (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986).   Moreover, 
prepotent responding is also believed to be done with a relative lack of awareness of the behaviour.  
One operationalization of behavioural prepotency is habitual behaviour.  Thus, one general goal of 
the present work is to examine whether some avoidance behaviour is habit-like in nature.  According 




of those variables related to self-regulatory capacity.  Therefore, a second general goal of the present 
work is to examine whether executive-functioning abilities of an individual moderates the intention-
behaviour relation.  Specifically, here executive abilities are operationalized as the ability to inhibit 
prepotent responses.  Both potential moderators (i.e., level of habitual avoidance and executive-
functioning ability) and their potential relation to procrastination behaviour are further outlined 
below. 
Habitual Avoidance Moderating the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
 In general, habits can be defined as, “learned sequences of acts that have become automatic 
responses to specific cues, and are functional in obtaining certain goals or end states.” (Verplanken & 
Aarts, 1999; p. 104).   Inherent in this definition is that habit-like behaviours are, at least initially, 
goal-directed in that they serve us in some way (e.g., give us immediate pleasure).  Habits tend to 
develop in stable situations, or similar contexts, such that the behaviour itself becomes associated 
with features of the environment in which it is performed (Neal, et al., 2006).  The result of this kind 
of paired-association is that features of the environment may directly cue behaviour in a way that is 
relatively automatic in nature (Neal, et al., 2006).  In other words, although habits are often originally 
initiated by intentions to act, over time habit-like behaviours become less reliant on intentions and 
instead are directly triggered by environmental cues. Some evidence for the non-intentional nature of 
habits stems from diary studies of daily experience.  For example, Wood, Quinn and Kashy (2002) 
had participants report on their hourly activities and rate several aspects of their experience including 
how often they had performed the current activity in the past and whether the context was similar to 
past contexts.  The researchers also rated the level of correspondence between what the person was 
thinking at the time of task performance and what they were doing.  Habits were defined as 
behaviours that tended to be repeated in stable contexts.  The results of two studies indicated that 




less likely to think about what they were doing when performing habits.  According to Wood et al. 
(2002), these data suggest that habitual behaviour need not rely on conscious intention either 1) 
because intentions are not required for these kinds of behaviours, or 2) because the behaviour was 
not intentional in the first place.  A meta-analysis conducted by Ouelette and Wood (1998) is 
consistent with the premise that habits are initiated relatively automatically by environmental cues. In 
their review of how past behaviour predicts future behaviour, Ouelette and Wood (1998) outlined 
how past behaviour is a better predictor of performance than intentions when the behaviour is 
performed frequently in similar contexts (i.e., is habit-like).  However, intentions empirically 
outperform previous behaviour in predicting future behaviour when the behaviour is performed less 
frequently in relatively unstable contexts.  In summary, whereas non-habitual behaviours appear to 
be guided heavily by intentions, habitual behaviours do not follow directly from one’s intentions to 
act.  Further, the notion that habits are triggered relatively automatically by environmental cues 
makes the habitual avoidance behaviour a candidate variable for moderating the intention-behaviour 
relation.  
 There is evidence from the literature on habits that is consistent with the idea that avoidance 
patterns that are habit-like may limit the effectiveness of one’s good intentions (e.g., to complete 
aversive tasks).  For example, Ji Song and Wood (2007) reported on how the strength of habits can 
moderate the relation between explicit intentions and actual behaviour.  These investigators predicted 
different behaviours (e.g., purchasing fast food; watching TV news; taking the bus) using a 
longitudinal design requiring participants to state their intentions ahead of time.  Both intention to 
perform and level of habit were measured for each behaviour.  The results confirmed that the level of 
habit moderated the intention-behaviour relation.  When habits were weak-to-moderate in strength, 
the participants in these studies acted on their previously stated intentions (e.g., those intending to eat 




habits were present, explicit intentions to act in a particular way had no effect on behaviour.  Those 
with strong habits continued to perform the previous behaviour irrespective of their stated intentions 
(e.g., level of fast-food consumption remained stable despite intentions to the contrary).  Stated 
differently, intentions guided actions only in the absence of strong habits.   
 The premise that habits are triggered automatically by environmental cues is supported by 
research examining context change.  By examining college students’ behaviours both before and 
after a transfer of universities, Wood, Tam and Guerrero Witt (2005) could determine how a change 
of one’s environment affected the performance of habits.  In a first session, participants reported on a 
number of behaviours at their old university, including how much they exercised, read the 
newspaper, and watched television.  In addition, whether the behaviour at the old university was 
habitual (i.e., performed frequently in a stable context) was assessed.  Participants also rated their 
intentions to engage in each behaviour at the new university. Four-weeks into their time at the new 
university, students were asked to rate how similar the performance contexts (e.g., location) were 
between universities.  These ratings were completed for each behaviour.  Wood and colleagues 
hypothesized that if habits are triggered by environmental cues, habitual behaviours performed at the 
old university would continue (regardless of intentions) if the contexts remained similar across the 
transfer.  Conversely, if a change in context is perceived by the student, then behaviour should more 
closely follow one’s intentions since the behaviour should no longer be triggered by (the old) 
environmental cues.  The results were consistent with the idea that context change can disrupt strong 
habits, bringing them back under the control of one’s intentions.  When the context of performance 
was perceived as stable across the transfer, habitual behaviour was carried out regardless of the 
students’ intentions.   However, when students perceived a change in performance context, 
previously strong habits were successfully predicted by students’ intentions.  These data have led 




involve not only changing attitudes and intentions, but should be applied during times when 
individuals are experiencing naturally occurring changes (e.g., moving homes) so that changes in 
intention can more readily effect behaviour change.   
 With respect to procrastination, it seems reasonable to speculate that at least some avoidance 
behaviour is habit-like in nature.  As reviewed above, estimates of procrastination indicate that from 
one-third to one-half of a student’s day is spent avoiding tasks (e.g., Hill et al., 1976; Pychyl et al., 
2000).  Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that almost half of all of a student’s daily activities 
are habit-like in nature (Wood, et al., 2002).  Taken together, these two observations point to the 
possibility that some patterns of avoidance – especially those repeated frequently in a stable context 
– have the potential to take on the qualities of a behavioural habit.  Given this possibility, the level of 
habit associated with a specific avoidance behaviour may moderate the effect of one’s previous 
intentions in carrying out an unpleasant task.    
Inhibitory Control Moderating the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
Self-regulation is an important part of everyday life. We are bombarded with situations that 
require us to resist impulses that satisfy some of our more immediate desires.  Our daily lives provide 
numerous examples of how we are forced to choose between short-term vices and longer-term 
payouts.  Feelings of exhaustion may sway us toward staying in bed on a workday morning.  The 
aroma of baked goods may tempt us to partake in unhealthy food choices.  Similarly, the allure of a 
television drama may dissuade us from tasks we have the best intentions of completing.  Yet, in spite 
of these temptations, we are simultaneously (although sometimes begrudgingly) motivated to keep 
our jobs, watch our waistline and complete important tasks in a timely manner.  For these 
overarching goals to take precedence over our immediate gratifications requires that we regulate our 
own behaviour.  Self-regulation, then, refers to the ability for “altering one’s own responses, 




and to support the pursuit of long-term goals” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; p. 351).  This is 
consistent with the definition of self-regulatory capacity offered by Hall & Fong (2007) which 
emphasizes one’s capacity to engage in the effortful process of regulating behaviour.  It is important 
to note here that some investigators consider the terms “self-regulation” and “self-control” to be 
synonymous with each other.  However, as pointed out by Baumeister et al. (2007), self-regulation is 
a construct that may also subsume processes that do not imply conscious self-control per se (e.g., 
homeostatic processes like maintaining body temperature).  Therefore, here the term self-regulation 
is specifically used to denote the effortful component of regulating one’s own behaviour.  The ability 
to self-regulate has obvious implications for completing important, but unpleasant tasks.  To behave 
according to one’s longer-term goals or intentions, a degree of self-control is required in order to 
overcome the immediate contingencies of performing boring or aversive tasks.  It is for this reason 
that some investigators (e.g., Steel, 2007) believe that procrastinating represents a fundamental 
failure to regulate the self.  Stated differently, individuals who chronically avoid or delay unpleasant 
tasks may possess low self-regulatory abilities.  Further, some researchers (e.g., Ferrari et al., 1995) 
have speculated that subtle neurological differences may exist between procrastinators and non-
procrastinators and may be responsible for the procrastinator’s relative inability to follow through 
with important tasks. 
Executive functioning is a term often used interchangeably with concepts like cognitive 
control or supervisory attention in describing the collection of brain processes responsible for 
guiding our thoughts and behaviour (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986).  Executive functioning is 
especially important when ‘top-down’ control of behaviour is required in novel or difficult situations 
wherein responses are not well-learned or where planning, decision-making, or troubleshooting are 
involved.  Perhaps most relevant to the current discussion of procrastination, is the observation that 




to require executive functions in order for behaviour to reflect internally generated plans or goals 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986).  Namely, although a college student may have formed the good intention 
to work on a term paper after dinner, the act of carrying out that task may involve a number of 
aversive contingencies that are unpleasant in the short-term (e.g., writing about a boring, prescribed 
topic).  Here strong executive functioning is required to actually sit down and begin writing – 
especially if more immediately gratifying activities are also present (e.g., an opportunity to socialize 
with roommates).  Taken together, stronger executive functioning abilities should allow a person to 
better overcome immediate contingencies in the service of longer-term goals or intentions.  
Conversely, weaker executive functioning abilities should be associated with the avoidance of tasks 
common in chronic procrastinators.  
As pointed out by Hall and Fong (2007) in their development of the TST, executive functions 
are generally believed to be housed in the frontal lobes of the human brain.  With respect to self-
regulation, two structures appear to play central roles.  First, there is evidence that the prefrontal 
cortex is associated with following through with previous intentions.  Functionally speaking, the 
prefrontal cortex is involved in planning, working memory processes, goal formation, and the 
selection of appropriate behavioural responses (e.g., Gazzaniga, 1995; Nolte, 1999).  Patients 
suffering trauma to this region demonstrate symptoms of planning difficulty, a paucity of goal-
directed behaviour, and can easily be primed by environmental cues to perform certain actions 
(L’hermitte, 1983; L’hermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989).  
The second structure strongly implicated in self-regulation is the anterior cingulate (ACC), whose 
functional nature includes the regulation of both cognitive and emotional processes (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000).  In his review of the ACC’s role in behavioural control, Paus (2001) points out that 
the ACC not only has connections with prefrontal areas (suggesting a role in higher-order cognitive 




ACC is also connected to structures associated with the arousal state of the organism.  Evidence from 
imaging studies also suggests that ACC activity often co-occurs with prefrontal activation, and that 
the ACC becomes activated when novel actions compete against well-learned responses.  From both 
the anatomical and functional evidence, Paus (2001) concluded that the ACC is a structure that may 
be partially responsible for propelling intentions into actions.  In summary, the prefrontal cortex and 
the ACC are both candidates for regions in which procrastinators may show relative deficits 
compared to non-procrastinators.   
  Despite what is known about the neurological correlates of executive functioning, there have 
been questions about whether or not these varied functions represent the same underlying ability.  
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, and Howerter (2000) made an empirical attempt to answer this 
question by examining individual differences collected from a ‘neurologically-intact’ student sample.  
Using a multi-method approach, these researchers modeled the individual differences associated with 
three frequently cited executive functions – the shifting of mental sets, monitoring and updating 
working memory, and the inhibition of prepotent responses.  This was accomplished using structural-
equation modeling, measuring each of the purported functions using multiple indicators of 
performance for each potential function.  The resulting factor analyses confirmed the presence of 
three correlated, but distinct, latent variables representing each of the proposed functions.  Namely, a 
three-factor model (i.e., representing three separate executive functions) fit the data significantly 
better than a single-factor model which assumed the unity of the three executive functions.  One 
conclusion drawn from this work was that executive abilities are not unitary.  The three distinct 
factors were significantly correlated to some extent (i.e., latent relations among the executive 
functions ranged from .42 to .63).  The fact that these functions are distinct is important for the 
present discussion.  From reviewing the literature on procrastination, the executive function of 




(2001) define inhibition as, “one’s ability to deliberately inhibit dominant, automatic, or prepotent 
responses when necessary” (p. 57).  It is not hard to imagine our own natural proclivity for avoiding 
aversive tasks in favour of doing something that is more immediately gratifying.  To the extent that 
task-alternatives are dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses it is reasonable to believe that the 
ability to inhibit such responses is related to the procrastination of unpleasant tasks.  In order to carry 
out tasks that are aversive or unpleasant we require the ability to inhibit the performance of tasks that 
are more immediately reinforcing, but do not accord with our longer-term goals.  Following this line 
of reasoning, chronic procrastinators should demonstrate relatively lower self-regulatory abilities.  
Compared to non-procrastinators, chronic procrastinators should evince relative deficits in the 
executive ability of inhibiting dominant response options.  This relation between procrastination and 
inhibition should be evident at the trait level of analysis.  Namely, trait-procrastinators should 
demonstrate these relative deficits in inhibitory control.  Further, lowered executive abilities should 
also moderate the intention-behaviour relation at the level of action.  Individuals with stronger 
executive functioning abilities should follow through with their intentions to act more than 
individuals whose executive functioning is relatively weak.   
 The proposed effect of executive abilities on procrastination behaviour is consistent with 
research investigating health-related behaviours.  Across two studies, Hall, Fong, Epp and Elias 
(2007) investigated whether the relation between intentions to engage in health activities and actual 
behaviour was moderated by one’s executive functioning ability.  In both studies, participants 
attended two laboratory sessions.  In the first session participants reported on their health behaviours 
in one of two domains in the past week (i.e., number of hours of vigorous exercise or the amount of 
fruits/vegetables consumed).  They also rated their behavioural intentions in the same domain for the 
upcoming week.   A computerized Go/NoGo task was also administered which assessed the 




participants in both studies reported on their actual behaviour in either the domain of exercise or 
healthy eating.  The results were consistent across both study samples and for both health-related 
behaviours.  Significant two-way interactions between Go/NoGo performance and behavioural 
intentions suggested that individual differences in executive functioning strongly moderated the 
relation between intentions and reported behaviour. Individuals with stronger executive functioning 
abilities were more likely to follow through with their intentions to exercise and eat healthily over the 
course of a week.  In contrast, individuals with weaker executive functioning abilities followed 
through with their intentions to exercise, and to eat healthily, much less often than stated in intentions 
one week prior.  This is consistent with a self-regulatory framework: those higher in executive 
functioning persisted and behaved according to their goals despite the short-term costs of 
inconvenience and discomfort normally associated with actual exercise and healthy eating.  Since 
tasks are often avoided (i.e., procrastinated on) for similar reasons, it follows that procrastination 
may be related to the same type of executive functioning abilities. 
To date, only one investigation has directly examined the relation between procrastination 
and executive functioning.  Doctoral research conducted by Stone (1999) provided the first 
investigation of executive abilities in the context of procrastination.  In this study, chronic 
procrastinators on academic probation were compared to non-procrastinators on neurologically-based 
measures which included those purported to assess executive-functioning abilities.  The main tool 
used for assessing executive functioning was the Tinker Toy Test (TTT; Lezak, 1983), which 
required participants to assemble objects of their choice using up to fifty plastic construction pieces.  
The participant’s final creation is then assessed based on a scoring system that takes both number of 
pieces used and the complexity of the object into account. This task was chosen over other executive-
functioning tasks (e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; WCST, Berg, 1948) because the TTT is less 




executive abilities that are required for one to do well in unstructured environments (e.g., use of 
planning abilities), and his assumption that procrastinators do poorly under these circumstances 
because of relative deficit in these areas of functioning.  Unfortunately, however, the data from this 
investigation provided no evidence that this type of executive functioning was related to trait-level 
procrastination.  Yet Steel (2007) encouragingly noted that executive functions that are related to 
impulsive behaviour still hold promise in relation to one’s tendency to put off or delay tasks.     
 Provided that impulsivity is theoretically associated with lowered inhibition, it follows that 
individuals lower in this executive function may tend to procrastinate more than those who are better 
able to inhibit dominant or prepotent responses.  Unlike the TTT, which was designed as a global 
measure of executive functioning, the inhibition tasks identified by Miyake et al. (2000) add 
specificity with respect to measuring an executive ability that should be directly related to 
procrastination per se.  Moreover, there is evidence that other tasks measuring inhibition (e.g., the 
Go/NoGo task) are predictive of whether or not individuals follow through with their intentions with 
respect to carrying out health-related behaviours that are not immediately rewarding (e.g., Hall et al., 
2007).  Therefore, there is good reason to believe that chronic procrastinators will demonstrate 
relative deficits in the executive ability of inhibition.  Overall, this executive function is clearly a 
good candidate to investigate with respect to the impulsive, distractible type of self-regulatory failure 
often ascribed to procrastinators who give up on aversive tasks in favour of more immediately 
rewarding alternative activities.  
Summary and Research Questions 
 The literature review provided information from a number of domains ranging from 
procrastination to theories regarding factors that moderate the relation between intentions and actual 




1. Avoiding important tasks or procrastinating is a pervasive problem that has both concrete and 
psychological consequences.   
2. Task delay is associated with properties of both the task and the person.  Boring, unpleasant, 
or otherwise aversive tasks are often avoided.  When it comes to people, trait procrastination 
is most strongly associated with low self-efficacy, high impulsivity and low 
conscientiousness (especially with respect to low self-discipline).  
3. Temporal Self-Regulation Theory (TST) is a good framework for modeling dilatory 
behaviour since procrastination has been conceptualized as a failure to carry out previous 
intentions (i.e., self-regulatory failure).  Moreover, TST suggests classes of variables that 
moderate the intention-behaviour gap often associated with procrastination (i.e., prepotent 
responding and self-regulatory capacity).  
4. Since much of our daily behaviour consists of habits, one possibility is that some avoidance 
behaviour may be habitual.  The level of habitual avoidance associated with a particular 
behaviour may represent one form of prepotent responding that moderates whether one’s 
intentions are carried out in task completion.  
5. From the perspective of procrastination understood as self-regulatory failure, chronic 
procrastinators should demonstrate relative deficits in executive-functioning abilities.  
Procrastinators may, more precisely, have reduced abilities with respect to inhibiting 
dominant or prepotent responses.   
Failures to self-regulate were examined in the context of performing important but unpleasant 
tasks.  The following questions were examined in two studies: 
1. Considering that many of our everyday behaviours become automatic responses cued by our 




2. If avoidance can be habit-like, what is the nature of that habit?  Does habitual avoidance 
simply entail the evasion of behaviour (i.e., habitually avoiding course readings regardless of 
what the alternative behaviours are performed)?  Or is habitual avoidance strongly linked to 
particular behaviours associated with more pleasant activities (e.g., one ‘avoids’ a task by 
always partaking in television watching)?  The nature of avoidance is investigated in Study 1. 
3. Does the level of habitual avoidance associated with a given task moderate the relation 
between one’s intention to perform the task and future behaviour?     
4. At the level of the person, are relative deficits in the executive ability of inhibition more 
prevalent in chronic procrastinators? 
5. At the level of behaviour, does the executive function of inhibition moderate the relation 





The purpose of this study was to better understand the experience of avoiding important 
tasks. One specific goal was to determine whether frequent avoidance patterns can be so entrenched 
that they take on the qualities of a habit.   Important first steps toward this aim included investigating 
the potential habit-like quality of avoidance, to demonstrate that habitual avoidance can be measured 
systematically, to explore how habitual avoidance relates to intentions and other variables like 
attitudes which inform intentions, and to investigate the environmental features that may trigger the 
habitual-avoidance patterns themselves.  Identifying habitual avoidance patterns is of central 
importance because previous research suggests that changes in intentions do not directly correspond 
with changes in habitual behaviour. 
The Case for Avoidance as a Habit 
 Avoidance is not simply the absence of behaviour.  Here it can be thought of as the act of 
“refraining from, or escaping from, an action, person or thing” (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004; p. 293).  
Since avoidance behaviour typically removes a person from an unpleasant circumstance, the avoidant 
response is believed to be strengthened via mechanisms of negative reinforcement.   The behaviour 
functions, at least in the short term, to remove the person from unpleasant experience (e.g., providing 
relief).  Avoidance can be an intentional behaviour which can be repeated, and therefore, has the 
potential of developing into a habit over time (Wood & Neal, 2007).  Preliminary evidence for 
avoidance as a habit is evident in both animal and human research.   
Animal studies have demonstrated that rats can learn to escape specific parts of an apparatus 
(e.g., a Shuttle Box) to evade electric shocks (see Bouton, 2007 for a review).  Over time, avoidance 
behaviour can develop wherein no aversive stimulus need be delivered for the behaviour to persist 
once relevant cues become associated with electric shock.  During a learning phase, impending 




state (i.e., fear) elicited by the aversive stimulus (e.g., a shock).  Once this association is learned, the 
animal successfully avoids the shock as a result of increased fear which is produced upon 
presentation of the warning signal alone. 
With respect to habit-like avoidance, after extensive training warning signals no longer 
produce the same level of fear response.  This finding provides evidence that a relevant-motivational 
state (i.e., fear) is no longer necessary to maintain the behaviour once it has become a habit (Bouton, 
2007).  The idea that behaviour like this can become a habit is consistent with reinforcer devaluation 
studies wherein animals learn to perform a response for food (e.g., pressing a lever).  Rats eat less 
after the reinforcer is subsequently diminished (e.g., by associating the food with illness), suggesting 
that their behaviour is sensitive to goals or outcomes.  This is not the case when the behaviour is 
habit-like.  If the response is practiced extensively, then devaluation effects are minimal, indicating 
that over-learned habits are not goal-oriented but are automatic responses to situational cues (e.g., 
Balleine & Dickenson, 1998).        
 There is also evidence from human data that provides precedent for the idea that avoidance of 
a response can become habit-like.  Baldwin, Rothman, Hertel, Linde and Jeffery (2006) examined the 
quitting behaviour of a large number of smokers following an eight-week cessation program.  The 
primary focus of the study was on cognitive variables that were supported by the data: self-efficacy 
predicted successful quitting attempts for those early in the quitting process (i.e., initiators), whereas 
satisfaction with the outcomes of no longer smoking predicted whether participants who were not 
currently smoking (i.e., maintainers) stayed quit.  Most interesting was that neither cognitive variable 
predicted which maintainers remained quit after nine months of not smoking.  The only factor that 
continued to predict quit status was the number of continuous months that participants had avoided 




period of time their avoidance behaviour is no longer maintained by cognitive variables because it 
has taken on habit-like qualities which need not rely on motivational or cognitive influences. 
Identifying Avoidance as Habit 
 Verplanken and Orbell (2003) note that habits not only have a history of repetition, but their 
performance takes on qualities of automaticity (i.e., they require little awareness for performance, are 
difficult to control, and are performed with efficiency).  Therefore, habitually avoiding an unpleasant 
task should be experienced as a relatively automatic phenomenon as compared to the experience of 
avoiding unpleasant tasks which are not habitually avoided.  Verplanken and Orbell (2003) also 
suggest that some habits may become assimilated as features of one’s identity.  Thus, if some 
avoidance patterns are habitual in nature, those more frequently avoided should be more likely to 
become part of one’s personal identity. 
The Present Study 
 Whereas previous work has assessed the habit level of specific behaviours (e.g., television 
watching) the level of habit for the act of avoidance itself is under consideration in the present study.  
Two possible forms of avoidance patterns are examined.   
First, it is possible that habitual avoidance patterns are distinct and separate from common 
alternative behaviours, are triggered independent of cues prompting alternative activities, and may be 
replaced by any number of functionally-equivalent alternative behaviours.  One may avoid doing 
homework in a habit-like manner.  Yet, the alternative replacement behaviours may vary despite the 
automatic nature of the avoidance.  For example, for students who often play video games instead of 
doing homework, taking away the gaming console will not affect the habitual avoidance of 
homework because the avoidance may be triggered by an independent cue (e.g., a notebook) and may 
be replaced by any available alternative behaviour (e.g., surfing the internet).  Here we would expect 




alternative activity (video gaming).  We would also expect the avoidance pattern and replacement 
behaviours to share few environmental triggers.  
The second possibility is that the avoided task simply becomes associated with a replacement 
activity performed in the context of avoidance.  In this sense, it would not only be the avoidance 
itself that is habitual, rather there would also be a particular habitual behaviour that becomes cued 
concurrently. If one typically plays video games while avoiding homework, it may be video game 
playing that is habitual in addition to homework avoidance being habit-like.  In this case, taking 
away the gaming console should reduce habitual avoidance of homework because the avoidance was 
triggered by the same cue that prompted the habitual alternative behaviour (i.e., the console itself).  If 
habitual avoidance is intrinsically linked to a habitual alternative behaviour, we would expect that 
habitual-avoidance levels to be positively related to the habit levels of a common alternative activity.  




 Forty-eight university undergraduates (31 females) participated for course credit or pay (at a 
rate of $5/hour).  The sample consisted primarily of students whose first language was English (n = 
42).  Most students reported their ethnicity as either Caucasian (n = 25) or Asian (n = 11).  The 
academic majors of the participants included arts (n = 28), science (n = 11), math and/or computer 
science (n = 6) and engineering (n = 3).  Most students in the sample were enrolled in a full-course 
load at the time of the study (mean number of courses = 4.2; SD = 1.5). 
Procedure 
 Participants came into the laboratory to complete a number of questionnaires and responded 




A). They were told that the focus of this study was on tasks that they think are important – yet 
sometimes avoid because task performance is either unpleasant and/or unrewarding.  Participants 
listed several examples of tasks they were presently avoiding.  Then two avoided tasks were chosen 
as the focus of the remainder of the study (see Figure 4).   
The first task was selected because it was avoided frequently whereas the second task was 
chosen because it was avoided much less often.  This was done to exploit the known relation between 
frequency and habitual tendencies by maximizing the differences in avoidance frequency between 
the two patterns.  A package of questionnaires associated with the task avoided most frequently (i.e., 
task “A”) was then completed.  This package also queried about what activity is normally engaged in 
instead of that task (i.e., activity “B”).  This entire process was then repeated for the task avoided 
much less frequently (i.e., task “C”) and its corresponding alternative behaviour (i.e., activity “D”).  
To gauge how often habitual avoidance may be tied to particular alternative behaviours, for both 
avoided tasks the experimenter asked about the percentage of time that the listed alternative 
behaviour was the activity performed.  The entire procedure took approximately 120 minutes.   
 
Figure 4. An example of Two Avoided Tasks and their Respective Alternative Activities. 
 
Measures 
Adult Inventory of Procrastination (AIP; McCown & Johnson, 1989).   The AIP purportedly 
measures procrastination tendencies that are motivated by the avoidance of task aversiveness and 




the AIP is a measure of avoidant procrastination.  The scale contains 15 items that asks participants 
to rate their level of agreement using a 5-point Likert scale (from Disagree to Agree).  Sample items 
include, “I am not very good at meeting deadlines” and “Putting things off till the last minute has 
cost me money this year.”  This unidimensional scale also has an acceptable level of internal 
consistency (e.g., alpha = .79; McCown & Johnson, 1989). 
Cognitive-Behavioural Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004).  The CBAS is 
a 31 item self-report scale that assesses both cognitive and behavioural avoidance in both social and 
non-social aspects of one’s life. The CBAS has four scales representing avoidance in Behavioural 
Nonsocial (e.g., “Rather than getting out and doing things, I just sit at home and watch TV”), 
Behavioural Social (e.g., “I avoid attending social activities”), Cognitive Nonsocial (e.g., “I avoid 
making decisions about my future”), and Cognitive Social (e.g., “I just wait out tension in my 
relationships hoping that it will go away”) domains.  Each of these factors are reliable (alpha’s from 
.75 to .86), and are moderately correlated with each other (r’s between .39 and .57; Ottenbreit & 
Dobson, 2004).   Of particular interest were the two scales of nonsocial avoidance.  Items on the 
CBAS are rated using a 5-point Likert scale with higher scores indicating increased avoidance.   
 The following measures were included in packages presented to participants for each avoided 
task and associated alternative activity.  Packages contained all the content outlined below.  For ease 
of exposition, the measures are grouped below according to content (e.g., attitude measures for each 
avoided task are reported together).  Unless otherwise specified, measures consisted of single items 
presented in likert-format with responses ranging from one to seven.  Appendix A contains the full 
set of measures in the item order presented to participants.     
Attitudes.  It follows that strong negative attitudes about a task (or positive attitudes towards 
avoiding that task) may lead to repetitive avoidance behaviour (e.g., Ajzen & Madden, 1986) that 




alternative activity normally carried out instead. Participants’ attitudes were measured using bipolar 
adjective pairs (i.e., pleasant/unpleasant; good/bad; positive/negative; rewarding/unrewarding; 
boring/fun; pleasurable/painful) both toward the experience of performing the activity (i.e., short-
term attitude) and toward the fact that one engaged in the activity (i.e., long-term attitude about 
having performed or avoided each task).   
 Intentions and Related Constructs.  Participants rated their intentions when avoiding each 
task in addition to variables involved in the formation of intentions (see Ajzen & Madden, 1986).  
Specifically, they were asked whether people in their lives believe they should engage in (and not 
avoid) a particular activity (social pressures) and about beliefs regarding their ability to do the task 
(self-efficacy).  Outcome measures about task quality and task completion were also assessed.      
 Avoidance and Alternative Activity Habit Indices.  The Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI; 
Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) was used to assess the level of habit associated with each specific 
alternative activity (i.e., tasks “B” and “D”).  In addition to past frequency, this 12-item scale 
measures whether the behaviour is experienced as occurring relatively automatically (i.e., with lack 
of awareness, difficulty to control, and with mental efficiency) as well as whether the behaviour has 
become part of one’s self-identity.  Across numerous studies the internal reliability of the measure is 
high (alphas mostly above .90; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) and has discriminant and predictive 
validity across a number of domains (e.g., eating habits; Brug, de Vet, de Nooijer, & Verplanken, 
2006).  Modifications were made to the SRHI to test whether the tendency to avoid can be habitual.  
Whereas the items of the SRHI are normally used to assess the habit-level of a specific behaviour 
(e.g., “Watching television is something…I do without thinking”), item modifications were required 
to assess the tendency to avoid a particular behaviour (e.g., “Doing homework is something… I 
avoid without needing to think about it”).  Hereafter this scale is referred to as the Avoidance Habit 




Environmental Features.  Participants were asked to list features of their immediate 
environment typically present when they avoid or perform the alternative activity.  They also rated 
how often these features are present and how much these affect behaviour.  One open-ended question 
asked participants to describe how these features affected their actions.  Whether the avoidance (or 
behaviour) often occurs in the same physical location, at the same time of day or in the presence of 
other people was also assessed.  Participants also rated whether they typically feel the same way, and 
were asked an open-ended question about how they have felt when they avoid (or perform) the 
activity.   
Results 
Task Characteristics 
 Ferrari and Scher (2000) documented how academic tasks are often completed less often than 
non-academic tasks.  The same findings also demonstrated that college students also procrastinate on 
tasks unrelated to school.  The present self-report data is consistent with these observations.   
Three independent raters categorized each avoided task into one of three separate categories: 
academic tasks, household chores, and a miscellaneous category.  Across raters, the mean kappa 
coefficient was .81.  Interviewer ratings were then used to resolve discrepancies.  For the most 
frequently avoided task (i.e., Task A), most often the avoided activity was either academic in nature 
(e.g., studying; N = 27) or involved a household chore (e.g., cleaning; N = 11).  The remaining tasks 
included an assortment of miscellaneous items that were avoided (e.g., completing a tax return; N = 
10).  For the tasks that participants avoided much less frequently (i.e., Task C), the number of 
household chores (N = 11) remained the same.  However, the proportion of academic tasks avoided 
were lower (N = 14) and the number of reported miscellaneous tasks were higher (e.g., paying bills; 




For each avoided task selected, participants were also asked to report the activity they 
normally engaged in instead of the task they were avoiding.  The mean kappa coefficient among the 
raters was .90.  Many of these activities fell into three general categories: solitary entertainment, 
socializing, and other productive tasks.  The alternative behaviour normally associated with the most-
frequently-avoided task (i.e., activity B) most often included solitary entertainment (e.g., watching 
television; N = 25).  To a lesser extent, the most-frequently-avoided task was associated with 
activities related to socializing (e.g., talking with friends; N = 12), other productive tasks (e.g., 
tidying up; N = 8) or miscellaneous activities (e.g., sleeping; N = 3).  The alternative behaviour 
normally associated with the less-avoided task (i.e., activity D) included similar frequencies of 
activities related to solitary entertainment (e.g., playing video games; N = 27), socializing (e.g., go 
out with friends; N = 7), other productive tasks (e.g., homework; N = 12), and other miscellaneous 
activities (e.g., go to the donut shop; N = 2).   
Normative and Reliability Data for Habit Scales 
 Internal consistencies for the AHI scales associated with the avoidance of tasks A and C (and 
the alternative activities) are reported in Table 1.  These reliability coefficients were reasonably high.       
 
 
Table 1     
     




Total Score  
Mean 
SD 
Avoidance (AHI)  Task A .88  (n = 48) 59.8 13.1 
  Task C .94  (n = 48) 42.0 17.6 
Alternative Activity  Activity B .89  (n = 48) 66.6 14.0  
 Activity D .95  (n = 48) 64.9 16.0  
     





Construct Validity of Habitual Avoidance 
 Frequent avoidance of an unpleasant task should be experienced in a similar way as other 
habits might (i.e., with a high degree of automaticity and a high degree of relevance for self-
definition).  The central test of validity compared the habitual avoidance level of the most-
frequently-avoided task to that of the less-frequently-avoided task.  Total habit scores were 
calculated for each avoided task by summing the items of each habit scale.  Three items from these 
indices directly assessed frequency and were removed for this analysis.  The critical related-samples 
t-test confirmed that the avoidance associated with the more-frequently-avoided task is experienced 
as more habit-like than the avoidance associated with the task avoided less often, t(47) = 4.7, p < .01; 
partial eta squared = .32.   
The second method for testing construct validity treated each task as an independent event 
(96 avoided tasks in total) and used AHI scores to predict other constructs.  A series of multi-level 
analyses were conducted to determine whether task observations were independent for each criterion 
variable.  This was necessary because tasks were nested within participants.  Intraclass-correlation 
coefficients (ICC’s) were calculated which represent the proportion of shared variance in the 
criterion scores that is attributable to the grouping variable – in this case participant.  For relations 
wherein the ICC was negligible (≤ .01), simple zero-order Person correlations were used.  However, 
relations with substantial ICC’s (≥ .09) were examined by allowing mean participant scores to vary 
randomly in a series of multi-level analyses.  Standardized fixed effect (SFE) relations between AHI 
scores and these variables were then used to interpret the strength of these relations (see Bickel, 
2007).  In essence, SFE’s represent average relations among variables that are observed within each 




Frequency of Avoidance.  Provided the known relation between behavioural frequency and 
felt automaticity (e.g., Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), the experience of avoiding tasks habitually 
should be positively associated with the frequency of task avoidance.  The three frequency items on 
the AHI measures (standardized alpha = .75) were summed to create a total frequency of avoidance 
score for each pattern.  The zero-order correlation demonstrated a substantial relation between 
frequency of past avoidance and habit level (r = .87; p < .01).    
 Attitudes.   Separate total scores were created for participants’ short-term attitudes towards 
the task avoided and about the avoidance itself.  Scores for negative items were reversed and all 
items were averaged to create positive attitude scores.  Average scores were also calculated for 
participants’ long-term attitudes. With respect to short-term attitudes towards the avoided task (alpha 
= .75), there was a significant correlation between participants’ short-term attitudes towards each 
avoided task and the level of habitual avoidance experienced for that task (r = -.30; p < .01).  This 
pattern was consistent with long-term attitudes about the task (alpha = .78), suggesting that less 
favourable long-term attitudes were related to more habit-like avoidance (SFE = -.23; p < .05).  
Although there was no evidence that short-term attitudes towards avoiding a particular task predicted 
AHI scores (SFE = .08; p > .05), there was a trend indicating that negative attitudes towards having 
avoided the task were associated with habit-like avoidance patterns (SFE = -.19; p < .10).       
 Social Pressure / Self-efficacy.  Measures of social pressure (rated with items ranging from 1 
to 7) provided no evidence for relations between social pressure to engage (mean = 6.3; SD = 1.2), or 
not avoid (mean = 2.2; SD = 1.8), the task (respective SFE’s of .16 and -.13; p’s > .05). However, it 
is possible that these results reflected statistical ceiling/floor effects which were produced by high 
levels of perceived social pressure.  Similarly, there was no suggestion that self-efficacy beliefs were 
related to habit-like avoidance patterns (SFE = -.05; p > .05), likely due to high endorsement rates 




 Intentions.  A small relation between intentions to avoid and increased habit-like avoidance 
was observed (SFE = .22; p < .05).  Future intentions to avoid were also related positively with 
habitual avoidance (SFE = .25; p < .05).   
 Predictive Validity.  Associations between habitual qualities and task quality/completion were 
examined.  As expected, experience of avoidance as habitual was associated with both reduced task 
quality (SFE = -.23; p < .05) and reduced levels of eventual task completion (r = -.31; p < .01).  To 
explore the association more thoroughly, a hierarchical linear regression analysis was also used to 
predict task completion.   All motivational variables were entered on Step 1 (i.e., attitude towards the 
task and avoidance of the task; self-efficacy; social pressure; intentions); Step 2 included only the 
habitual avoidance score for each task.  The group of motivational variables entered on Step 1 
together predicted significant variability in the level of task completion F(9,95) = 3.0; p < .01.; R2 = 
.24.  Importantly, Step 2 accounted for a significant increment in prediction of task completion over-
and-above the motivational variables that may have led to the original habit formation (Fchange(1,95) = 
4.6; p < .05; ∆R2 = .04).   
Nature of Habitual Avoidance 
 Characterizing habitual avoidance includes describing whether the avoidance simply entails 
the absence of behaviour (i.e., avoiding homework to perform any other task) or whether habit-like 
avoidance more often results in the engagement of a particular alternative activity.  In the present 
data, a positive relation was observed between habitual avoidance and the percentage of time that the 
common alternative was the chosen activity (SFE = .21; p < .05).   
 However, the results provided no evidence of a correlation between habitual avoidance and 
habit-level of the alternative behaviour (r = .00; p > .05).   
 Participants rated the extent to which they think about the consequences of their avoidance 




independently of conscious-thought processes.  However, there was no evidence that participants 
were less mindful of consequences when avoidance was habitual (SFE = .14; p > .05).   
Environmental Triggers 
There was no evidence that general variables such as stability of location (SFE = .04), time of 
day (SFE = .10), or whether others are consistently present (SFE = .08; all p’s > .05) were associated 
with more habitual avoidance patterns.  However, in contrast to previous work examining pre-
specified behaviours (e.g., Wood et al., 2005) an idiosyncratic approach was used here such that 
participants could select any avoided task.  This approach created a heterogeneous set of tasks and 
features that may have triggered the avoidance pattern.   
Reported features typically present during the avoidance could be described as items 
associated with the aversive task (e.g., textbooks related to avoiding homework; n = 38), the 
alternative activity (e.g., video-game console to play; n = 42), or both (n = 2).  Two raters 
categorized each feature as either physical (e.g., textbooks) or non-physical (Kappa = .82).  
Discrepancies were resolved by a third rater.  Non-physical features often included task constraints 
(e.g., avoiding the task due to a lack of time) or task hurdles (e.g., not attending office hours because 
of inconvenience).  One prediction is that physical triggers may represent cues that are a part of a 
stable environmental context in which the avoidance (and common alternative) has occurred 
repeatedly over time.  In contrast, non-physical triggers associated with practical constraints (e.g., 
time constraints) may not be associated with habitual avoidance to the same degree because this type 
of avoidance may not be tied to a particular environmental context.  To test this hypothesis, the level 
of habitual avoidance associated with each type of trigger was compared.  An independent-sample t-
test revealed that avoidance was more habit-like when identified environmental features were 




representing practical constraints on performing the task itself (n = 25; mean = 43.3; SD = 16.9; t[94] 
= 2.6; p < .05).  
Participants also reported how their identified environmental feature(s) typically affect their 
behaviour.  Common examples included how cues to avoid signal (or initiate) avoidance (e.g., a 
stack of books is a reminder of work) and how cues for the alternative activity are enticing in nature 
(e.g., the television affords a good distraction).  Participants were asked how frequently that feature 
is present when they avoid task A (mean = 6.1; SD = .82) and task C (mean = 6.0; SD = 1.2).  Given 
the high rates of endorsement for this item across both tasks, it is unsurprising that there was no 
relation between frequency of the feature and habitual avoidance (SFE = .01; p > .05).  Participants 
were also asked to rate the extent to which they believe the identified feature affects their avoidance 
behaviour.  Here, participants’ beliefs about how the feature affects their behaviour were positively 
associated with habitual avoidance (r = .26; p < .05).   
 Finally, participants were asked whether they typically feel the same way while avoiding.  
Typical responses often included negative emotions including guilt, anxiety and sadness.  
Participants reported having more stable emotions while avoiding tasks when the avoidance was 
experienced as more habitual in nature (SFE = .22; p < .05). 
Trait Analyses.   As described above, the AIP measures avoidant procrastination tendencies – 
i.e., putting off a task because of task aversiveness or negative aspects of performing the task (e.g., 
due to a fear of failure).  The CBAS assesses both cognitive and behavioural avoidance in both social 
and non-social aspects of one’s life.  Although the former has been shown to predict the delay of 
tasks, the latter has demonstrated relationships with more deleterious outcomes including symptom 
measures of depression and anxiety (e.g., Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004).  Therefore, the relationship 
between these two trait measures was examined here.  The results of a correlational analysis revealed 





 The main goal of this study was to determine whether frequent avoidance patterns can display 
habitual qualities.  The expectation was that the act of avoiding a frequently-avoided task should be 
experienced as an automatic phenomenon as compared to unpleasant tasks that are avoided less 
frequently.  The results presented here confirm that frequent avoidance of a particular task can in fact 
result in avoidance patterns that take on the qualities of habit.     
Habitual avoidance was associated in expected ways with motivational variables.  There were 
negative relations found between attitudes toward the avoided task (in both the short- and long-term) 
and the level of habitual avoidance.  There was also evidence that the intention to avoid is directly 
related to habit-like avoidance.  No relations were observed between habitual avoidance and self-
efficacy and/or social pressures – potentially due to ceiling/floor effects.   
The fact that task attitudes and intentions were associated with habitual avoidance may speak 
to the original development of the habit itself.  Like many everyday habits (e.g., strapping your 
seatbelt), the avoidance of an unpleasant task may have initially been informed by motivational 
tendencies and/or were driven by strong intentions.  However, a recent model of how goals and 
habits interface with one another (Wood & Neal, 2007) describes the relative contribution of habits 
and goal-related constructs when both habits and goals dictate the same response.  Once a habit is 
formed the habitual response itself is triggered by environmental cues independent of goals and 
intentions.  When a behaviour becomes habitual, “goals in effect are rendered epiphenomena, as 
action control is outsourced to context cues that reliably co-varied with past performance” (Wood & 
Neal, 2007; p. 853).  Research on habits suggests that future intentions to break habitual avoidance 
patterns may prove difficult for students.  The present data also suggest that habitual avoidance is 
related to lower levels of quality of performance and less eventual task completion – even after 




Participants more often chose the same alternative activity when avoiding habitually.  
However there was no evidence that habit level of avoidance is tied directly to the habit level of the 
alternative activity.  Therefore, it is unlikely that habitual avoidance patterns are functionally 
equivalent to habit-like alternative behaviours.  For example, the habitual avoidance of studying is 
likely not the by-product of a video-gaming habit.  Instead, habitual avoidance appears to work 
independently of the habit-level of alternative activities which makes it unlikely that the cues that 
trigger the activation of the habitual avoidance pattern are the same cues that trigger other habitual 
alternatives.  The construct of habit-like avoidance appears to be separable from habit-patterns of 
common alternative activities.      
Nevertheless, participants did tend to select the same alternative activity more when the 
avoidance was habitual.  Although the magnitude of this relation was small (i.e., .21), responding in 
the same fashion when avoidance is habit-like is consistent with the notion that the AHI measure 
used here is assessing habits which are not mediated by conscious goals.  Whereas goal-dependent 
behaviour may be accomplished via a number of acceptable responses which satisfy the goal (i.e., 
any activity that is not the avoided task), here habit-like avoidance tended to be associated with a 
single alternative activity, suggesting that such instances may involve less conscious deliberation 
about the choice of the alternative activity.   
With respect to environmental features, the data were consistent with the expectation that 
physical features prompting participants to avoid (or engage in the alternative activity) would 
demonstrate a greater association with habitual avoidance than non-physical features representing 
barriers to task completion – possibly because the latter type of avoidance does not consistently co-
vary with physical features in the environment.  In addition, triggers associated with more habit-like 




this evidence is consistent with habit-like avoidance triggered by salient contextual cues in one’s 
environment.   
Another stable cue associated with habit-like avoidance came from within participants’ 
internal milieu.  Habitual avoidance was related to experiencing stable emotional states like anxiety 
and guilt.  From the present data, however, it is unclear whether stable feelings work as a cue to 
behave or are a consequence or product of counter-intentional behaviour.       
 An analysis of secondary interest was conducted that involved trait-procrastination and trait-
avoidance.  Although statistically significant, the observed relation between procrastination and 
pathological avoidance was somewhat smaller than expected.  One possibility for this result is that 
the procrastination items on the AIP focus exclusively on one’s ability to effectively meet deadlines 
in a timely manner whereas the CBAS consists of items in which a deadline is not clearly specified.  
This measurement issue may reflect the current state of the psychological literature wherein the exact 
relation between procrastination and avoidance has not been clearly outlined.  Another possible 
theoretical difference may surround the motivational ambivalence towards competing task 
alternatives.  For example, it is possible that, at the trait level, chronic procrastinators are 
simultaneously motivated to avoid aversive tasks and also wish to engage them (i.e., procrastinators 
may experience high levels of motivational ambivalence).  Alternatively, the strong avoidance-
motivations of the chronic task-avoider may work largely in the absence of any motivations to 
approach aversive tasks (i.e., an experience of low motivational ambivalence).  It is important to note 
here that the avoided tasks used in this study were selected specifically because they were important 
to participants.  Thus, we can be somewhat confident that the processes examined here explore task 
avoidance that does involve some degree of ambivalence. 
To summarize, the demonstration that avoidance patterns can become so entrenched they 




intentions and are instead initiated directly by environmental cues.  Paper piles littering a student’s 
dorm-room may represent more than clutter on the floor – they may also trigger entrenched 
avoidance.  Further, habitual avoidance patterns may weaken the effects of good intentions to stop 
avoiding and may be particularly difficult to modify without a corresponding change in 
environmental context.  Effectively breaking avoidance patterns may involve a number of context 
change-strategies for students including tidying paper piles or choosing to study in places absent of 
avoidance cues. 
The conclusions from Study 1 must be somewhat tempered by its limitations.  The causal 
inference of one variable on another requires that at least three criteria be met including that (1) the 
cause precedes the effect in time (temporal precedence), that (2) the two variables are related 
(covariation) and that there (3) are no plausible alternative explanations for the observed relation 
(nonspuriousness; e.g., Pelham & Blanton, 2003).  Although there is clear evidence of covariation 
between habitual avoidance and the other constructs examined here (e.g., between habitual avoidance 
and reduced task completion), naturally, it is difficult to eliminate all possible alternative 
explanations for the observed relations.  Despite attempts in Study 1 to control for many of these are 
variables statistically (e.g., intentions) there is always a possibility that correlational results are the 
product of unexamined variables.  However, the most salient weakness of Study 1 is its self-reported 
and retrospective nature – which fails to meet the criterion of temporal precedence and makes it 
difficult to establish the directionality of the observed relations (e.g., whether intentions predict 
behaviour and not that behaviour leads to biased and retrospective reporting of intentions).  
Establishing temporal precedence is particularly important for establishing the relation between 
intentions and behaviour given that intention-behaviour gaps are viewed as a quintessential form of 
self-regulatory failure.  Thus, a prospective design was adopted for Study 2 wherein a number of 




week later.  This type of approach has the added benefit of reducing the need for participants to 





In addition to building on the construct validity of habitual avoidance from Study 1, a main 
goal of the second study was to investigate the possible relation between the executive-functioning 
ability of inhibition and trait-level procrastination.  Procrastination is often conceptualized as self-
regulatory failure.  In addition, the fact that procrastination has known relations to constructs like 
impulsivity and low self-discipline makes it likely that the ability to inhibit dominant behaviours 
(e.g., television watching) is one executive function that may be relatively impaired in chronic 
procrastinators.  Compared to non-procrastinators, chronic procrastinators should demonstrate 
impaired executive functioning on a set of computer tasks used to assess the ability to inhibit 
prepotent responses. 
Another general goal of Study 2 was to investigate factors that may impede one’s ability to 
behave in a way that is consistent with the intention to complete arduous tasks.  This was 
investigated at both the level of behaviour and at the level of the person.  Participants were asked 
about their intentions to complete unpleasant, but important tasks.  One week later they reported on 
their actual behaviour.  At the behavioural level, the extent to which behaviours were avoided 
habitually was assessed to determine whether this construct moderated the observed intention-
behaviour relation with respect to specific behaviours.  A larger discrepancy between intentions and 
behaviour for tasks that are typically avoided in a habit-like way was also expected. For tasks 
avoided in an ‘automatic’ and habit-like way, intentions should not predict behaviour well.  By 
comparison, tasks not associated with habit-like avoidance should more closely follow one’s 
previous intentions.  
At the person level, individual differences in the ability to inhibit prepotent responses were 
measured to determine whether one’s executive-functioning abilities moderate the relation between 




should follow through with their intentions to perform tasks (i.e., not avoid) even though tasks are 
often aversive to perform. Individuals with weak executive functioning, however, should not follow 
through with previous intentions to the same extent – precisely because they are unable to inhibit 
prepotent responses that are more immediately reinforcing (e.g., are more pleasurable than the 
intended task) or are more susceptible to cues that trigger other behaviour.   
 Wood and Neal (2007) recently outlined an empirically-based model describing the interface 
between goals and habits and how these systems interact when in conflict with one another.  An 
understanding of this model may help to unpack the joint effects of habit-like avoidance and 
inhibitory abilities.  According to this account, self-control is required to override habitual behaviour 
that is automatically cued and “exerting such control depends on available regulatory capacity to 
inhibit the unwanted habit” (p. 851).  Notably, this is commensurate with TST’s conceptualization 
that individuals with greater self-regulatory capacity should be better equipped to inhibit prepotent 
responses.  Such a framework suggests a clear prediction with respect to how habitual avoidance and 
inhibitory abilities should interact.  Tasks that are not avoided habitually should directly follow one’s 
intentions to act because there is no conflict between current intentions and a previous habitual 
response.  However, when habitual avoidance is present, a conflict arises between the habitual 
response to avoid and one’s good intentions to carry out the unpleasant task.  In such instances, the 
ability to inhibit prepotent responses should be a saving grace – allowing individuals with better 
inhibitory abilities to override prepotent avoidance patterns. 
Methods 
Participant Recruitment and Sample 
 A large group of students enrolled in introductory psychology courses completed a package 
of surveys at the beginning of either the Fall or Winter school term.  A subset of participants from 




fluency was also required for participation.  A stratified-sampling procedure was utilized such that 
scores from each tail of the distribution of AIP scores were oversampled.  Half of the students 
eligible to volunteer in the study had AIP scores of at least one standard deviation either above or 
below the mean of AIP scores.  In a normal distribution, only thirty percent of the distribution would 
be expected to contain scores deviating from the mean to this extent.  The remaining half of students 
eligible to volunteer were randomly selected from the middle segment of the distribution of AIP 
scores.  This procedure ensured that variance in avoidance tendencies would be maximized, while 
still allowing for variables of interest to be continuous in nature for analytic purposes.  
One-hundred and thirty-nine university undergraduates (97 female) participated in the study.  
The mean age of the sample was 19.5 years (SD = 2.4) and most participants were enrolled in Arts 
(N = 85), Science (N = 29), Health Studies (N = 15) or Math or Computer Science (N = 8).  The most 
commonly identified ethnicity was Caucasian (N = 94) followed by Asian (N = 24).  All participants 
reported speaking English for at least twelve years at the time of the study.   
Procedure 
 Session Design.  The study was comprised of two sessions.  Time 1 consisted of a laboratory 
session requiring between 60 to 90 minutes.  Participation at Time 2 occurred on-line one week later.  
Research on public commitment effects shows that people follow through with their intentions more 
if intentions are stated publicly and they are aware that their behaviour will be monitored (e.g., 
Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; e.g., when compared to private intentions left 
unmonitored).  Participants were therefore run individually and the follow-up session was an on-line 
format (as opposed to a laboratory session) to increase anonymity, thereby reducing these effects.  
The on-line session took approximately 30 minutes to complete and could be completed at a location 




participants who completed the surveys at Time 2 had their names entered into a draw for prizes 
including a restaurant gift certificate and a music player.     
Timing.  The timing of participation was restricted.  Study sessions were only scheduled after 
the first month of the academic term had passed and participation had to be completed before the last 
month of the academic term had begun.  The rationale for a later start in the term was to give 
students enough time at the beginning of each term to establish prepotent avoidance patterns towards 
academic tasks.  At the end of a term, students are typically given time off to prepare for exams.  
This period was not investigated because anecdotal evidence suggested that some students leave 
campus during this time.  The researcher running participant sessions was blind to participant AIP 
scores.   
Time 1. In session one, individual participants came into the laboratory and completed three 
computerized tasks assessing the executive ability of inhibition.  The presentation order for the three 
tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  Next, participants completed personality 
questionnaires including measures of conscientiousness, neuroticism, procrastination, chronic-task 
avoidance, self-efficacy, impulsivity, and self-control. Finally, one Future Intended Activity Report 
(FIAR) was completed for each important but unpleasant task they believed they should work on in 
the following seven days.  All materials are outlined in detail below. 
 Time 2.  On the morning of the seventh day following the initial session, an e-mail reminder 
was sent to the participant requesting completion of the on-line component sometime between 6:00 
pm and 11:59 pm.  If participants failed to complete the on-line component that day, identical 
reminder e-mails were sent in the morning of subsequent days until either the surveys were 
completed or five days had passed.    
The on-line component included completing a series of Past Intended Activity Reports 




assessed what percentage of their intended actions they actually accomplished and the number of 
hours they engaged in each task. Participants also completed the Avoidance as Habit Index (AHI) for 
each task which assesses the extent to which the participant typically avoids that task and whether the 
avoidance is experienced as relatively ‘automatic.’ At the end of the on-line session, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
Measures 
 Executive Function.  Three computerized tasks were used to assess the executive function of 
inhibition.   E-Prime experimental software (Psychology Software Tools, 2002) controlled the timing 
and presentation of stimuli and logged responses and response times (RTs). Stimuli were presented 
on a standard 17” SVGA color monitor.  
The first task was the Go/NoGo task used by Hall et al. (2007).  For this task, participants 
were presented with a series of individual letters of either upper case or lower case.  Trials were 
separated by a fixation cross.   Participants were instructed to hit the ‘enter’ key each time a LOWER 
CASE letter was presented. In addition, they were told to refrain from pressing the ‘enter’ key on 
trials when UPPER CASE letters were presented. Participants began by completing a block of 12 
practice trials (with equal number of upper and lower case letters) after which the experimenter 
emphasized the importance of speed and accuracy before commencing with the experimental trails. 
The experimental phase consisted of eight blocks of 60 trials. In half of the blocks lower case letters 
predominated (‘Go’ phase blocks) and in the remaining blocks upper case letters predominated 
(‘NoGo’ phase blocks).  Following Hall et al. (2007), the dependent measure was overall RT to the 
target letter, collapsed across blocks. 
 The second task was the variant of the Stroop (1935) task described by Miyake et al. (2000).  
Participants were asked to name the color of a stimulus aloud as quickly as possible on each trial, 




responses via keyboard while sitting in the room with the participant.  The experimental trials 
commenced after 30 practice trials.  The experiment proper consisted of a single, mixed-block of 
trials wherein stimuli included a string of asterisks printed in one of six colours (i.e., blue, green, 
orange, purple, red, yellow; 60 trials), a colour word printed in a different colour (e.g., RED printed 
in blue colour; 60 trials), or a colour word matching the printed colour (e.g., RED in red; 12 trials).  
The difference in RTs when comparing asterisk trials to incongruent trials was the dependent 
measure.  
 Also following Miyake et al. (2000), the final measure of inhibition was the antisaccade task 
(Hallett, 1978; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994).  Each trial began with a fixation cross at the centre 
of the screen – presented for one of nine randomly selected times (between 1500 and 3500 
milliseconds (ms) in 250 ms intervals).  Next, a visual cue (0.4°) was then presented for 225 ms on 
one side of the display.  Directly following, a target was presented on the opposite side of the display 
for 150 ms, and was masked by a cross-hatched pattern.  This occurred on every trial. The visual cue 
was a simple black square, followed by the target which was an arrow (pointing left, up or right) 
placed in the centre of a square box.  On each trial, participants were required to press the button that 
corresponded to the direction of the target arrow.  Both the cues and targets appeared the same 
distance from the centre of the screen (3.4 inches).  After 22 practice trials, participants completed a 
single block of 90 experimental trials. For this task, the dependent measures were the proportion of 
correct experimental trials and RTs.    Naturally, what makes this task challenging is that the 
participant must inhibit reflexively looking in the direction of the cue in order to correctly orient 
attention toward the arrow presented on the opposite side of the screen.  The antisaccade task is, 




Cognitive-Behavioural Avoidance Scale (CBAS; Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004).  This scale is 
described in detail in Study 1.  This inventory is included with all paper-and-pencil measures used 
for Study 2 in Appendix B. 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999).  Given their known relation to 
procrastination tendencies, the personality dimensions of conscientiousness (including self-rated 
items such as, “Carry out my plans”) and neuroticism (e.g., “Get upset easily”) were each assessed 
using 10-items scales from the IPIP.  According to Goldberg (1999), both of these dimensions have 
demonstrated good internal consistency (alphas of .92) and correlate highly with corresponding 
domains from other Big-5 measures like the NEO inventory (r’s of .79 and .82, respectively).  
Participants rated their level of agreement with each item (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
using a 5-point Likert scale.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of each trait.   
Adult Inventory of Procrastination (AIP; McCown & Johnson, 1989).   Characteristics of the 
AIP are presented in Study 1.   
 General Procrastination Scale (GPS; Lay, 1986).   This 20-item scale requires participants to 
rate their level of agreement with a number of statements using a 5-point Likert format (e.g., “I 
usually buy an essential item at the last minute”).  The procrastination tendencies assessed by the 
GPS are believed to be driven by the individual’s need for sensation or thrill-seeking (Ferrari, 1992; 
1993; however, see also Simpson & Pychyl, 2009).  As such, this is purportedly a measure of arousal 
procrastination.  This measure has demonstrated a high degree of internal consistency over a number 
of studies (i.e., alphas normally above .80; Ferrari, et al., 1995).   
 Aitken Procrastination Inventory (API; Aitken, 1982).  The API is a 19-item measure that 
was developed to identify procrastinators in college samples.  Participants rate whether each 
statement is more or less true about them (e.g., “I am often frantically rushing to meet deadlines”).  




procrastination that is motivated by fear of failure and sensitivity to the aversiveness of tasks (Ferrari 
et al., 1995). 
 New General Self-Efficacy Scale (NGSE; Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001).  The NGSE Scale 
measures participants’ general self-efficacy.  This includes the extent to which they “view 
themselves as capable of meeting task demands in a broad array of contexts” (Chen, et al., 2001; p. 
63). For this 8-item scale, participants rate their level of agreement for each statement (e.g., “I will be 
able to successfully overcome many challenges”) on a scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree).  The NGSE has demonstrated good reliability (alpha’s between .85 and .88), 
successfully predicts achievement performance (e.g., exam scores), and is empirically distinct from 
related constructs like self-esteem (Chen, et al., 2001).    
 Impulsivity Inventory (Dickman, 1990).  According to Dickman (1990; 2000), impulsivity is a 
two-dimensional construct that includes both functional and dysfunctional impulsivity.  Whereas 
dysfunctional impulsivity is understood as a tendency to, “act with less forethought than most people 
of equal ability,” (Dickman, 1990; p. 95), functional impulsivity is the tendency to act with little 
forethought when doing so is optimal for the self.  The former tendency is often associated with 
negative outcomes, whereas, the latter is related to high activity and successful risk-taking behaviour.  
The dysfunctional scale contains 12 items (e.g., “Often, I don’t spend enough time thinking about a 
situation before I act”).  Similarly, the functional scale contains 11 items (e.g., “I am good at taking 
advantage of unexpected opportunities, where you have to do something immediately or lose your 
chance”).  Both the dysfunctional (alpha = .85) and the functional (alpha = .74) have acceptable 
internal consistencies (Dickman, 1990).  Participants rated their level of agreement for each item on a 
Likert scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Higher scores indicate 




 Brief Self-Control Scale (SCS-Brief; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004).  Authors of the 
SCS based the scale on self-regulatory views of behaviour (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981).  From this 
framework, self-control is, “the ability to override or change one’s inner responses, as well as to 
interrupt undesired behavioural tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from acting on them,” 
(Tangney et al., 2004).  The scale assesses four domains of self-control including the control of one’s 
thoughts, emotions, impulses and behaviour.  The alphas associated with the brief version of this 
scale (e.g., .83 - .85) indicate that the SCS is a reliable measure of self-control.  Among other things, 
this measure of self-control is associated with better grades, fewer impulse-control problems (e.g., 
binge eating), and less depression and anxiety (Tangey et al., 2004). 
 Future Intended Activity Report (FIAR; adapted from Ferrari & Scher, 2000). Ferrari and 
Scher (Ferrari & Scher, 2000; Scher & Ferrari, 2000) used the FIAR to examine procrastination as 
the failure to complete intended tasks.  In their original work, participants had to complete one FIAR 
for each task they intended to complete in the following 24 hours.   The importance of the task was 
also rated using a 27-point Likert scale with anchors indicating that the task was “not at all 
important” to “very important.”  Participants circled the percentage of the tasks they intended to 
complete in the next day (from 5% to 100% presented in 5% increments).  A variant of the FIAR was 
created for this study.  The first major change was the use of multiple indices of intended action.  
These included the degree to which the participant ‘intends,’ ‘wants’ and is ‘likely’ to do the task 
(each rated on 11-point likert scales ranging from low- to high-endorsement).  The final measure of 
intention was the number of intended hours to work on each task.  Secondly, instead of a 24 hour 
interval, participants were asked to complete a FIAR for each task they intended to work on in the 
next 7 days.  This time period was extended in order to (1) more closely resemble the work of Hall et 
al. (2007) in their study of health-related behaviours, and to (2) maximize the likelihood that we 




instead of only asking participants to report on tasks they strongly intended to complete, they were 
asked to report on tasks they believed they should work on in the next seven days.  This change was 
made to maximize the variance associated with participants’ original intention levels.  We did not 
want to ask only about intended tasks (as in Ferrari & Scher, 2000) because this would limit the 
range of task intention scores, thereby making it difficult to examine any relations between intention 
and our variables of interest (i.e., habitual avoidance and executive functioning). Tasks instructions 
also clearly stated that scheduled routines participants were in the habit of doing were to be excluded 
in favour of effortful tasks that might seem like a chore to actually perform.  Finally, although the 
original measure included rating each task on a number of dimensions (e.g., whether the task was 
pleasurable), the modified measure omitted these items on the FIAR.  
 Past Intended Activity Report (PIAR; also adapted from Ferrari & Scher, 2000).  Ferrari and 
Scher (2000; Scher & Ferrari, 2000) used the PIAR in conjunction with the FIAR to investigate 
failures of intention.  Participants completed a PIAR for each task previously reported on using a 
FIAR.  The original PIAR included a likert-rating of the time spent working on the task, a rating 
about the amount of time actually spent on the activity.  Here participants also indicated the, 
“percentage of what they intended to accomplish that they actually did accomplish” (Scher & Ferrari, 
2000; p. 258) using a scale that ranged from 0% to “> 100%.”  The modified version of the PIAR 
used here included a number of additional items about the task itself including ratings of how boring, 
difficult, and unpleasant the task was to perform, and how capable the participant felt in completing 
the task.  To get a better sense for why tasks may not have been completed participants were also 








Time 1 Preliminary Analyses 
Computer Task Performance.  Preliminary analyses were completed before calculating 
composite inhibition scores from computer task responses.  First, error rate data for each of the tasks 
were examined.  Participants whose performance was characterized by exceptionally high error rates 
had their computer task data removed from subsequent analyses.  The error rate data from the 
antisaccade task revealed one participant who provided no correct responses for one of the response 
directions.  From the Go/NoGo task performance, five participants had error rates which were thirty 
percent or higher.  These errors included missing the target when present (i.e., errors of omission) or 
hitting the button when they were supposed to inhibit a response (i.e., errors of commission).  One 
participant also invalidated over twenty percent of trials on the Stroop task by triggering the 
microphone inappropriately.  In total, this procedure resulted in the removal of task data from five 
participants.    
Preliminary analyses for the antisaccade task also demonstrated a statistical ceiling effect for 
trials which required participants to identify an upward facing arrow (4% error rate).  A within-
subject ANOVA revealed that this was significantly lower than the average error rate for the “left” 
(12%) and “right” (15%) arrow responses, F(1, 138) = 57.8, MSE = .012, p < .01.  Hence, upward 
arrow trials were removed from further analysis.   
For each computer task, the remaining RT data were subjected to a recursive outlier procedure in 
which scores falling three or more standard deviations above or below the mean score for each 
participant in each condition were eliminated from further analysis (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994). 
This resulted in elimination of 1.7%, 1.9% and 3.0% of the RTs from the Go/Nogo, Stroop and 




Computer Task Effects.  The RT data from trials with a correct response were submitted to 
separate analysis of variances (ANOVAs) for each task.  These confirmed basic RT effects including 
a block effect for the Go/NoGo task (Go Phase RTs were faster than No/Go Phase RTs; F(1, 133) = 
754.2, MSE = 849.1, p < .001) and an archetypal Stroop effect (RTs on incongruent colour trials 
were slower than RTs on neutral trials; F(1, 137) = 663.5, MSE = 2437.7, p < .001).  Error-rate 
analyses mirrored the same pattern of results.  No basic effects were calculated for the Antisaccade 
task given there are no conditions within the task to compare. 
Latent Structure of Inhibition 
 To examine the factor structure of the computer-task data, a confirmatory factor analysis was 
carried out using Amos 6.0 (Arbuckle, 2005) in which the four standardized dependent variables 
from the three tasks were allowed to load on the single latent factor labelled by Miyake et al. (2000) 
as inhibition.  Overall, this model provided good fit to the data, χ2(4, N = 134) = 1.78, p = .777; 
comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) < .001, p = 
.865.  However, given previous reports of women outperforming men on executive ability tasks in 
both preschool children (Weibe, Epsy, & Charak, 2008) and adults (Yuan, He, Qinglin, Chen, & Li, 
2008), the latent factor structure was examined separately for each gender (see Figure 5a and 5b).  To 
test for gender differences in the factor structure, a latent model was created which constrained the 
four path coefficients to be equal between the genders.  This model did not fit as well, χ2(7, N = 134) 
= 113.97, CFI = .873, RMSEA = .085, p = .162, and fit statistically worse than an unconstrained 
model making no assumptions about path equality, χ2diff (3, N = 134) = 12.20, p < .05.  By inspection 
this appeared to be due to the Stroop effect RTs not correlating well with the other measures for 
women.  Stroop effect RTs were removed as an indicator of inhibition.  This final one-factor model 
(see Figure 5.c) fit the data very well, χ2(7, N = 134) = 3.19, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .001, and no 




Latent inhibition scores produced from this model were used in all subsequent analyses.  An 
independent-samples t-test did demonstrate a mean gender difference which contrasts with previous 
gender differences in executive functioning.  Namely, in this sample of students, men performed 





















Figure 5:  Model of Inhibition.  Latent measurement models of inhibition for (A) men (n=42), (B) women (n=92) and the final model 
(C) which includes the three retained indicators for the entire sample (ignoring gender).  The letters e1 through e4 represent error 
variables reflecting imperfect measurement by the respective indicators of inhibition.  With the exception of the path to Stroop-RT for 
women, all paths from the inhibition variable to the indicators are significant at p < .01.  Anti-Errs = proportion of errors on the 
antisaccade task; Anti-RT = RTs on the antisaccade task; GNoG-RT = overall RTs on the Go/NoGo task; Stroop-RT = Stroop effect in 
RTs for the Stroop naming task.   
 
Inhibition and Self-reported Personality 
 Latent inhibition scores were used to predict procrastination and other person-level 
constructs.  All self-reported personality traits were represented at the latent level using measurement 
models wherein each questionnaire item represented an indicator of the underlying construct.  
Overall procrastination scores from the AIP, API and GPS were highly related to each other (mean r 




model fit the data quite well, χ2(6, N = 134) = 5.08, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA < .001, and latent scores 
from this factor were used to represent procrastination. 
The gender differences for inhibition reported above prompted separate analyses for men and 
women.  For all relations between inhibition and personality traits, the path representing each relation 
was constrained to be equal across genders.  This model was then compared to an unconstrained 
model for which this assumption was not made.  The observed gender differences using this 
procedure are reported in Table 2, which also includes the latent relations between inhibition and 
each trait for both men and women.   
 
Table 2        
Latent Inhibitory Ability Scores Predicting Latent Construct Scores of Self-reported Personality – 




Relation to Inhibition 
 
Personality Trait 
Males         
N = 42 
Females       
N = 92 
Gender Difference 
PROC   -.40†   (.21)    -.05 (.14) n.s. 
SCS    .26   (.19)    -.17 (.14) n.s. 
DYS-I   -.54* (.24)     .21 (.16) p < .01 
FUNCT-I    .12   (.20)     .11 (.14) n.s. 
GSE    .45†   (.27)     .03 (.12) n.s. 
CON    .23   (.21)     .03 (.13) n.s. 
NEUROT   -.54* (.24)     .14 (.13) p < .05 
CBAS   -.38†   (.22)     .03 (.15) n.s. 
 
Note. Higher inhibition scores represent increased ability to inhibit prepotent responses.  Gender difference = statistical difference in 
constrained vs. unconstrained models; PROC = latent procrastination score; SCS = latent Self-Control Scale score; DYS-I = latent 
dysfunctional impulsivity score from the Impulsivity Inventory; FUNCT-I = latent functional impulsivity score from the Impulsivity 
Inventory; GSE = latent General Self-Efficacy Scale score; CON = latent conscientiousness score; NEUROT = latent neuroticism 
score; CBAS = latent score from the Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale.   † p < .10.  * p < .05.   
 
The significant gender differences suggest that inhibition predicts dysfunctional impulsivity 
and neuroticism differentially for men and women.  Whereas no relations were observed for women, 




By inspection, however, some of the remaining non-significant group tests may not adequately 
capture additional relations that seem evident for men but not women.  For men, better inhibitory 
abilities significantly predicted reduced trait-procrastination, better global self-efficacy and less 
chronic avoidance behaviour (all tests one-tailed).  In contrast, inhibition was not a significant 
predictor of any self-reported personality trait for women.  The fact that the group tests between men 
and women were not significant is likely due to the lack of statistical power required for such 
comparisons.  Nevertheless, the fact that these relations are present within the smaller group of men 
is a good demonstration that these effects are evident for the male cohort in this sample.  Similarly, 
the relatively large female group allows for increased confidence that substantial effects could have 
been detected in this sample if they were indeed present.  Furthermore, outlier analyses provided no 
evidence that any individuals unduly influenced the size of the observed relations for their gender (all 
standardized dfbeta’s < 1; Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003), and a structural model constraining 
the variance of inhibition scores between the models for each gender provided no evidence, when 
compared to the unconstrained model, that the range of inhibition scores differed substantially 
between men and women, χ2diff (1, N = 134) = .023, p > .05.  Having ruled out these distributional 
explanations for the observed gender differences, inhibitory ability, at least at the self-reported trait 
level, appears to have substantive relations with other constructs for men but not for women in this 
sample of students.   
Time 2 Compliance 
 One-hundred and thirty-one participants (94%) completed the on-line surveys at Time 2.  The 
majority submitted their responses on time (N = 94; 72%) or one day late (N = 24; 18%) with an 







 A total of 1383 tasks (mean = 9.95 tasks/participant) were reported at Time 1.  Tasks were 
coded on several dimensions in order to ensure that participants provided tasks that followed the 
study instructions, that the tasks could be assessed in terms of eventual completion, and that tasks 
could reasonably be avoided.  These criteria maximized the possibility of observing intention-
behaviour failures wherein moderating factors may alter the effect of intentions.  Three independent 
raters were trained using a coding scheme designed for this study (see Appendix C for the detailed 
procedure).  Basic task requirements included that (1) the reported task was fairly clear in what it 
entailed, (2) performing the task likely required at least moderate effort, (3) task completion was not 
dependent on unpredictable events (e.g., snowfall), (4) the task was not already scheduled, (5) the 
task described a behaviour and not the absence of behaviour (e.g., not smoking), the (6) task could 
likely be avoided or delayed without drastic consequences (e.g., job loss), and (7) the task could 
reasonably be assigned a particular number of hours to complete.   
Two raters first coded all reported tasks for satisfaction of the basic task requirements.  The 
tasks suspected of not meeting all requirements by either rater were categorized as ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ 
according to each of the seven basic task requirements.  The inter-rater agreement for excluding 
items on this basis was high (Kappa = .82).  Rater disagreements were then settled by a third 
independent party.  This procedure resulted in the retention of 92% (N = 1272) of the originally 
reported tasks.   
Since the focus was to examine important, but relatively unpleasant tasks, pleasantness 
ratings on the PIAR were investigated.  Tasks rated as being pleasant in nature were removed by 
selecting tasks that were scored 7 (neutral) or lower on a likert-pleasantness scale that ranged from 1 
(very unpleasant) to 11 (very pleasant).  A total of 269 (20%) of the original tasks were removed 




 After these procedures, participants completing the on-line surveys at Time 2 had a mean 
number of 7.4 reported tasks that were deemed valid for further analysis.  These tasks were the focus 
of the remainder of the study.  
Task Characteristics 
 Task type was coded by two independent raters (see Appendix C for details).  Interrater 
reliability was high (Kappa = .92) and disagreements were settled by a third rater.  Tasks were most 
frequently academic in nature (e.g., “reading for psychology”; 42%) or involved a household chore 
(e.g., “cleaning the washroom”; 26%).  The remaining tasks included exercising (e.g., “running”; 
7%), social acts that were not better described by other categories (e.g., “calling my parents for 
money”; 4%), and other miscellaneous activities (e.g., “applying for jobs”; 21%). 
Intentions and Behaviour 
 Intentions. Composite intention scores at Time 1 were calculated for each reported task.  As 
described above, the four intention measures on the modified FIAR included likert ratings assessing 
the degree to which the participant ‘intended,’ ‘wanted’ and was ‘likely’ to do each task and the 
number of hours intended to spend performing the task.  Each of these four intention measures was 
first standardized within each participant such that scores were transformed (to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one) based on raw scores associated with all other tasks reported by that 
particular individual.  For example, the ‘intended hours’ measure was standardized by taking each 
raw score for a particular participant and subtracting the mean number of hours for all tasks reported 
by that participant, then dividing the result by the standard deviation for ‘intended hours’ reported by 
that participant.  This procedure is akin to group-mean centering described in multilevel modelling 
procedures (see Bickel, 2007).   
The benefit of this standardization process is that it equates each of the four intention indices 




aggregated composite reduces the influence of errors associated with any particular estimate of 
intentions (e.g., correctly guessing the number of hours to complete a task).  Hence, the four 
standardized intention scores were summed to arrive at a final composite intention score which was 
subsequently used as the primary measure of intention level.     
 One drawback of transforming intention scores in this manner is that intention levels for each 
task must be interpreted in relation to other tasks reported by the same participant.  The focus on 
relative intentions within a person is not particularly problematic here considering that the aim of this 
study was to examine whether one follows through with one’s own intentions.  Following one’s own 
intentions presumably involves weighing some personally-relevant tasks higher than others and that 
this process occurs somewhat independently of how strongly others intend to complete tasks that are 
of interest to them.  This approach also makes the assumption of homoscedasticity which requires 
that the relation between intention and behaviour take the same form across the entire range of 
possible values.  Here there is no strong apriori reason to believe that intentions predict behaviour in 
a manner that changes form depending on intention level2.   
 Behaviour.  Two measures of behaviour were assessed on the PIAR at Time 2:  the 
percentage of intended action completed and the number of hours engaged in each task.  Each 
dependent variable was analysed separately and reported in parallel. 
Data Analysis Strategy 
 The study data has a multilevel structure consisting of two levels of analysis.  Each reported 
task is a lower-level observation nested within a participant.  The first level (within-person) contains 
information related to individual tasks.  The second level (between-person) is comprised of data 
assessed at the person-level and represents variation between participants that may influence level-
one constructs and relations.  The main research questions concerned the prediction of level-one task 




(i.e., inhibition levels) and a cross-level interaction (i.e., inhibition scores moderating the intention-
behaviour relation).  Multilevel modelling is the approach of choice because it estimates variations in 
the data at all levels (i.e., within- and between-person) simultaneously.  Analyses were conducted 
using HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) utilizing restricted maximum-likelihood estimates.  
Robust standard errors were also used since these estimates are relatively insensitive to violations of 
homoscedasticity (Chou, Bentler, & Satorra, 1991).  All of the presented models permitted intercepts 
and slopes to vary at random for all variables – effectively creating unique relations among the 
variables for each participant.  These estimates were then pooled across participants producing fixed 
(or average) effects of each predictor on task completion.   
Finally, task level characteristics known to influence performance (i.e., task difficulty, 
boringness and self-efficacy) as well as person-level behaviour (i.e., days late in submitting Time 2 
measures) were used as control variables at their respective levels.  This was done for all analyses.  
Also assessed was whether participants “completely forgot” about each task.  Unfortunately, only 
roughly half of the reported tasks included a rating on this item (N = 536 tasks).  It is possible that 
the strong wording of the item implied to participants that item completion was required only if the 
task was forgotten entirely.  Hence, the forgetting data was not reported.   
Habitual Avoidance as a Moderator of the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
The percentage of task completion and number of hours engaged in each task were predicted 
in separate analyses using models with identical independent variables3.  Each analysis consisted of a 
multilevel model in which the dependent variable was predicted by level-one intention and AHI 
scores and the two-way interaction between these variables.  Intercepts and slopes were allowed to 
vary among participants.  Analyses also included all aforementioned covariates at their respective 




covariates significantly interacted with any of the main predictors for any of the reported analyses 
(all p’s > .05).  Hence, only the main effects of the covariates are reported.   
 The results are displayed in Table 3.  Providing a direct replication of Study 1, stronger 
intentions produced increased task completion both in terms of percentage completed and number of 
hours (p’s < .001).  Both dependent variables also demonstrated reduced completion levels when 
avoidance patterns associated with the task were experienced as habit-like in nature (p’s < .001).  
Contrary to expectations, there was no evidence of moderation for either outcome measure (p’s > 




Figure 6:  Joint Influence of Habitual Avoidance and Intentions.  Pooled within-person effects of intention and AHI scores in 
predicting percentage and number of hours completed for each task.  Low, med(ium) and high correspond to -1, 0, and +1 SD from the 
respective centered means for each variable.  The figure depicts the main findings with all covariates at their respective-centered means 
of zero.  
Table 3       
Multilevel Regression Results Predicting Time 2 Task Completion From Time 1 Intentions and Avoidance-Habit 
Levels 
 










Intercept 50.9*** 1.57  2.59*** .06 
Intention 17.93*** 2.10  .63*** .07 
AHI -7.74*** .81  -.18*** .03 






   Boring .12 .48  .00 .01 
   Difficult -1.27** .38  .05** .02 
   Efficacy 1.63* .70  .03 .02 
   Days late 3.26 † 1.76  .00 .09 




 Note.  AHI = Avoidance as Habit Index score for a particular task; Boring = rating of task boringness; Difficulty = level of task difficulty; 
Efficacy = level of capability for completing a task; Days late = number of days late Time 2 surveys were submitted; SE = robust standard 
error estimate. The sample included 134 participants. Although not reported, no effects of Gender were found nor did it moderate any 









Inhibition as a Moderator of the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
Two multilevel models were utilized such that each dependent variable was predicted by 
level-one intention scores and level-two inhibition scores.  The cross-level interaction between 
intention scores and inhibition level was also examined.  Both analyses included all covariates at 
their respective levels of analysis and only the main effects of these variables are reported.   
 The results are detailed in Table 4.  As expected, stronger intention scores produced increased 
completion for both measured outcomes (p’s < .001).  Although no main effect of inhibition was 
evident (p’s > .15), the predicted cross-level interaction was significant with respect to both 
percentage completed and time spent on tasks (p’s < .05).  For these unpleasant tasks, participants 
with higher inhibitory abilities followed their intentions to a greater extent than those with lower 






Table 4       
Multilevel Regression Results Predicting Time 2 Task Completion From Time 1 Intentions and Inhibition Levels  










Intercept 50.9*** 1.56  2.58*** .05 
Intention 22.08*** 2.01  .73*** .07 
Inhibition 2.51 1.72  -.03 .05 






   Boring -1.11* .48  -.02 .02 
   Difficult -1.86*** .42  .04* .02 
   Efficacy 2.23** .74  .03 .02 
   Days late 1.75 1.61  -.05 .08 




 Note.  Inhibition = latent inhibition score indicating ability to inhibit prepotent responses; Boring = rating of task boringness; Difficulty = 
level of task difficulty; Efficacy = level of capability for completing a task; Days late = number of days late Time 2 surveys were submitted; 
SE = robust standard error estimate. The sample included 134 participants. No effects of Gender were found nor did it moderate any 





Figure 7. Joint Influence of Inhibition and Intentions:  Pooled within-person effects of intention and inhibition scores in 
predicting percentage and number of hours completed for each task.  Low, med(ium) and high correspond to -1, 0, and +1 SD 
from the respective centered means for each variable.  The figure depicts the main findings with all covariates at their respective-
centered means of zero. 
 
The Role of Inhibition in Overriding Habitual Avoidance Patterns 
Following through on intended-task completion should rely more on inhibitory ability if that 
task has been avoided previously in a habit-like manner.  In theory, this increased need for inhibitory 
control should be the result of a conflict between good intentions to complete the aversive task and a 
pre-existing habitual avoidant response which is triggered by salient environmental cues (e.g., Wood 
& Neal, 2007; Hall & Fong, 2007).  In contrast, task completion wherein this conflict is absent (i.e., 
where no habitual avoidance pattern exists) should more directly follow from one’s intentions.  This 
prediction was tested using a 3-way interaction wherein both habitual avoidance and inhibitory 
ability were included in the same analysis.  The pattern of results was the same for both dependent 
variables.  The observed main effects of intentions (p’s < .001) and AHI level (p’s < .001), and the 
interactions between intentions and inhibition (p’s < .05), were qualified by significant 3-way 
interactions among intentions, AHI and inhibitory ability levels (p’s < .05; one-tailed).  Task 




present.  However, when a pre-existing habit did exist, the intention-behaviour relation was stronger 
for individuals with increased inhibitory abilities4.  The results are outlined in Table 5 and are 





Table 5       
Multilevel Regression Results Predicting Time 2 Task Completion From Time 1 Intentions,  Avoidance-
Habit Levels, Inhibition, and their Interaction 
 










Intercept 51.0*** 1.58  2.58*** .06 
Intention 17.44*** 2.06  .62*** .07 
AHI -7.91*** .80  -.18*** .03 
Inhibition -.84 1.69  .00 .05 
Intention X AHI -.13 .98  .04 .04 
Intention X inhibition 4.63* 1.90  .14* .07 
AHI X inhibition .63 1.15  -.01 .03 






   Boring .10 .47  .01 .01 
   Difficult -1.23** .39  .05* .02 
   Efficacy 1.67* .71  .02 .02 
   Days late 3.92* 1.73  .00 .09 




Note.   AHI = Avoidance as Habit Index score for a particular task ; Inhibition = latent inhibition score indicating ability to inhibit 
prepotent responses; Boring = rating of task boringness; Difficulty = level of task difficulty; Efficacy = level of capability for completing 
a task; Days late = number of days late Time 2 surveys were submitted; SE = robust standard error estimate. The sample included 134 










Figure 8:  Joint Influence of Habitual Avoidance, Inhibition and Intentions: Pooled within-person effects of intention and 
inhibition scores by previous habitual-avoidance pattern levels.  The dependent variables are percentage of task completed and 
number of hours completed for each task.  Low, med(ium) and high correspond to -1, 0, and +1 SD from the respective 
centered means for each variable.  The figure depicts the main findings with all covariates at their respective-centered means of 
zero. 
 
Personality as a Moderator of the Intention-Behaviour Relation 
Possible moderating effects of personality were also examined.  Two separate multilevel 
models were used to predict the dependent variables for each respective trait. These analyses were 
carried out for procrastination, dysfunctional impulsivity and neuroticism.  Whereas the latter two 
traits were investigated because they interacted with Gender with respect to inhibitory abilities, 
procrastination was included because chronic procrastination should theoretically be associated with 
weakening the intention-behaviour relation.  In separate analyses, each level-two personality score 
was permitted to interact with intentions to predict level-one behaviour.  The cross-level interactions 







Note.   Despite reporting all effects in a single table, each of the three personality traits were subjected to separate analyses for 
both dependent variables.  For ease of exposition, the covariates for each analysis are not presented here.  PROC = latent 
procrastination score; DYS-I = latent dysfunctional impulsivity score; NEUROT = latent neuroticism score. The sample included 




Significant main effects suggest that increased procrastination and higher neuroticism scores 
were associated with reduced task performance.  However, in contrast to the deleterious effects of 
poor inhibitory control on the strength of intentions, none of the cross-level interactions (all p’s > 
.05) demonstrated any moderating effects of self-reported personality.  A final multilevel analysis, 
using Gender as an additional predictor, revealed that none of these effects depended on the sex of 
the participant (p’s > .05).   
 
 
Table 6       
Multilevel Regression Results Predicting Time 2 Task Completion From Time 1 Intentions and Self-
Reported Personality Traits 
 











   Intercept 51.1*** 1.49  2.60*** .05 
   Intention 22.0*** 1.99  .74*** .07 
   PROC -3.3* 1.54  -.12* .05 






   Intercept 51.3*** 1.53  2.59*** .05 
   Intention 22.09*** 1.99  .73*** .07 
   DYS-I -1.65 2.41  -.01 .08 






   Intercept 51.5*** 1.48  2.69*** .05 
   Intention 21.8*** 1.95  .73*** .07 
   NEUROT -4.90* 2.05  -.15* .07 





 The first goal of Study 2 was to investigate the relation between the executive-functioning 
ability of inhibition and trait-level procrastination.  Whereas some investigations have suggested that 
procrastination is related to reduced self-control tendencies (e.g., Ferrari & Emmons, 1995), previous 
work using neurologically-based measures of general executive functioning has found no evidence of 
a connection with trait-level procrastination (Stone, 1999).  However, since the executive function of 
inhibition may be most closely related to impulsive behaviour, its relations to personality traits like 
procrastination were examined here.  Prior to investigating these relations, a series of initial analyses 
was first undertaken.  
Preliminary analyses revealed gender differences in the structure of inhibition.  Stroop effect 
RTs did not correlate well with the other indices of inhibition for women.  Although unexpected, this 
type of result is not without precedent.  In his review of a half century of research on the Stroop 
effect, MacLeod (1991) described how relations between Stroop interference and other constructs 
have been reduced (or non-existent) for women as compared to men – understood to be the result of 
increased impulsivity in men.  In the present sample, this result may be related to laboratory effects 
wherein the male experimenter affected Stroop performance differentially for participants.  The 
Stroop task was the only task wherein the experimenter was present during the experimental trials.  
Women in the sample may have made concerted efforts to reduce impulsive tendencies when in the 
presence of the male experimenter (or alternatively experienced moderate levels of performance 
anxiety that attenuated typical impulsivity levels).  This possibility is admittedly speculative in 
nature.  Nevertheless, the final model which excluded Stroop scores did provide a replication of 
Miyake et al.’s (2000) work, demonstrated no structural differences between genders, and predicted 




 The main trait analyses revealed that inhibitory abilities predict self-reported personality 
differently across genders.  Expected relations were observed for men including positive relations 
between inhibitory control and self-efficacy, and negative relations between inhibition and 
procrastination, dysfunctional impulsivity, neuroticism and chronic task avoidance.  In contrast, 
inhibition was not a significant predictor of any self-reported personality trait for women.  One 
reason for these different effects may reflect how the ‘inhibition’ tasks measured different constructs 
for men and women.  For women, for example, these tasks may assess something other than the 
ability to inhibit a prepotent response.  However, this possibility is unlikely given that latent 
‘inhibition’ scores predict behaviour at Time 2 in the same way for both men and women.  
Alternatively, men and women may have reflected on different aspects of themselves when self-
reporting as a consequence of their performance on the computer tasks.  Whereas women’s self-
concepts are more influenced by maintaining harmonious relationships, men’s self-definitions tend to 
rely more on having unique abilities and being distinguished from others (e.g., Cross & Madson, 
1997).   If struggling on the computer tasks was experienced as a task-oriented failure by 
participants, such a failure may reflect more about the self for men as compared to women.  
Specifically, this experience may have provided a salient example for men of their (in)adequacy, and 
this exemplar may have then been used as a benchmark for their standing on the remaining 
psychological constructs assessed by the personality questionnaires (e.g., impulsivity; self-efficacy).  
By comparison, women who struggled on the computer tasks may not have viewed the experience as 
relevant to their self-views given that women often define their self-concepts in the relational 
domain, which should have been relatively unaffected by difficulties with computer task 
performance.  Ultimately, however, it is difficult to be confident about the source of these gender 




 Another general goal of Study 2 was to investigate factors that impede one’s ability to behave 
in a way that is consistent with the intention to complete unpleasant tasks.  Following the results of 
Study 1, the extent to which behaviours were avoided habitually was assessed to determine whether 
the degree of habituation moderated the observed intention-behaviour relation with respect to 
specific behaviours.  Directly replicating results from Study 1, task AHI scores did predict reduced 
task performance while controlling for intentions, task difficulty, boringness, and self-efficacy 
towards the task.  However, the moderation analysis indicated that, at least as an isolated variable, 
habitual avoidance does not weaken the effectiveness of intentions.   
 Individual differences in the ability to inhibit prepotent responses were also measured to 
determine whether one’s executive-functioning abilities moderated the relation between intentions 
and task completion.  Individuals with relatively high inhibitory abilities followed through with their 
intentions to perform tasks more than those with lower inhibition levels.  The ability to inhibit 
prepotent responses modulated the strength of one’s intentions for engaging in unpleasant tasks. 
 All of these effects were qualified by a 3-way interaction involving intentions, AHI scores 
and inhibition levels.  In general, unpleasant tasks were completed according to intentions for 
participants when no habit-like avoidance patterns were present.  However, when habit-like 
avoidance patterns were pre-existing, the role of one’s inhibitory ability became apparent: the 
intention-behaviour relation was stronger for individuals with demonstrated superiority with respect 
to inhibiting prepotent responses.   
The contextualized effects observed here allow for more precise interpretations of how 
inhibitory abilities work in strengthening the effect of previous intentions.  Wood and Neal (2007) 
and Hall and Fong (2007) both point out how self-control resources are required when goal-directed 
systems are in direct conflict with systems responsible for habitual behaviour.  When an unwanted 





required to inhibit the (relatively) automatic response and act in accordance with one’s previous 
intentions.  Indeed, the present findings are consistent with the premise that better inhibitory abilities 
work to attenuate the prepotent triggering of pre-existing, habitual-avoidance patterns.  This 
perspective is discussed at length in the General Discussion. 
 A final observation is that none of the personality traits moderated the intention-behaviour 
relation.  Previous theorists have suggested that procrastination leads to failure of intentions 
specifically because of subtle neurological differences which are associated with impulsiveness (e.g., 
Steel, 2007).  The assumption inherent in this argument is that (at the trait level) procrastination 
should predict more gaps in the intention-behaviour relation and that, more precisely, this should be 
the direct result of reduced self-regulatory capabilities.  Yet Study 2 provided no evidence that trait 
procrastination weakens the effect of intentions for completing unpleasant tasks.  Hence, the idea that 
the effects of trait procrastination on the intention-behaviour relation are mediated by subtle 
neurological differences is clearly not supported by the present data.  This is particularly interesting 
because the results here do demonstrate that inhibition levels moderate the intention-behaviour 
relation.  Although this finding is consistent with the original suggestion that self-regulatory abilities 
help in following through with one’s intentions, the role of trait procrastination in this relation is not 
evident.  In his discussion of the procrastination literature, Steel (2007) concluded that, “the degree to 
which people are susceptible to an intention–action gap is largely influenced by the trait of 
procrastination” (p. 84).  Steel (2007) further cited the work of Van Hooft et al. (2005) as evidence 
for procrastinators following through less with their intentions.  Yet, on close inspection, 
procrastination in that study did not actually moderate the relation between implementation 
intentions and behaviour.  The lack of evidence, both here and in the literature, calls into question the 
utility of using trait-level procrastination measures in predicting the type of moderating effects 




of habitual avoidance and inhibitory control appears to readily capture self-regulatory failure for 





On the surface, self-regulation involves holding attitudes and intentions about engaging in 
tasks that serve our long-term goals.  Having good intentions is the first step in implementing goal-
oriented action.  However, this assumes that people have the top-down regulatory capacity to carry 
out their good intentions.  The present work investigated whether people complete unpleasant tasks, 
focusing on the influences of controlled and automatic processes and how these factors alter the 
effectiveness of intentions.  A general goal of the present work was to understand whether some 
avoidance patterns can be described as prepotent responses that are enacted relatively automatically 
(i.e., habitually).  The roles of habitual avoidance and executive functioning (i.e., inhibitory abilities) 
were also examined with respect to whether either factor moderated intentions for carrying out 
important (but unpleasant) tasks.  This type of self-regulatory failure is often described as the core 
feature of procrastination behaviour.  Finally, the hypothesized relation between trait-level 
procrastination and reduced executive functioning was also examined given previous suggestions 
that such a relation is responsible for producing intention-behaviour gaps in procrastinators. 
These studies broadly sought to investigate the following questions:  
1. Can the frequent avoidance of a task develop into a habit? 
2. Does habitual avoidance simply entail the absence of behaviour or is habit-like avoidance 
linked to a particular alternate behaviour?  
3. Does the level of habitual avoidance associated with a given task weaken the relation between 
one’s intention to perform the task and future behaviour?     
4. Does the executive function of inhibition strengthen the relation between intentions to 
perform important tasks and actual task completion? 





The first question regarding the habitual qualities of avoidance was addressed in Study 1.  
The results clearly demonstrated that tasks which are frequently avoided were rated higher on a 
measure of habit assessing whether the avoidance itself was experienced as a relatively automatic 
phenomenon, compared to the experience of avoiding unpleasant tasks which are not avoided 
frequently.  Frequent avoidance patterns were also more likely to become part of one’s personal 
identity.  According to Verplanken and Orbell (2003), these are the central features of a habit.  The 
fact that habitual avoidance scores in Study 1 predicted reduced task completion after taking 
intentions and all motivational variables into account provides further validity for the construct and is 
evidence that the habit-like avoidance described here is not mediated by explicit goals, but is rather 
triggered in an automatic fashion.  Furthermore, the results of Study 2 replicate the finding that habit-
like avoidance patterns predict reduced task completion irrespective of one’s intentions to act.    
Question 2 was also examined in the first study.  No evidence was found suggesting that the 
habit-level of the avoidance pattern is related to the habit-level of the common alternative activity.  
This is consistent with the idea that habitual avoidance patterns are not functionally equivalent to 
habit-like alternative behaviours, and likely work independently of cues that may (or may not) trigger 
the activation of a habitual alternative behaviour.  However, participants did choose the same 
alternative activity more often when avoiding habitually.  Stated differently, habitual avoidance 
patterns most often result in the same ‘behaviour’ – but that particular alternative need not be habit-
like in nature.  The observation that habit-like avoidance patterns often result in the same alternative 
activity is consistent with the notion that the AHI is measuring a habit – i.e., a behaviour that is not 
mediated by goals.  Once a goal is activated, goal-dependent behaviour can be satisfied in a number 
of ways (i.e., various responses may satisfy a goal).  In contrast, habit-like behaviour is believed to 




Here habit-like avoidance patterns were associated with the same alternative response despite 
numerous activities that could accomplish a general goal of avoiding.   
Idiosyncratic environmental features reported in Study 1 were often associated with 
avoidance or engagement in the alternative activity.  These types of triggers demonstrated a greater 
association with habitual avoidance than features that represented barriers to task completion.  This 
observation is likely due to the fact that the former type of avoidance frequently co-varies with 
physical features in the environment.  Finally, participants reported that triggers associated with more 
habit-like avoidance affected them with respect to avoiding more often than triggers associated with 
non-habit-like avoidance.  Taken together, the data from Study 1 provide evidence consistent with 
the idea that habit-like avoidance is triggered by salient environmental triggers.   
The pattern of results surrounding habitual avoidance patterns from Study 1 is consistent with 
Temporal Self-Regulation Theory (TST; Hall & Fong, 2007).  The observation that habit-like 
avoidance patterns are associated with environmental cues makes this behaviour-level variable a 
good candidate for a behavioural prepotency in the TST model, which describes how intentions may 
not guide behaviour for avoidance once a habit has formed.  The general literature on habits further 
suggests that changes in intentions (i.e., to no longer avoid) may be difficult via intention-change 
alone.        
Study 2 investigated Questions 3 and 4 by examining intention-behaviour gaps between Time 
1 and 2.  Habitual avoidance on its own did not moderate the intention-behaviour relation.  Although 
motivationally-based models (e.g., TMT; Steel, 2007) do not explicitly incorporate the effects of 
prepotent responding, this null finding is also inconsistent with both the general habit literature (e.g., 
Ji Song & Wood, 2007) and the TST model of behaviour (Hall & Fong, 2007).  According to these 
accounts, intentions should predict behaviour better in the absence of prepotent behavioural 




In contrast, greater inhibitory control at Time 1 strengthened the effect of intentions in 
producing behaviour at Time 2.  This finding is consistent with TST which describes how we are 
hypersensitive to immediate contingencies in our environment (e.g., the pleasure of watching 
television) and that this tendency makes it difficult to carry out unpleasant tasks that serve longer-
term goals (e.g., exercising).  Self-regulatory capacity is believed to be necessary for the effortful 
completion of such tasks.  It has been suggested that the executive ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses represents one such capability.  The data from Study 2 are consistent with the theoretical 
position that those better able to inhibit prepotent responses should carry out intentional behaviour 
more often precisely because of their increased ability to inhibit immediately gratifying behaviours 
(Hall & Fong, 2007).     
Temporal Motivational Theory is founded on a similar premise: distal consequences are 
discounted relative to more proximal ones and that this process is partially a function of one’s 
sensitivity to delay (e.g., Steel & König, 2006; Steel, 2007).  Greater sensitivity to delay should 
lower the preference for unpleasant, but goal-congruent, tasks when they are temporally distant – 
resulting in deferred action compared to individuals with lower sensitivity to the same period of 
delay.  Regarding the present data, it is possible that individuals with superior inhibitory abilities 
were less sensitive to periods of delay, and were better able to inhibit preferences for distracting tasks 
which allowed for earlier task completion.  However, according to Steel (2007), the ability to inhibit 
prepotent responses should be related to increased behavioural follow-through because of the 
conceptual associations with individual differences like procrastination and impulsiveness.  In the 
present work these relations were evident for men but not women.    
 Questions 3 and 4 are best addressed by the interactions among intentions, habitual-avoidance 
and the inhibitory ability levels in Study 2.  Unpleasant tasks were completed according to intentions 




patterns did conflict with one’s intentions to complete a task the intention-behaviour relation was 
stronger for those individuals who were better at inhibiting prepotent responses during the computer 
tasks.  Inhibitory abilities mattered most when a countervailing pattern of habitual avoidance 
opposed carrying out the unpleasant task.  Explaining this contextualized effect requires additional 
theoretical framing.  For example, the interactive effects of these two variables are not explicitly 
outlined by the model of dilatory behaviour described by TMT.  Recent accounts describing how 
habits and goal-dependent behaviour interface with one another (Wood & Neal, 2007; Hall & Fong, 
2007) may provide the most appropriate characterization of the observed effects. 
In their model, Wood and Neal (2007) outline three principles that guide habitual responding 
and how habits interact with goals.  The first principle states that the automatic nature of habits is due 
to the fact that habits are cued by context.  Habits are initially formed by covariation between 
performance environments and the responses themselves.  Simple paired-associations develop 
between environmental triggers and responses which are stored in procedural memory upon frequent 
repetition.  The authors explain how this type of associative learning is slow and is believed to rely 
on structures like the basal ganglia and cerebellum (e.g., Graybiel, 1998; Packard & Knowlton, 
2002).  This is consistent with human learning studies that demonstrate a neostriatal habit learning 
system which is distinguishable from explicit learning systems (Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 
1996).  Whereas goal-dependent behaviour relies on executive structures like the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) for selecting intended actions (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001), repeated responses gradually 
promote the redistribution of brain activity to subcortical areas which rely less on frontal brain 
structures for action (Jonides, 2004; Kelly & Garavan, 2005).  The product of this process is habitual 
behaviour that is triggered by performance cues in a relatively automatic manner. 
According to the second principle of Wood and Neal’s (2007) model, goals do not mediate 




behaviour, once a habit has formed, “habits are performed without mediation of a goal to achieve a 
particular outcome or a goal to respond (i.e., behavioural intention; Wood & Neal, 2007; p. 844).”  
Goal recruitment becomes less necessary as the behaviour becomes habitual.  From this perspective, 
habits can be differentiated from behaviour driven by implicit goals because a behavioural habit is 
inflexibly cued by triggers whereas implicit, goal-driven behaviour is much more flexible and can 
take any number of forms that serve the same goal.  For example, there are many responses that may 
satisfy an implicit goal of travelling, but travel modes (e.g., driving) cued in predictable ways by 
environmental triggers would be considered stimulus-driven or habit-like (for alternative views also 
see e.g., Verplanken & Aarts, 1999; Aarts, 2007).             
 The third principle most directly speaks to Questions 3 and 4 which focus on moderators of 
intentions.   According to the third principle, goals and habits operate from relatively independent 
systems which can also interact.  Wood and Neal’s (2007) exposition describes how goals are often 
initially responsible for repetitive behaviour which may eventually develop into habit.  However, 
once a habit has formed, habits tend to be relatively stable and do not readily change in the presence 
of opposing goals or behaviour.  Most germane to the present questions is how these two systems 
interface when goals and habits conflict.  Sometimes the habitual response is enacted in an 
environment that cues that particular behaviour.  However, Wood and Neal (2007; and Hall & Fong, 
2007) propose that the performance of a cued response may be inhibited once it has become activated 
by environmental triggers via the application of self-regulatory control – “people may implement 
effortful control to override the habit disposition and prevent it from manifesting in behavior” (Wood 
& Neal, 2007; p. 854).   
Recent accounts suggest that self-control is a finite resource that can be depleted in strength 
like a muscle that tires from exertion (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister et al., 2007).  




directed behaviour may conflict.  For example, across several studies, Vohs, Baumeister and 
Ciarocco (2005) found that first engaging in an effortful activity depleted self-regulatory resources 
(e.g., trying to control one’s thoughts) had the effect of reducing participants’ ability to overcome 
habitual responses (e.g., when interacting with others in a subsequent task).  Effortful attempts to 
overcome habitual self-presentation patterns had the similar effect of diminishing participants’ ability 
to self-regulate in a second task (e.g., persisting on difficult problems).  It appears that depleting self-
control resources makes inhibiting habit-like responses difficult.  A corollary of this finding is that 
preventing unwanted habitual responding requires self-control resources.  Without adequate top-
down resources one’s ability to inhibit unwanted behaviours is significantly impaired.     
  In addition to the more dynamic levels of self-control, stable individual differences in self-
control may also interact with habits in producing behaviour.  Inherent in some definitions of self-
control is the ability to break unwanted habits (e.g., Tangney et al., 2004).  This conceptualization of 
self-control is a successful predictor of outcomes at the trait level.  For example, the ability to 
interrupt undesired tendencies is associated with reduced impulsive behaviours (e.g., binge eating; 
alcohol abuse; Tangney et al., 2004).  Individuals with higher trait-levels of self-regulatory abilities 
should have less difficulty inhibiting prepotent responding.   
An account of the present data can be forwarded under the framework proposed by Wood and 
Neal (2007).  Study 1 demonstrated that habitual-avoidance patterns were experienced by 
participants as occurring relatively automatically and reflecting their own self-identities, both of 
which are cardinal features of habit-like behaviour (e.g., Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).  These kinds 
of behavioural patterns were also associated with contextual cues that participants believe have an 
effect on how they behave.  Although correlational in nature, these data suggest that contextual 
triggers associated with habit-like avoidance patterns are associated with cueing prepotent patterns of 




both studies suggesting that the construct works independently of motivational variables: habitual-
avoidance scores predicted reduced task performance even after controlling for motivational 
constructs like intentions.  Additional construct validity for avoidance-as-habit was found in the 
contextualized effect of how inhibition moderated intentions.  In Study 2, all participants followed 
their intentions when no habit to avoid was present.  However, when approach goals conflicted with 
habitual-avoidance patterns, individuals with better regulatory capacity (i.e., inhibitory abilities) were 
much more effective in breaking prepotent-avoidance responses in order to carry out their own 
intentions for the week.  This pattern mirrors the findings expected when habits and goals conflict in 
guiding behaviour.  Those with higher self-control resources at their disposal were more effective in 
breaking (relatively) automatic avoidance patterns.   
Wood and Neal (2007) propose two possible mechanisms for self-regulation under such 
conflict.  Whereas one mechanism involves controlling a habitual response once it has been evoked, 
another proposed strategy to improve self-regulation involves more pre-emptive measures.     
First, control over cued behaviour may take place once the stimulus-driven response has been 
initiated through the “sheer dint of will” (Wood & Neal, 2007; p. 854).  In Study 2, inhibitory ability 
may have translated into increased capacity for stopping an avoidance pattern even after it has been 
primed by environmental cues.  This type of response inhibition represents the clearest parallel to the 
abilities required to perform well at the computer tasks at Time 1 (e.g., the antisaccade task).  In 
Study 2, two of the three indicators of inhibition were taken from performance indices from the 
antisaccade task, which has been described as a task that, “yields reliable and sensitive measures of 
the processes involved in resolving the conflict between volitional and reflexive behavioral 
responses” (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; p. 302).  This type of conflict resolution may have helped 
participants stop avoidance patterns once they were initiated.  A recent review synthesizing the 




that activation in the neural systems underlying the prosaccade (toward the distracter cue) must 
somehow be reduced to allow the systems responsible for orienting attention away from the distracter 
to reach threshold activation first.  Most models emphasize how antisaccade errors are the result of 
either (1) a failure to maintain task-relevant instructions (i.e., task set) in memory or (2) failure to 
adequately activate the intention to look away from the distracter cue (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006).  
This is commensurate with lesion data suggesting that errors on the antisaccade task are often 
associated with damage to brain structures responsible for top-down processing like the dorsolateral 
(and ventral) PFC and also the ACC (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006).   To summarize, it is plausible that 
poor inhibitors in Study 2 were not able to sufficiently maintain their intentions for carrying out 
unpleasant tasks because they lost the mental representation for task completion (i.e., task set) when 
a competing avoidance habit was activated.  Alternatively, poor inhibitors may not have translated 
their intentions into behaviour because of a deficit in converting their good intentions into action 
when faced with competing habit-like avoidance responses.   
A second mechanism proposed for controlling habitual responses is to avoid exposure to cues 
that may trigger the habitual response (Wood & Neal, 2007).  It is possible that those with increased 
inhibitory control also reduced their exposure to avoidance cues during the week.  However there is 
no straightforward connection between this tendency and the computer task requirements assessed at 
Time 1. 
Finally, the issue of how inhibitory control relates to trait procrastination (Question 5) was 
also addressed by Study 2.  Whereas expected relations were found for men, no relations were found 
between inhibition and personality for women.  Although the present data do not lend themselves to 
a single interpretation of this gender difference, the ultimate impact on the main focus of the present 
work is limited.  A main reason for investigating the relation between inhibition and procrastination 




of subtle neurological impairments which result in lowered self-regulatory capabilities (e.g., Steel, 
2007).  Yet there was no evidence from Study 2 (or other published work) that trait-level 
procrastination actually moderates (or weakens) the influence of previous intentions.  This type of 
result ultimately renders the test of mediation moot.  Reduced inhibition cannot be responsible for 
why trait-procrastinators do not carry out their intentions if there is no evidence that chronic 
procrastinators follow through with their intentions to a lesser extent in the first place.  With respect 
to moderating the intention-behaviour relation, Study 2 suggests that only two variables mattered: the 
ability to inhibit prepotent responses and the strength of habit-like avoidance patterns.  Hence, the 
joint assessment of these two variables appears to be more sensitive in detecting the self-regulatory 
failure believed to underlie procrastination behaviour.     
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present work included theoretical and methodological limitations which may be 
addressed by future investigations.   The first theoretical issue surrounds the role of goals, as there is 
presently a debate about the role of goals in habit-like behaviour.  Whereas some have argued that 
goals do not mediate the stimulus-driven nature of habits (e.g., Neal, et al., 2006; Wood & Neal, 
2007; Neal & Wood, in press), others believe that goal-pursuit can become automatized and that 
habits are one form of nonconsicous self-regulation (see Aarts, 2007 for a review).  From the latter 
perspective, selecting a particular response repeatedly in the same context encourages the 
development of cognitive structures that associate goals with specific actions and environmental 
triggers.  If a future situation allows for the performance of a habit, activation of this habit-like goal 
structure spreads automatically to behavioural representations and action occurs without requiring 
conscious intentions to behave.  Despite no direct assessment of nonconscious goals in the current 




goal structures.  Fortunately the presence of implicit goals in habitual responding does not affect the 
main interpretations of the present work.   
 A related view is that goals can be flexibly pursued without conscious awareness (e.g., Aarts, 
2007; Bargh, 2005).  From this account, if a situation does not afford the performance of a habit, then 
an activated goal can still result in nonconscious goal-pursuit that need not be rigid or stimulus-
driven.  In contrast to traditional views wherein awareness is only required for behavioural control 
when habits fail (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986), this type of flexible, nonconscious goal pursuit is 
also thought to rely on executive processes like working memory and inhibition which aid in self-
regulation below the level of conscious awareness (e.g., Aarts, 2007; Bargh, 2005).  One possibility 
is that the habitual avoidance observed here is not truly habit-like, but instead reflects the automatic 
experience of nonconscious goal pursuit.  For example, the environmental cues to avoid identified by 
participants may not directly trigger a rigid behavioural response, but instead may prime goal-related 
structures which produce avoidance that achieves some goal (e.g., avoiding in order to bring relief 
from studying for an impending exam).  Notably such goal pursuit may take the form of any number 
of behaviours that achieve the same goal (e.g., playing video games, watching TV, or eating).  One 
weakness of the present work is that the study does not directly assess nonconscious goal striving 
(e.g., whether nonconscious priming of the goal to avoid can lead to different forms of alternative 
activities).  The results from Study 1 do suggest that automatic avoidance more often results in the 
same alternative activity when compared to avoidance patterns that are not experienced in an 
automatic fashion.  This finding is consistent with AHI scores reflecting (relatively) rigid behavioural 
patterns like habits.  Additionally, the observation that the experience of automaticity was strongly 
related to the frequency of past avoidance lends evidence to the interpretation that AHI scores 
measure stimulus-driven habits which were developed from repeated performance.  This is in 




repetition.  Nevertheless, future work in this domain could involve manipulating nonconscious goals 
via implicit-priming paradigms while monitoring for variability in avoidance responding. 
The fact that habits were conceptualized from a single perspective could also be expanded by 
future work.  For example, Wood and colleagues have explicitly incorporated context stability in the 
measurement of habit wherein both frequency and context are taken into account (e.g., Ouellette & 
Wood, 1998; Wood et al., 2005).  Habit scores are created by jointly assessing whether behaviours 
are enacted frequently and in a stable context.  Habits measured in this way clearly moderate the 
intention-behaviour relation whereby intentions matter less when habits are strong (e.g., Wood et al., 
2005; Ji Song & Wood, 2007).  Recent work has demonstrated the utility of including the stability of 
context in the measurement of habit.  In a correlational study spanning four weeks, Danner, Aarts 
and de Vries (2008) assessed initial intentions and habit levels associated with behaviours like 
snacking, drinking milk and travelling.  Their findings one month later demonstrated that habits 
moderated the intention-behaviour relation when the measurement of habit included the joint 
assessment of frequency and context stability.  No moderating effects of habit were found when past 
frequency was used as the sole indicator of a habit.  Thus, context stability appears to add 
incremental validity in capturing habitual behaviour when compared to frequency alone.  Taking a 
different approach, the studies presented here used a modified habit index (Verplanken & Orbell, 
2003) which measured habits by tapping unique aspects of habit performance including the 
experience of automaticity (Bargh, 1994) and the extent to which avoidance patterns were 
assimilated by participants as features of their personal identities.  The current data demonstrate that 
this introspective assessment of habits moderates the intention-behaviour relation for poor inhibitors.  
Furthermore, the observation that good inhibitors followed through with their intentions despite 
existing habitual-avoidance patterns is consistent with models of the habit-goal interface (i.e., Wood 




avoidance scores did not moderate the intention-behaviour relation overall (i.e., ignoring inhibition) 
is less clear.  One direction for future research would be to replicate Study 2 using multiple measures 
of habitual avoidance which specifically incorporate the role of context. 
 Another future direction could include investigating additional cognitive variables that may 
moderate the intention-behaviour relation for unpleasant tasks.  The present work focused on 
inhibitory control abilities.  However, working-memory and task-switching abilities are executive 
functions that are correlated with inhibition (see Miyake et al., 2000) and are worth further study.  
For example, a set of studies by Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt (2008) revealed 
that working memory capacity moderated the influence that automatic versus controlled precursors to 
behaviour had on actual performance.  The results demonstrated that explicit attitudes predicted 
behaviour for individuals with high working memory capacity better than implicit measures.  In 
contrast, the automatic impact of implicit attitudes was more predictive of behaviour for those with 
poor working memory abilities.  These authors concluded that good working memory capacity is 
necessary for the inhibition of automatically activated influences on behaviour.  Working memory 
may play an important role in both inhibiting irrelevant automatic representations of behaviour while 
also strengthening representations of goal-oriented action.  In the face of prepotent-alternative 
behaviours, the ability to represent task-relevant information may also moderate the effect of one’s 
intentions for carrying out unpleasant tasks.  Future research could simultaneously examine all three 
executive functions to better understand the specific contribution of inhibitory control.   
 Although we agree with Neal and Wood (in press) that “naturalistic data can provide a 
uniquely valid window into the psychological and situational factors that impact real-world 
behavior” (p. 782), some consideration of methodological limitations is warranted given the 
correlational nature of the present studies.  First, self-report biases could have been present in Study 




avoidance patterns.  The prospective design of Study 2 aimed to reduce some of this bias by 
obtaining simple self-reports of behaviour at shorter intervals (e.g., one week or less) which 
presumably reduces potential biases that were due to recall difficulties.  Second, correlational designs 
also limit causal interpretations of the data.  In the first study, for example, it is possible that 
intention ratings were influenced by how often tasks were typically accomplished, as opposed to the 
preferred interpretation that intentions causally drive behaviour.  The prospective design of Study 2 
addressed this concern by measuring intention and inhibition levels prior to assessing outcomes (i.e., 
establishing temporal precedence; Pelham & Blanton, 2003).  However, AHI scores were obtained at 
Time 2 with the main dependent outcome variables.  This strategy is consistent with naturalistic 
studies of habit that typically collect habit data retrospectively in order to prevent drawing attention 
to behaviour during the performance of the habit.  Evidence suggests that attending to habit-like 
performance can re-engage goal-directed control over responding (for a review see Neal & Wood, in 
press).  Despite the intentional use of this strategy in Study 2, the possibility remains that participant 
reports of their avoidance experience were influenced by their actual behaviour (as opposed to the 
preferred interpretation that pre-existing habit-levels affected eventual task performance).  For 
example, failing to complete an intended task for the week may have prompted participants to report 
that the experience was automatic, with the implication that it was somehow out of their control – 
effectively absolving themselves from responsibility for self-regulatory failure.  While possible, this 
interpretation is unlikely given the complete pattern of findings in Study 2.  It is difficult to imagine a 
plausible explanation for how the observed three way interaction is the result of simple biases 
reflecting impression management strategies at Time 2.  An alternative explanation like this would 
need to include a plausible rationale for why poor inhibitors were more likely than good inhibitors to 
succumb to this tendency for intended tasks that went undone.  Ultimately, correlational data must 




directly address these issues.  For example, to reduce the need for recalling distant habit-like 
behaviour a daily-diary method of investigation could be adopted wherein reports can be obtained 
almost concurrently with the behaviour itself.  This method of data collection could be used to 
support the evidence here that particular environmental cues are typically present when avoiding in a 
habit-like way and that specific alternative behaviours are more likely to occur when the avoidance is 
habitual.  To address the issue of causality, future work could directly manipulate the main 
independent variables.  For example, some computer task studies have manipulated the habit-level of 
responses (e.g., Hay & Jacoby, 1996).  A possibility for future work would be to create prepotent 
avoidance patterns in the laboratory (e.g., the habitual avoidance of an aversive stimulus which is 
also associated with long-term rewards) and test for effects of self-regulation.  For example, a 
manipulation of state levels of self-regulatory capacity via depletion techniques (e.g., Vohs et al., 
2005) could be employed to determine whether habitual avoidance is more common when self-
control resources are taxed in the laboratory.  This may include manipulating factors known to affect 
self-regulatory abilities including amount of sleep (Nilsson et al., 2005) and level of alcohol 
consumption (see Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).   
 Two final issues are of note.  First, the decision to not limit the type of tasks reported by 
participants was made to increase the external validity of the findings.  Yet the effects observed here 
may be stronger for some tasks compared to others.  Additional research may choose to focus on 
specific task types (e.g., exercising) that may address explicit concerns (e.g., physical health). 
Finally, the intention-behaviour gaps observed in Study 2 were assessed over the period of seven 
days.  It would be interesting to carry out further work to examine the generalizablity of the present 
results to larger time frames (e.g., a school term), wherein failures of intention may be associated 
with debilitating psychological sequelae like depression (e.g., Jacobson et al., 2001; Ottenbreit & 





 The cost of avoiding important tasks is clear.  Procrastination related to delaying unpleasant 
tasks is detrimental to task-performance itself and is associated with poor psychological health.  
Furthermore, chronic avoidance patterns are strongly correlated with both clinical levels of anxiety 
and depression (e.g., Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004).  The fact that avoidance patterns can take the form 
of prepotent responses (i.e., habits) has implications for how to correct unhelpful behaviour patterns.  
Furthermore, the present results suggest that particular interventions may be more important for some 
people compared to others.      
 Whereas more traditional theories of persuasion and behaviour change make attempts to alter 
people’s intentions (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), habitual avoidance patterns which are prepotent require 
increased self-control to inhibit their manifestation.  Inhibitory abilities are especially important 
when intentions do not match prepotent-avoidance patterns.  Three general strategies may prove 
useful in overcoming habitual avoidance in the service of conflicting intentions. 
 First, to the extent that environmental stimuli directly cue habitual avoidance, interventions 
that remove idiosyncratic triggers for avoidance should prevent the initiation of the behaviour proper 
(Wood & Neal, 2007).  This approach is similar to addiction interventions which advise patients to 
avoid triggers that prompt problematic behaviour (e.g., Witkiewitz & Marlatt, 2004) and is consistent 
with the view that chronic drug-seeking behaviour is driven by habits primed by conditioned stimuli 
(Everitt & Robbins, 2005).  For students this may involve removing self-identified avoidance triggers 
or choosing locations wherein distractions are few (e.g., the library).  Alternatively, interventions 
may be most productive directly following a naturally occurring change (e.g., moving into a new 
residence).  It has been proposed that this type of context change should allow for a window of 
opportunity wherein intentions for behaviour change become more effective and new habits can 




Stopping the habitual behaviour once it has already been initiated is another possible area for 
intervention.  For example, Quinn, Pascoe, Wood and Neal (2009) found that vigilant monitoring is a 
relatively effective method for curbing bad habits as they occur in a naturalistic setting (e.g., 
compared to distraction).  This observation is consistent with the present finding that higher 
inhibitory control is associated with better follow through when habitual-avoidance patterns exist.  
Presumably, the effectiveness of this strategy will be limited by one’s current level of self-regulatory 
ability.  Fortunately there is evidence that practicing self-regulatory control can increase this type of 
willpower.  Analogous to the strengthening of a muscle, exercising self-control regularly in one 
domain (e.g., using your nondominant hand for a period of time) has been shown to improve self-
control efforts in unrelated domains (see Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007).  The main benefit of 
regularly exerting self-control is increased resistance to depletion (or endurance) for future tasks 
requiring self-control.  Although poor inhibitors demonstrated reduced follow through when habits 
contradicted their intentions, practicing self-regulation (even in unrelated domains) may improve 
their capacity for inhibiting habitual-avoidance patterns in the future.  Such practice may also include 
specific executive-control training procedures (e.g., Karbach & Kray, 2009).  As an alternative to 
directly exercising self-regulatory abilities, increasing cardiovascular fitness has also been 
demonstrated to have positive effects on self control, including improving the executive abilities of 
planning, scheduling, working memory, and interference control (see McAuley, Kramer & 
Colcombe, 2004).  Pharmacological interventions may also increase self-regulatory abilities in some 
cases.  For example, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a condition believed to 
involve self-regulatory deficits which are improved by stimulant medications.  Further, there is some 
evidence that individuals with ADHD show improved performance on tasks of executive functioning 
when actively medicated (e.g. Biederman et al., 2008).  Conversely, removing factors which are 




well rested (i.e., not sleep deprived; Nilsson et al., 2005) and not consuming alcohol when attempting 
to regulate one’s own behaviour (e.g. before working) will help maintain self-regulatory strength (see 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996 for a review).            
  Major context changes and/or improving self-control capacity may help poor inhibitors 
overcome habit-like avoidance patterns.  However these strategies are somewhat dramatic and may 
involve significant effort.  A third possible strategy for improving self-regulation in the face of 
habitual avoidance is to replace old habits by directly cueing more adaptive, goal-oriented responses 
using implementation intentions.  According to Gollwitzer (1999), intentions to behave can be 
bolstered by simple plans concerning where, when and how the intended behaviour will be 
performed.  These implementation intentions psychologically link situational cues to goal-directed 
responses in the form of “Whenever situation X arises, I will initiate the goal-directed response Y” 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; p. 494).  In essence, when the situation does arise, the control over action is 
delegated to these environmental cues which elicit the planned behaviour in a relatively automatic 
fashion.  With respect to breaking old habits, Holland, Aarts, and Langendam (2006) used 
implementation intentions in a workplace setting to replace old habits with new recycling behaviour.  
The investigators surreptitiously measured employees’ garbage disposal behaviour at a baseline, and 
also at one-week, two-week and two-months after the experimental manipulation.  Half of the 
employees were asked to plan when, where and how they were going to recycle their old paper and 
plastic cups.  The remaining employees in the control condition were given no such instructions.  
Employees also provided self-reported habit-levels of wastebasket use (i.e., as opposed to recycling 
materials).  The results clearly showed that implementation intentions increased subsequent recycling 
behaviour while also reducing the amount of garbage.  More importantly, whereas previous 
wastebasket habits predicted behaviour post-manipulation for those in the control condition, habit 




 Adriaanse, de Ridder and de Wit (2009) provide a similar demonstration of how old habits 
can be replaced with new behaviours using implementation intentions.  These authors replaced 
unhealthy snacking with healthy snacking by linking the cues that normally prompt the former with 
plans to carry out the latter.   In their second study participants selected either a situational cue (e.g., 
being at home, at school, on a visit) or a motivational cue normally associated with a reason they eat 
unhealthily (e.g., feeling bored, enjoyment, distraction).  Their implementation intentions included 
planning to eat a healthier alternative when they felt like snacking.  A control group made no such 
implementation intentions.  Compared to the control condition, only those using a motivational cue 
to prompt healthier eating were successful in replacing bad snacking habits with healthier eating.   
To extrapolate, the findings of Holland et al. (2006) and Adriaanse et al. (2009) suggest that 
the negative effect of prepotent-avoidance patterns may be attenuated if the cues which initiate 
avoidance also become directly linked to goal-directed behaviour via implementation intentions.  
Provided that motivational cues may outperform traditional situational cues (e.g., when and where) in 
changing some habits (Adriaanse et al., 2009), further examination of these cue types in future 
studies is warranted.  Selection of the most appropriate cues notwithstanding, the main advantage of 
this approach would be in creating ‘if-then’ plans that need not place any additional cognitive 
demands on those already struggling with poor inhibitory control.   
Conclusion 
 The present results demonstrate that procrastination cannot so easily be equated with self-
regulation failure – at least to the extent that trait-procrastination is believed to weaken the effect of 
good intentions.  What is clear from the present studies is that habitual avoidance and inhibitory 
control jointly affect whether intentions translate into behaviour.  Poor inhibitors have difficulty 
completing unpleasant tasks that they have avoided in a habit-like way despite good intentions to 




intentions irrespective of past avoidance patterns.  The present research suggests that interventions 
aimed at helping people follow through with their intentions should incorporate an understanding of 
how both bottom-up and top-down factors jointly affect behaviour.  Old avoidance patterns can take 
the form of automatically-triggered habits.  Without sufficient self-regulatory strength to overcome 
prepotent-habitual avoidance patterns, our good intentions to change how we behave may be formed 






1.    K denotes the number of studies used for each result of the meta-analysis. 
2.   Notably, single-indicator intention scores (e.g., the number of intended hours) produced the same 
pattern of results (e.g., predicting number of completed hours) as the composite intention scores.   
3.   Given that proportion variables are bounded by zero and one, when used as a dependent variable 
relations with predictors may be non-linear (i.e., S-shaped).  To ensure the shape of the 
distribution did not artificially influence the results, the percentage-completed dependent 
variable was converted to a proportion and then transformed using the archsine transformation to 
linearize any relations with this dependent variable (see Cohen et al., 2003).  The main analyses 
were then re-conducted.  The main results remained significant even after performing this 
transformation.     
4.    In the reported multilevel models, the regular and robust standard error estimates were 
comparable in magnitude for all the main analyses.  This suggests that there were no substantial 
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< Participant reads Information Letter and provides written consent to participate> 
 
“The first part of this study is completing this set of questionnaires.  When you are complete, please place 
them in this empty envelope and open the door – then I’ll return and we’ll start the next part of the study.” 
 
< The experimenter gives the participant a package containing a demographics questionnaire, the 
CBAS and AIP.  The experimenter then leaves, returning when door opens. > 
 
“For this part of the study we want you to think about tasks that you are currently avoiding.” 
 
 < Instructions for the “Thinking about Tasks You Avoid” sheet is reviewed, the participant 
completes the sheet and places the sheet face down on the table after completion.> 
 
“Next I want you to think about one important task that you find yourself avoiding the most often.” 
 
 <Instructions for how to complete the “Two Tasks That You Avoid (Task I)” sheet are reviewed 
verbally.  Participant completes the form.> 
 
“Could I please take a quick look at what you wrote down so that I may ask some questions about that task?” 
 
 <After briefly looking at the task, the experimenter queries:> 
 
“In your own words, why do you think you avoid <Task A>?” 
 
 <The experimenter ensures that the task is avoided, at least in part, because performing the task is 
unpleasant, unrewarding or extremely boring to perform.  If the task is avoided for other reasons 
then the participant is asked to select another task and the process is repeated.> 
 
“Whenever we avoid one task, there could be any number of things that we could do instead of that task.  
What percentage of the time (from 0 to 100%) would you say that you <Activity B> when you’re 
avoiding <Task A>?” 
 
 <This procedure is then repeated for Task C (the less-frequently-avoided task) – using the form 
entitled “Two Tasks That You Avoid (Task II).>   
 
“The remainder of this study focuses on these two tasks.  For this next part, please complete this package of 
questionnaires, place your responses in the envelope when you are finished, and open the door when 
you are complete – so that we can start the next part of the study.” 
 
<Part I, containing items regarding avoided Task A (and alternative Activity B), is provided to 
participants to complete.  The experimenter returns after the door opens.  Part II (regarding avoided 
Task C and alternative Activity D are given to the participant when the door opens.  After 
completing Part II, the participant is thanked and debriefed.> 








Title of Project:  The Experience of Avoiding Important Tasks 
 
Faculty Investigator:  Dr. Jonathan Oakman 
Contact Info:   Office: PAS 3015 
Phone; 888-4567 Ext. 33659 
e-mail: jmoakman@watarts.uwaterloo.ca 
 
Student Investigator: Jeff Paulitzki (jrpaulit@watarts.uwaterloo.ca) 
 
This study entitled ‘The Experience of Avoiding Important Tasks,’ is being conducted by Jeff Paulitzki under the supervision 
of Dr. Jonathan Oakman of the Department of Psychology at the University of Waterloo.  The purpose of the study is to take 
a closer look at different ways that people avoid tasks (or procrastinate) and their experience while avoiding.     
 
If you decide to participate, you will also complete a questionnaire about how you generally avoid tasks (e.g., rating items 
like “I find myself avoiding tasks or assignments that are really important”).  You will also participate in an informal 
interview in which you will be asked to select two tasks that you avoid because they are either unpleasant or unrewarding.  
For each task, you will be asked to complete some questionnaires asking about aspects of the task (e.g., rating how “good” 
vs. “bad” the task is to perform).          
 
In recognition of your time given to this study (approximately 2 hours), you will receive two (2) experimental credits toward 
your Psychology Course.  Another benefit of participating is the knowledge that your participation may help us better 
understand why people avoid important tasks.  There are no known or anticipated risks from participating in this study. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may decline to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer and you can 
withdraw your participation at any time without penalty or loss of credit.   
 
It is important for you to know that any information that you provide will be confidential. All of the data will be summarized 
and no individual could be identified from these summarized results.  The data collected from this study will be accessed 
only by the two researchers named above and will be kept in a restricted access area in the Psychology, Anthropology, and 
Sociology Building (i.e., Dr. Oakman’s lab area) for seven years after completion of the study. After 7 years, the data will be 
destroyed using a confidential shredder.  Only individuals authorized by Dr. Jonathan Oakman will have access to the data 
during this period.  
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research 
Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or 
concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Susan Sykes, Director, Office of 
Research Ethics, at (519) 888-4567 ext. 36005 or by email at ssykes@uwaterloo.ca . 
Should you have any questions about the study, please contact either Jeff Paulitzki by e-mail at 
jrpaulit@watarts.uwaterloo.ca or Dr. Jonathan Oakman by e-mail at jmoakman@watarts.uwaterloo.ca. Further, if you would 
like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact either investigator. 
Thank you for considering participation. 
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Consent of Participant 
 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about the “Experience of Avoiding 
Important Tasks” being conducted by Dr. Jonathan Oakman and Jeff Paulitzki of the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Waterloo.  I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related 
to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.  I 
am aware that I may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time by advising the 
researchers of this decision.  
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research 
Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns 
resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics 










_______________________________   _________________________ 
 








_______________________________   ________________________ 
 







 Please complete the following set of questions.  This information will help us understand 
some general characteristics about the participants in our study.  All the information that is 
collected will be kept confidential and you may decline to answer any of the questions if you 
wish.    
 
 
1.  Age: _______ 
 
2.  Sex:   ( Male / Female) 
 
3.  Academic program (e.g., Math, Arts, etc): _______________________ 
 
4.  Ethnicity ______________________ 
 
5.  Country of Origin: _______________________ 
 
6.  What is your native language?  ___________________ 
 
7.  How long have you been speaking English?  ___  year(s) 
 









These statements are concerned with your opinions on different situations. No two statements are 
exactly alike, so please consider each statement carefully before responding. Answer as honestly 
as possible with the following rating scale: 
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Sometimes disagree/sometimes agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
 
  Rating 
1. I pay my bills on time.  
2. I am prompt and on time for most appointments.  
3. I lay out my clothes the night before I have an appointment so I won’t be late.  
4. I find myself running later than I would like to be.  
5. I don’t get things done on time.  
6. 
If someone were teaching a course on how to get things done on time I would 
attend. 
 
7. My friends and family think I wait until the last minute.  
8. I get important things done with time to spare.  
9. I am not very good at meeting deadlines.  
10. I find myself running out of time.  
11. I schedule doctor’s appointments when I am supposed to without delay.  
12. I am more punctual than most people I know.  
13. 




When I have to be somewhere at a certain time my friends expect me to run a bit 
late. 
 






Instructions: Different people use different strategies to deal with situations and problems in their lives.  
Below are a number of strategies that people may use to deal with situations and problems.  A number of 
the items below refer to dealing with situations at work or school.  If you are not currently working or 
attending school, answer these items instead using your daily duties and activities.   Please read each 
statement carefully and indicate how true, in general, each statement is for you using the following key: 
  
   1= Not at all true for me 
   2= Somewhat true for me 
   3= Moderately true for me 
   4= Very much true for me 
   5= Extremely true for me     
           












2.  When uncertain about my future, I fail to sit down and think  











3.  I would like to achieve things at work/school, but I have to 











4.  I fail to do what is needed to follow through with achievement 











5.  In order to avoid feelings of disappointment, I just try not to 











6.  Rather than try new activities, I tend to stick with the things  











7.  I choose to turn down opportunities to further my  











8.  I do not answer the phone in case people are calling with  

































11. I think to myself that I will not be able to complete really    











12. While I know I should make decisions about my personal  






















14. I do not go out to events when I know there will be a lot of           











15. Instead of thinking about problems in my social life, I tell    

































18. I do not try to think about ways to improve my work/school  




















   1= Not at all true for me 
   2= Somewhat true for me 
   3= Moderately true for me 
   4= Very much true for me 
   5= Extremely true for me    
           
19. I try not to think about my future and what I will do with  











20. I just wait out tension in my relationships hoping that it will  





















22. There is nothing I can do to improve problems in my  





















24. I tend to remain to myself during social gatherings or   





















26. When I experience confusion in my relationships, I do not  











27. While I know that I have to make some important decisions  











28. Rather than getting out and doing things, I just sit at home  











29. I distract myself when I start to think about my work/school  











30. I do not bother thinking about how to solve problems in my  











31. I find myself avoiding tasks and assignments that are really  












           
 
Please indicate how helpful you feel the above described type of avoidance strategies are for you 
in dealing with life situations and problems by circling the number corresponding with helpfulness 
rating that applies to you: 
 
_1_________________2 _____________3_________________4__________________5_ 
Not at all      Somewhat                Moderately   Very much  Extremely  











Thinking about Tasks You Avoid 
 
 
General Instructions:  There are many ways that people engage in the tasks and activities of their lives. Here 
we are interested in ways you avoid important tasks because they are unpleasant or unrewarding.  These 
may include putting off homework to watch TV, sticking to activities you know instead of trying something 
new, or quitting an activity because it is too challenging.  What we are not interested in activities that you 
don’t do because you have forgotten about the activity, or don’t really care about whether or not it gets done.  
Here we are interested in tasks that you care about, but that you may avoid because they are unpleasant or 
unrewarding to perform. 
 
Please take a moment to consider the ways that you may avoid tasks.  Try and think of recent examples 
in your own life where you have put off a task because you thought it may be unpleasant or unrewarding and 
ended up doing something else. 
 
In the table below, please write down examples of how you have recently avoided, or put off, tasks 
because they might be unpleasant or unrewarding to perform.  In each example, please include what you were 
avoiding (e.g., a homework assignment) and what you did instead of that task (e.g., watched TV; surfed the 
internet).  Please write at least three situations. 
 
 












Two Tasks That You Avoid (Task I) 
 
 
Please think carefully about the next sections, as you will be asked to refer to each of these later in the study. 
 
 
In the table below, please write down (A) the important task that you find yourself avoiding the most often 
and (B) one activity what you normally do instead of working on that task.  Remember, the task in A is one that 
you think you should work on, but do not because it is either unpleasant or unrewarding.  If you have difficulty 
thinking about which important task you avoid often, please pick one example from your life that most easily 
comes to mind.  Similarly, if you have difficulty thinking about what you normally do instead of engaging in the 
important task, please pick a previous activity that most easily comes to mind. 
 
Task Avoided  
*OFTEN* 









Approximately how often do you avoid the task described in “A” ?  
(Please check one box) 
 
c Less than Once a Month 
c Monthly 
c Every other week 
c Weekly 
c Twice Weekly 
c Every other Day 
c Daily 
c Twice Daily 




When given the opportunity, what percentage of the time do you avoid this task? (0 – 100%)  __________(%) 
 
 
   Never   Sometimes     Always 
Although you avoid the task in “A,” do you 
eventually get around to doing it? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
    
   Very Poor               Neutral          Very Good 
If you rated the quality of your work after doing 
task “A,” how would you normally describe it? 
 







Two Tasks That You Avoid (Task II) 
 
 
In the next table, please write down (C) another important task that you find yourself avoiding and (D) what 
you normally do instead of working on that task.  This time, please choose a task that you mostly do work on, 
but occasionally avoid doing it.  Pick a task that you avoid much less than you avoid task “A” in the section of 
the table on the previous page (i.e., a task you mostly do, but avoid occasionally because it is either unpleasant 
or unrewarding).     
 









Approximately how often do you avoid the task described in “C” ?  
(Please check one box) 
 
c Less than Once a Month 
c Monthly 
c Every other week 
c Weekly 
c Twice Weekly 
c Every other Day 
c Daily 
c Twice Daily 




When given the opportunity, what percentage of the time do you avoid this task? (0 – 100%)  __________(%) 
 
 
   Never   Sometimes     Always 
Although you avoid the task in “C,” do you 
eventually get around to doing it? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
    
   Very Poor               Neutral          Very Good 
If you rated the quality of your work after doing 
task “C,” how would you normally describe it? 
 




















In the space below, please write down the important task that you find yourself avoiding the 
most often (i.e., copy your response from the table on the first page). 
 





About Task “A”… 
 
We can often have mixed feelings about how we behave.  For example, sometimes a behavior can feel 
good in the short-term (e.g., while we are doing it) but feel less good in the long-term (e.g., because of the 
long-term consequences of the behavior) or vice versa.  Keeping this in mind, please answer the next few 
items. 
 
1. In the “short-term,” performing the task described in “A” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 




2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I performed the task described in “A” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 











   Strongly think I        
  Should Not 
Neutral 
 
   Strongly think 
I Should 
3. Do you believe that most people who 
are important to you think that you 
should (or should not) engage in 
activity “A”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 




             Strongly 
            Agree 






In the space below, please write down the important task that you find yourself avoiding the most 
often (i.e., copy your response from the table on the first page). 
 





Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the following section. 
 
The task described in “A” is something . . .  
 
    Disagree  Neither Agree or Disagree  Agree 
1. …I avoid frequently.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …I avoid automatically.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 
…I avoid without having to consciously 
remember. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. 
…that feels sort of natural to me when I 
avoid it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …I avoid without thinking.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. 
…that would require mental effort to 
stop avoiding. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …I avoid every day.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. 
…I start avoiding before I realize I’m 
avoiding. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …I would find it hard to stop avoiding.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. 
…I avoid without needing to think 
about it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. 
…that’s pretty “in character” for me to 
avoid. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







Even though situations can be different in many ways there may be some aspects (or features) that are common 
from one situation to another.  This may involve coming into contact with the same objects, events, or features in 
your environment on different occasions.  Some features of our environment may prompt us to behave in particular 
ways.  For example, seeing particular features of our home environment (e.g., the entrance to the kitchen) may act 
as a trigger for us to behave in a certain way (e.g., avoid washing the dishes that are stacking up on the kitchen 
counter).  Take a moment, and think carefully about times in the past when you have avoided <task A>. Think 
about how there may be triggers or events in your environment that have prompted the avoidance of this task.   
 
Instruction: Please state a feature (or features) of your environment that you now realize may trigger or cause 
you to avoid <task A>.    
 










1. How often is this feature (or these features) 
present when you avoid the task described in 
“A”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          




A Large  
Effect 
2. What effect do you think this feature (or 
these features) of your environment has on 
your behavior? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          




  Rarely or Never in 
the Same Location 
Sometimes in the 
Same Location 
Usually in the 
Same Location 
4. Are you typically in the same physical 
location (e.g., in a particular room or building) 
when you have done this in the past? 
 




        
  Rarely or Never at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
Sometimes at  
the Same  
Time of Day 
Usually at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
5. When you have done this in the past, does it 
often happen at the same time of the day? 




          
   








6. Are you usually with other people when 
you have done this in the past? 
 







Rarely or Never  




Sometimes Feel  





the Same  
Way 
7. Do you usually feel the same way when 
you have done this in the past? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  8.  In your words, describe how you feel when you have done this in the past:   
  






About Avoiding Task “A”… 
 
We can often have mixed feelings about how we behave.  For example, sometimes a behavior can feel good in the 
short-term (e.g., while we are doing it) but feel less good in the long-term (e.g., because of the long-term 
consequences of the behavior) or vice versa.  Keeping this in mind, please answer the next few items. 
 
1. In the “short-term,” AVOIDING the task described in “A” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I AVOIDED the task described in “A” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
   






          Strongly 
           Agree 
3. While you are avoiding the task described 
in “A,” you think a lot about the 
consequences of this choice. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
   
 Strongly think I        





    Strongly think 
I Should 
4. Do you believe that most people who are 
important to you think that you should (or 
should not) avoid task “A”? 
 
 




   






5. Before you avoid, to what extent do you usually 
INTEND to avoid the task described in “A”? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   





    Very Strongly 
6. To what extent do you INTEND to avoid the 
task described in “A” in the future? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
   






          Extremely  
          Energetic 
7. How ENERGETIC do you generally feel?  
 
 





In the space below, please write down what you normally do instead of working on that task described 
in “A” (i.e., copy your response “B” from the table on the first page). 
 





The next section refers to the activity you do most often when avoiding important tasks (i.e. the “B” 
part above).  Please answer each of the following items with respect to what you normally do instead 
of working on that important task. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the following section. 
 
The activity described in “B” is something . . .  
 
    Disagree  Neither Agree or Disagree  Agree 
1. … I do frequently.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …I do automatically.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. …I do without having to consciously 
remember. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. …that feels sort of natural to me.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …I do without thinking.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. …that would require mental effort not to do 
it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …I do every day.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. …I start doing before I realize I’m doing it.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …I would find hard not to do.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. …I do without needing to think about it.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. …that’s typically “me.”  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
















As mentioned above, some features of our environment may prompt us to behave in particular ways.  For example, 
seeing particular features of our environment (e.g., the television) may act as a trigger for us to behave in a certain 
way (e.g., watch the television).  Take a moment, and think carefully about times in the past when you have <task 
B>. Think about how there may be triggers or events in your environment that have prompted this behavior.  
Below, write down feature(s) of your environment that you now realize may trigger you to perform <task B>.    
 
Instruction: Please state a feature (or features) of your environment that you now realize may trigger or cause 
you to <task B>.    
 










1. How often is this feature (or these features) 
present when you do the behavior described in 
“B”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          




A Large  
Effect 
2. What effect do you think this feature (or these 
features) of your environment has on your 
behavior? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
 







  Rarely or Never in 
the Same Location 





4. Are you typically in the same physical location 
(e.g., in a particular room or building) when you 
have done this in the past? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
  Rarely or Never at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
Sometimes at  
the Same  
Time of Day 
Usually at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
5. When you have done this in the past, does it 
often happen at the same time of the day? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




   








6. Are you usually with other people when you 
have done this in the past? 







Rarely or Never  




Sometimes Feel  





the Same  
Way 
7. Do you usually feel the same way when you 
have done this in the past? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
8.   In your words, describe how you feel when you have done this in the past:   
  







In the space below, please copy your previous response “B” from the table on the first page. 
 




About Activity “B”… 
 
We can often have mixed feelings about how we behave.  For example, sometimes a behavior can feel good in the 
short-term (e.g., while we are doing it) but feel less good in the long-term (e.g., because of the long-term 
consequences of the behavior) or vice versa.  Keeping this in mind, please answer the next few items. 
 
1. In the “short-term,” performing the activity described in “B” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I engaged in the activity described in “B” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
   
 Strongly think I        





   Strongly think 
I Should 
3. Do you believe that most people who are 
important to you think that you should (or 
should not) engage in activity “B”? 
 
 











             Strongly 
            Agree 
4. I am capable of doing well in this 
activity. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
   






5. Before you perform the activity, to what extent 
do you usually INTEND to perform the activity 
described in “B”? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
   





    Very Strongly 
6. To what extent do you INTEND to perform 
the activity described in “B” in the future? 
 
 




















In the space below, please write down the OTHER important task that you find yourself avoiding (i.e., 
copy your response from the “C” section of the table on the first page). 
 





About Task “C”… 
 
1. In the “short-term,” performing the task described in “C” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I performed the task described in “C” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
   Strongly think I        
  Should Not 
Neutral 
 
   Strongly think 
I Should 
3. Do you believe that most people who are 
important to you think that you should (or 
should not) engage in activity “C”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 




             Strongly 
            Agree 





In the space below, please write down the important task that you avoid in the “C” section  (i.e., copy 
your response from the “C” section of the table on the first page). 
 





Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the following section. 
 
The task described in “C” is something . . .  
 
    Disagree  Neither Agree or Disagree  Agree 
1. …I avoid frequently.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …I avoid automatically.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 
…I avoid without having to consciously 
remember. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. 
…that feels sort of natural to me when I 
avoid it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …I avoid without thinking.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. 
…that would require mental effort to 
stop avoiding. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …I avoid every day.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. 
…I start avoiding before I realize I’m 
avoiding. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …I would find it hard to stop avoiding.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. 
…I avoid without needing to think 
about it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. 
…that’s pretty “in character” for me to 
avoid. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 






Even though situations can be different in many ways there may be some aspects (or features) that are common from one 
situation to another.  This may involve coming into contact with the same objects, events, or features in your environment 
on different occasions.  Some features of our environment may prompt us to behave in particular ways.  For example, 
seeing particular features of our home environment (e.g., the entrance to the kitchen) may act as a trigger for us to behave 
in a certain way (e.g., avoid washing the dishes that are stacking up on the kitchen counter).  Take a moment, and think 
carefully about times in the past when you have avoided <task C>. Think about how there may be triggers or events in 
your environment that have prompted the avoidance of this task.   
 
Instruction:  Please state a feature (or features) of your environment that you now realize may trigger or 
cause you to avoid <task C>.    
 










1. How often is this feature (or these features) 
present when you avoid the task described in 
“C”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          




A Large  
Effect 
2. What effect do you think this feature (or these 
features) of your environment has on your 
behavior? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
 





  Rarely or Never in 
the Same Location 
Sometimes in the 
Same Location 
Usually in the 
Same Location 
4. Are you typically in the same physical 
location (e.g., in a particular room or building) 
when you have done this in the past? 
 























Rarely or Never at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
Sometimes at  
the Same  
Time of Day 
Usually at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
5. When you have done this in the past, does it 
often happen at the same time of the day? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
   








6. Are you usually with other people when you 
have done this in the past? 







Rarely or Never  




Sometimes Feel  





the Same  
Way 
7. Do you usually feel the same way when you 
have done this in the past? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  8.  In your words, describe how you feel when you have done this in the past:    







About Avoiding Task “C”… 
 
We can often have mixed feelings about how we behave.  For example, sometimes a behavior can feel good in 
the short-term (e.g., while we are doing it) but feel less good in the long-term (e.g., because of the long-term 
consequences of the behavior) or vice versa.  Keeping this in mind, please answer the next few items. 
 
1. In the “short-term,” AVOIDING the task described in “C” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I AVOIDED the task described in “C” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
   






          Strongly 
           Agree 
3. While you are avoiding the task described in 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
   
 Strongly think I        





    Strongly think 
I Should 
4. Do you believe that most people who are 
important to you think that you should (or 
should not) avoid task “C”? 
 
 





   






5. Before you avoid, to what extent do you usually 
INTEND to avoid the task described in “C”? 
 
 









    Very Strongly 
6. To what extent do you INTEND to avoid the 
task described in “C” in the future? 
 
 





In the space below, please what you normally do instead of working on that task described in “C” 
(i.e., copy your response “D” from the table on the first page). 
 





The next section refers to the activity you do most often when avoiding important tasks (i.e. the “D” part 
above).  Please answer each of the following items with respect to what you normally do instead of working 
on that important task. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the following section. 
 
The activity described in “D” is something . . .  
 
    Disagree  Neither Agree or Disagree  Agree 
1. … I do frequently.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. …I do automatically.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. …I do without having to consciously 
remember. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. …that feels sort of natural to me.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. …I do without thinking.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. …that would require mental effort 
not to do it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. …I do every day.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. …I start doing before I realize I’m 
doing it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. …I would find hard not to do.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. …I do without needing to think 
about it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. …that’s typically “me.”  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 














As mentioned above, some features of our environment may prompt us to behave in particular ways.  For 
example, seeing particular features of our environment (e.g., the television) may act as a trigger for us to behave 
in a certain way (e.g., watch the television).  Take a moment, and think carefully about times in the past when 
you have <task D>. Think about how there may be triggers or events in your environment that have prompted 
this behavior.  Below, write down feature(s) of your environment that you now realize may trigger you to 
perform <task D>.    
 
Instruction: Please state a feature (or features) of your environment that you now realize may trigger or cause 
you to <task D>.    
 










1. How often is this feature (or these features) 
present when you do the behavior described in 
“D”? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          




A Large  
Effect 
2. What effect do you think this feature (or these 
features) of your environment has on your 
behavior? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
 





  Rarely or Never in 
the Same Location 
Sometimes in the 
Same Location 
Usually in the 
Same Location 
4. Are you typically in the same physical location 
(e.g., in a particular room or building) when you 
have done this in the past? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
  Rarely or Never at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
Sometimes at  
the Same  
Time of Day 
Usually at 
the Same  
Time of Day 
5. When you have done this in the past, does it 
often happen at the same time of the day? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
          
   








6. Are you usually with other people when you 
have done this in the past? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 








Rarely or Never  
Feel the  
Same Way 
 
Sometimes Feel  




the Same  
Way 
7. Do you usually feel the same way when you 
have done this in the past? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
  8.  In your words, describe how you feel when you have done this in the past:   







In the space below, please copy your previous response “D” from the table on the first page. 
 




About Activity “D”… 
 
We can often have mixed feelings about how we behave.  For example, sometimes a behavior can feel good in the 
short-term (e.g., while we are doing it) but feel less good in the long-term (e.g., because of the long-term 
consequences of the behavior) or vice versa.  Keeping this in mind, please answer the next few items. 
 
1. In the “short-term,” performing the activity described in “D” is an experience that is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
2. In the “long-term,” the fact that I engaged in the activity described in “D” is… 
(place circle a number between each pair of words below) 
 
Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 Bad 
Positive 1 2 3 4 5 Negative 
Unrewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Rewarding 
Boring 1 2 3 4 5 Fun 
Pleasurable 1 2 3 4 5 Painful 
 
 
   
 Strongly think I        





   Strongly think 
I Should 
3. Do you believe that most people who 
are important to you think that you 
should (or should not) engage in 
activity “D”? 
 










             Strongly 
            Agree 
4. I am capable of doing well in this activity.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
   






5. Before you perform the activity, to what extent 
do you usually INTEND to perform the activity 
described in “D”? 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
   





    Very Strongly 
6. To what extent do you INTEND to perform the 
activity described in “D” in the future? 
 
 








FEEDBACK SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
The Experience of Avoiding Important Tasks 
Dr. Jonathan Oakman & Jeff Paulitzki 
 
Thank you for your involvement in this study! 
 
The goal of this project was to get a sense of what the experience of avoiding an important task is really like. We 
had you choose two different tasks that you avoid. Even though both tasks are avoided because they are 
unpleasant, one of these tasks you avoid much more often than the other. Thus frequency of avoidance (or how 
often you avoid each task) was the main independent variable in this study. 
 
We wanted to see whether the more frequently avoided task is experienced differently than tasks avoided less 
frequently. One possibility is that when we avoid tasks often (and in similar ways across time) the avoidance 
behaviour itself may develop into a habit.  If this is the case, we expect that the frequent ‘avoidance behaviour’ 
should be experienced as happening more ‘automatically’ than avoidance behaviours that are less frequent.  
Therefore, how ‘habit-like’ each avoidance behavior was is the main dependent variable in this study. In addition, 
previous research has shown that some habit-like behaviours may be triggered by cues in our environment. Thus, 
we also examined whether frequent avoidance behaviour was triggered more by environmental cues than was less 
frequent avoidance behaviour.   
 
In this study we were also interested in whether avoidance of a particular task is usually associated with a 
particular ‘alternative’ behaviour. For example, does avoiding one’s homework usually mean watching TV 
instead (i.e. is TV watching the most frequent alternative behaviour)?  We predict that the correspondence 
between task-avoidance and alternative behaviour may be strongest for task-avoidance that is more habit-like in 
nature.  For example, if avoiding a particular task has become habitual (i.e. cued relatively consistently by one’s 
environment) then that same environment may be cuing specific behaviours in particular (e.g., the television 
cuing TV watching).   
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo and you may contact this office at (519) 888-4567, Ext. 36005 if you have any comments 
or concerns resulting from your involvement in this study. 
 
For further details regarding the logic behind this study, and some early results, please contact Jeff Paulitzki 
atmailto:jrpaulit@artsmail.uwaterloo.ca jrpaulit@uwaterloo.ca, or Dr. Jonathan Oakman at (519) 888-4567 
Ext. 37197 or by e-mail at jmoakman@watarts.uwaterloo.ca. 
 
For further reading on this issue you can refer to the following publications: 
 
Verplanken, B. (2006).  Beyond frequency: Habit as a mental construct. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 45, 639-656. 
Steel, P. (2007).  The nature of procrastination: A meta-analytic and theoretical review of quintessential 
self-regulation failure. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 65-94.  
 
 









Study 2 Materials 
 
 Experimenter Script (Study 2) 
Session 1: 
< Participant reads Information Letter and provides written consent to participate> 
 
“This study looks at how people carry out their daily tasks. We are interested in the tasks that people 
think they should complete in the next week or so. We are also interested in what tasks people do over the 
course of that time. To do this we ask that you complete some on-line surveys one week from now.  Today, 
we will ask you about tasks that you believe you should work on in the next week.  One week from today, 
we will ask you a number of questions about each task you reported here.  It is important that you 
complete the on-line surveys because we are interested in whether your responses today have anything to 
do with what you do over the next 7 days. Do you have any questions about this? 
 
Before we start asking you about the tasks you think you should work on this week, we’ll have you 
complete three brief computer tasks. Please take a seat here at the computer, and read the instructions on 
the screen for the first task.” 
 
< After reading instructions, the experimenter asks if further clarification is needed and the 
participant completes the task. The same procedure is carried out for the next two computer 
tasks. > 
 
“The next part of the study is a series of questionnaires. Here is the package of questionnaires.  If you 
have any questions about these please open the door and I will be happy to answer them. Otherwise, 
please complete this package and place it in this empty envelope. Then open the door when you are 
finished and we’ll continue with the next part of the study.” 
 
 < Participant completes questionnaire package and opens door > 
 
“In the next part of the study I will be giving you ten of these forms < show participant blank FIAR form 
>. What I want you to do is think about all the tasks you think you should work on in the next week. 
Although they should all be tasks that are important, some of them you may work on, whereas some of 
them you may not.  For each task you think you should work on this week, please fill out one of one of 
these forms. I want to point out here what we mean by ‘task.’ What we are interested in are NOT 
scheduled routines that you are in the habit of doing every day. For example, you are NOT required to 
complete a form for things like “brushing your teeth” or “walking to campus.” What we are interested in 
are tasks (or jobs) that are somewhat unpleasant and would take some effort to do, or might seem like a 
bit of a chore (e.g., working on a class assignment). Do you have any questions about this? Here is a 
sheet with some general instructions about the types of tasks we are looking for. Please complete these 
forms and place everything in this envelope. Then open the door when you are finished.    
 
< Participant completes FIAR forms > 
 
“All done? Great, thanks! The last is to complete the on-line component of the study in one week from 
now.” 
 
< E-mail information is obtained and the participant is thanked and dismissed.  One week later 
the participant is e-mailed and completes the on-line PIAR and AHI forms for each task.  Feedback is 








Title of Project:  Daily Tasks Study 
 
Faculty Investigator:  Dr. Jonathan Oakman         Contact Info:   Office: PAS 3015 
Phone; 888-4567 Ext. 33659 
e-mail:  jmoakman@watarts.uwaterloo.ca 
Student Investigator: Jeff Paulitzki (jrpaulit@watarts.uwaterloo.ca) 
 
This study entitled ‘Daily Tasks Study,’ is being conducted by Jeff Paulitzki under the supervision of Dr. Jonathan 
Oakman of the Department of Psychology at the University of Waterloo.  The purpose of the study is to examine 
how different people carry out their daily tasks.    
 
There are two parts to the study (90 minutes total).  The first part of the study is the lab component (~ 60 minutes) 
during which you will complete several brief computer tasks that will require you to make decisions (e.g., about 
the direction of an arrow) as quickly as possible.  You will then complete very short questionnaires about tasks 
you think you should work on over the next 7 days.  The second part of the study happens one week from now 
when you will log on to a website to complete a set of brief surveys (30 minutes total) about the tasks you 
reported on today in the lab.  If you decide to participate, you are required to complete both sessions (in lab and 
on-line).  It is important that you are able to complete the on-line session because we will be using all of your 
responses taken together.      
 
In recognition of your time given to this study, you will receive one and a half (1.5) experimental credits toward 
your Psychology Course.  In addition, if you complete the on-line component, with your agreement, we will enter 
your name into a draw to win an i-Pod Nano (~$250 value) and a $25 gift certificate to a local restaurant.  The 
chance of winning a prize is approximately 1/25. The draw for prizes will be held at the end of this academic term.   
 
There are no known or anticipated risks from participating in this study. There are also no direct benefits to you – 
aside from participation credit. Participation in this study is voluntary. You may decline to answer any questions 
that you do not wish to answer and you can withdraw your participation at any time without penalty or loss of 
participation credit.   
 
Any information that you provide will be confidential. All of the data will be summarized and no individual could be 
identified from these summarized results.  The data collected from this study will be accessed only by the two 
researchers named above and will be kept in a restricted access area in the Psychology, Anthropology, and 
Sociology Building (i.e., Dr. Oakman’s lab area) for seven years after completion of the study. After 7 years, the 
data will be destroyed using a confidential shredder.  Only individuals authorized by Dr. Jonathan Oakman will 
have access to the data during this period.  
 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about participation is yours. If you have 
any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Susan 
Sykes, Director, Office of Research Ethics, at (519) 888-4567 ext. 36005 or by email at ssykes@uwaterloo.ca . 
Should you have any questions about the study, please contact either Jeff Paulitzki by e-mail at 
jrpaulit@watarts.uwaterloo.ca or Dr. Jonathan Oakman by e-mail at jmoakman@watarts.uwaterloo.ca. Further, if 
you would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact either investigator. 




Consent of Participant 
 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about the “Daily Tasks 
Study” being conducted by Dr. Jonathan Oakman and Jeff Paulitzki of the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Waterloo.  I have had the opportunity 
to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my 
questions, and any additional details I wanted.  I am aware that I may withdraw from 
the study without loss of participation credit at any time by advising the researchers of 
this decision.  
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office 
of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any 
comments or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the 
Director, Office of Research Ethics at (519) 888-4567 Ext. 36005 (or e-mail: 











_______________________________   _______________________ 
 




Furthermore, I understand that my name will be entered, by the researchers, into a 




_______________________________    
 
Signature of Participant 
 
 
_______________________________   ________________________ 
 







 Please complete the following set of questions.  This information will help us 
understand some general characteristics about the participants in our study.  All the 
information that is collected will be kept confidential and you may decline to answer any 
of the questions if you wish.    
 
 
1.  Age: _______ 
 
2.  Sex:   ( Male / Female) 
 
3.  Academic program (e.g., Math, Arts, etc): _______________________ 
 
4.  Ethnicity ______________________ 
 
5.  Country of Origin: _______________________ 
 
6.  What is your native language?  ___________________ 
 





Instructions: Different people use different strategies to deal with situations and problems in their 
lives.  Below are a number of strategies that people may use to deal with situations and problems.  A 
number of the items below refer to dealing with situations at work or school.  If you are not currently 
working or attending school, answer these items instead using your daily duties and activities.   
Please read each statement carefully and indicate how true, in general, each statement is for 
you using the following key:  
   1= Not at all true for me 
   2= Somewhat true for me 
   3= Moderately true for me 
   4= Very much true for me 
   5= Extremely true for me     
           












2.  When uncertain about my future, I fail to sit down and think  











3.  I would like to achieve things at work/school, but I have to 











4.  I fail to do what is needed to follow through with  











5.  In order to avoid feelings of disappointment, I just try not to 











6.  Rather than try new activities, I tend to stick with the things  











7.  I choose to turn down opportunities to further my  











8.  I do not answer the phone in case people are calling with  





















10. I try not to think about problems in my personal  











11. I think to myself that I will not be able to complete really    











12. While I know I should make decisions about my personal  











13. I avoid trying new activities that hold the potential for     











14. I do not go out to events when I know there will be a lot of           











15. Instead of thinking about problems in my social life, I tell    































18. I do not try to think about ways to improve my work/school  
















   1= Not at all true for me 
   2= Somewhat true for me 
   3= Moderately true for me 
   4= Very much true for me 
   5= Extremely true for me    
           
19. I try not to think about my future and what I will do with  











20. I just wait out tension in my relationships hoping that it will  





















22. There is nothing I can do to improve problems in my  





















24. I tend to remain to myself during social gatherings or   





















26. When I experience confusion in my relationships, I do not  











27. While I know that I have to make some important decisions  











28. Rather than getting out and doing things, I just sit at home  











29. I distract myself when I start to think about my work/school  











30. I do not bother thinking about how to solve problems in my  











31. I find myself avoiding tasks and assignments that are really  












           
 
Please indicate how helpful you feel the above described type of avoidance strategies are for 
you in dealing with life situations and problems by circling the number corresponding with 
helpfulness rating that applies to you: 
 
_1________________2 _______________3_______________   4_________________5_ 
Not at all      Somewhat                Moderately   Very much  Extremely  







On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviours. Please use the rating scale 
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are 
now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to 
other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can 
describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read 
each statement carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to the number on the scale. 
Response Options 
1: Very Inaccurate  
2: Moderately Inaccurate 
3: Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4: Moderately Accurate 
5: Very Accurate 
Am always prepared. 1 2 3 4 5 
Get stressed out easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
Waste my time. 1 2 3 4 5 
Am relaxed most of the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
Pay attention to details. 1 2 3 4 5 
Worry about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
Find it difficult to get down to work. 1 2 3 4 5 
Seldom feel blue. 1 2 3 4 5 
Get chores done right away. 1 2 3 4 5 
Am easily disturbed. 1 2 3 4 5 
Do just enough work to get by. 1 2 3 4 5 
Get upset easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
Carry out my plans. 1 2 3 4 5 
Change my mood a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 
Don't see things through. 1 2 3 4 5 
Have frequent mood swings. 1 2 3 4 5 
Make plans and stick to them. 1 2 3 4 5 
Get irritated easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
Shirk my duties. 1 2 3 4 5 







These statements are concerned with your opinions on different situations. No two statements 
are exactly alike, so please consider each statement carefully before responding. Answer as 
honestly as possible with the following rating scale: 
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Sometimes disagree/sometimes agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
 
  Rating 
1. I pay my bills on time.  
2. I am prompt and on time for most appointments.  
3. I lay out my clothes the night before I have an appointment so I won’t be late.  
4. I find myself running later than I would like to be.  
5. I don’t get things done on time.  
6. 
If someone were teaching a course on how to get things done on time I would 
attend. 
 
7. My friends and family think I wait until the last minute.  
8. I get important things done with time to spare.  
9. I am not very good at meeting deadlines.  
10. I find myself running out of time.  
11. I schedule doctor’s appointments when I am supposed to without delay.  
12. I am more punctual than most people I know.  
13. 
I do routine maintenance (e.g., changing the car’s oil) on things I own as often 
as I should. 
 
14. 
When I have to be somewhere at a certain time my friends expect me to run a 
bit late. 
 







On a scale of 1 (LOW VALUE) to 5 (HIGH VALUE) please answer each of the following 
items. These statements are concerned with your opinions on different situations. No two 
statements are exactly alike, so please consider each statement carefully before responding. 
Answer as honestly as possible. Thank you. 
 
1 = False of me 
2 = Not usually true for me 
3 = Sometimes false/true for me 
4 = Mostly true for me 
5 = True of me 
 
  Rating 
1. I often find myself performing tasks that I had intended to do days before.  
2. 
I often miss concerts, sporting events, or the like, because I don’t get around to buying tickets 
on time. 
 
3. When planning a party, I make the necessary arrangements well in advance.  
4. When it is time to get up in the morning, I most often get right out of bed.  
5. A letter may sit for days after I write it before I mail it.  
6. I generally return phone calls promptly.  
7. 
Even with jobs that require little else except sitting down and doing them, I find they seldom get 
done for days. 
 
8. I usually make decisions as soon as possible.  
9. I generally delay before starting on work I have to do.  
10. 
When travelling, I usually have to rush in preparing to arrive at the airport or station at the 
appropriate time. 
 
11. When preparing to go out, I am seldom caught having to do something at the last minute.  
12. In preparing for some deadlines, I often waste time by doing other things.  
13. If a bill for a small amount comes, I pay it right away.  
14. I usually return a “R.S.V.P” request very shortly after receiving it.  
15. I often have a task finished sooner than necessary.  
16. I always seem to end up shopping for birthday gifts at the last minute.  
17. I usually buy even an essential item at the last minute.  
18. I usually accomplish all the things I plan to do in a day.  
19. I am continually saying “I’ll do it tomorrow.”  








For each of the items below, please indicate the extent to which the statement is more or less 
FALSE (1) or TRUE (5) of you.  Read each statement carefully; remember, there are no right 
or wrong answers. 
1 = False 
2 = Mostly false 
3 = Sometimes false/sometimes true 
4 = Mostly true 
5 = True 
 
  Rating 
1. I delay starting things until the last minute.  
2. I’m careful to return library books on time.  
3. Even when I know a job needs to be done, I never want to start it right away.  
4. I keep my assignments up to date by doing my work regularly from day to day.  
5. 
If there were a workshop offered that would help me learn not to put off starting 
my work, I would go. 
 
6. I am often late for my appointments and meetings.  
7. I use the vacant hours between classes to get started on my evening’s work.  
8. I delay starting things so long I don’t get them done by the deadline.  
9. I am often frantically rushing to meet deadlines.  
10. It often takes me a long time to get started on something.  
11. I don’t delay when I know I really need to get the job done.  
12. If I had an important project to do, I’d get started on it as quickly as possible.  
13. 
When I have a test scheduled soon, I often find myself working on other jobs 
when a deadline is near. 
 
14. I often finish my work before it is due.  
15. I get right to work at jobs that need to be done.  
16. 
If I have an important appointment, I make sure the clothes that I want to wear 
are ready the day before. 
 
17. I arrive at college appointments with plenty of time to spare.  
18. I generally arrive on time to class.  













    Strongly  
   Disagree 
                               Strongly  
                               Agree 
I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I 
have set for myself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will 
accomplish them. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
In general, I think that I can obtain outcomes that 
are important to me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
I believe I can succeed at most any endeavour to 
which I set my mind. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
I will be able to successfully overcome many 
challenges. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
I am confident that I can perform effectively on 
many different tasks. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very 
well. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
   
Even when things are tough, I can perform quite 
well. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 











Strongly                                   
Agree 
I don't like to make decisions quickly, even simple decisions, such as choosing what to wear, or 
what to have for dinner.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I will often say whatever comes into my head without thinking first.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I am good at taking advantage of unexpected opportunities where you have to do something 
immediately or lose your chance.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Most of the time, I can put my thoughts into words very rapidly.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I frequently make appointments without thinking about whether I will be able to keep them.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I am uncomfortable when I have to make up my mind rapidly.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I frequently buy things without thinking about whether or not I can really afford them.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I like to take part in really fast-paced conversations, where you don't have much time to think before 
you speak.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I often make up my mind without taking the time to consider the situation from all angles.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I don't like to do things quickly, even when I am doing something that is not very difficult.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Often, I don't spend enough time thinking over a situation before I act.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I would enjoy working at a job that required me to make a lot of split-second decisions.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I often get into trouble because I don't think before I act.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I like sports and games in which you have to choose your next move very quickly.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Many times the plans I make don't work out because I haven't gone over them carefully enough in 
advance.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I have often missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make up my mind fast enough.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I rarely get involved in projects without first considering the potential problems.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
People have admired me because I can think quickly.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Before making any important decision, I carefully weigh the pros and cons.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I try to avoid activities where you have to act without much time to think first.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
I am good at careful reasoning.  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 







Please rate each of the statements below. No two statements are exactly alike, so please consider 
each statement carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as possible. 
 
 
    Not at 
    All 
                                     Very                                             
                                    Much 
 I am good at resisting temptation.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I have a hard time breaking bad habits.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I am lazy.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I say inappropriate things.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I refuse things that are bad for me.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I wish I had more self-discipline.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 People would say that I have iron self- discipline.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work 
done. 
 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I have trouble concentrating.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals.  1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 
 Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, 
even if I know it is wrong. 
 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 







General Task Selection Instructions 
 
 
What we want you to do is think about ten (10) tasks that you believe you should 
do over the next 7 days.   For each task, please fill out one of these (FIAR) 
forms. I want to point out here what we mean by ‘task.’ What we are interested 
in are NOT scheduled routines that you are in the habit of doing every day.  For 
example, you are NOT required to complete a form for activities like “brushing 
your teeth” or “walking to campus.”  
 
Type of Tasks:   
What we are interested in are tasks (or jobs) that would take some effort to 
do, or might seem like a bit of a chore (e.g., working on a class 
assignment).   
 
Please select 10 tasks that you think you probably should work on in 
the next 7 days.  When selecting the 10 tasks, please select tasks that 
are: 
 
(1) important but are also  
(2) unpleasant or unrewarding to actually perform, and that you  
(3) may or may not have gotten around to doing in the past 
 
These might include tasks that you may or may not eventually get 
around to doing in the next 7 days – but they are important 








Task name:  















In the box below, indicate the total amount of time you intend to spend on this task in 

















PIAR # <TASK # PRESENTED HERE> 
 
Task name: <TASK NAME PRESENTED HERE> 
 
 
Based on what you intended to accomplish with this task, please indicate the percentage (%) of 
this task that you completed in the past 7 days.  In other words, if you planned to work on a class 



















Study 2: Task Coding Legend 
 
Summary of Coding Strategy 
 
• Phase 1:   
o After reviewing “Primary Task Characteristics” (see below) with coders, all 
coders will rate each task as either: 
 1 = Straightforward        (i.e. Task likely meets all Primary task  
      characteristics) 
 0 = NOT straightforward  (i.e. Task may not meet all Primary task  
      characteristic requirements) 
 
• Phase 2:  All coders rate all “NOT straightforward” tasks according to all “Primary 
Task Characteristics” items 
o See below for coding details 
o Code all items on each “Primary Task Characteristic” before moving to the 
next characteristic 
 
• Phase 3: A final list of “Satisfactory tasks” will be created based on whether tasks 
were either (1) scored as “Straightforward” in Phase 1 or (2) demonstrated valid 
“Primary Task Characteristics” for all of the Phase 2 items.   
o Rater disagreements settled by 3rd independent rater and a final list will be 
created and used in Phase 4 
 
• Phase 4: All coders rate all “Satisfactory tasks” with respect to task type 






Primary Task Characteristics 
 
1.  Is it fairly clear what the task entails? 
 
  Purpose:  Ensure that WHAT the individual plans to ACTUALLY DO is clear (or easily 
inferred) from description      
 
 Examples... 
TRUE (1):  “Working on my chemistry assignment” (presumably includes concrete   
              activities like examining lab results, writing a lab report, etc.) 
FALSE (0): “Being nicer to my family” (the concrete tasks required for this are     
unclear) 
 
2. Does performing the task itself require moderate effort? 
 
  Purpose:  Ensure that it is clear that the task will involve moderate physical or mental 
effort/energy (participants instructed to think of tasks that would be like a “job” or 
a “chore” to actually perform) 
 
 Examples... 
TRUE (1):   “Cleaning the bathroom” (requires physical work) 
FALSE (0):  “Going to bed early” (not clear that at least moderate-level of  
physical/mental effort is required) 
 
3. Task completion is not dependent on unpredictable/uncontrollable events?  
 
  Purpose:  Ensure that task performance does not depend on other events to occur for 
completion to be possible 
      
 Examples... 
TRUE (1): “Exercising” (no clear event necessary for completion to occur) 
 FALSE (0):  “Shovelling snow” (depends on snowfall and accumulation on ground) 
 
4.  Is the task ‘unscheduled?’  
 
  Purpose:  Only include tasks that can be carried out at more than one time (i.e. not @ one 
very specific time).  Note, for tasks where meetings are mentioned (but NOT 
explicitly scheduled already; e.g., “Do psych studies”) assume task is yet to be 
scheduled and is acceptable.  
 
 Examples... 
TRUE (1): “Working on a chemistry assignment” (many opportunities to do this) 
 FALSE (0): “Attending classes” (exclude because it must happen at a specific time) 
 
5. Task must be a ‘behaviour’ and NOT the absence of a behaviour. 
 




     
 Examples... 
TRUE (1):  “Flossing my teeth everyday” (here flossing is the performed activity) 





6. This task can likely be avoided or delayed.  
 
Purpose:  Only include tasks whose performance can reasonably be avoided or delayed (i.e. 
without drastic consequences, where drastic consequences are those not frequently occurring – 
e.g. losing your job. E.g. handing in assignments late or not at all occur frequently with some 
students.) 
      
 Examples... 
 TRUE (1):  “Walking instead of taking the bus” (here can avoid walking by  
bussing); “Working on my chemistry assignment” 
FALSE (0):  “Walking to the bus stop” (How else would one get to bus stop?);  
“Cooking Thanksgiving meal for my relatives” (unlikely that this task 
will be avoided or delayed) 
 
7. Can task be assigned a particular # of hours? 
 
  Purpose:  Only include tasks that can easily be assigned to a particular number of hours 
      
 Examples... 
TRUE (1):   “Walking the dog” (a specific number of hours could be estimated) 









5 Category Ratings 
  1 = Academic     (e.g., “Studying for an exam”) 
 2= Household Chore      (e.g., “Cleaning my dorm room”;  
“grocery shopping”) 
3= Social   (social activities NOT involving other task types  e.g., “Call my parents  
for money”) 
4= Exercising    (e.g., “Running”) 







Table D1     
Study 1: Statistics for Questionnaires 
Measure Mean SD Alpha Skew Kurtosis 
AIP 40.0 7.6 .75 -.06 -.74 










Study 2: Statistics for Questionnaires and Computer Tasks 
Measure Mean SD Alpha Skew Kurtosis 
Antisaccade RTs 515 ms 68.7 .96 1.0 2.0 
Antisaccade Errors 13.4 % 9.1 .82 .88 .07 
Go/Nogo RTs 391 ms 39.0 .98 .61 .23 
Stroop Effect RTs 153 ms 69.8 .84 1.1 1.9 
AIP 39 10.2 .86 -.15 -.45 
GPS 56 13.2 .88 -.09 -.60 
API 51 11.8 .86 -.06 -.41 
CBAS 56 15.8 .91 .70 -.17 
Conscientiousness 33 6.7 .80 .04 -.63 
Neuroticism 28 7.8 .85 .24 -.56 
NGSE 32 4.9 .91 -.08 -.47 
Funct-I 33 6.1 .78 .28 -.14 
Dys-I 29 7.0 .78 .53 -.08 


























Zero-order Correlations in Study 2: Level 1 Variables Aggregated to the Person Level 
Note.  Percentage = mean percentage of task completion across tasks; Hours = mean number of hours completed 
across tasks; Procrastination = latent procrastination scores; Intentions = mean intention scores across tasks; AHI 
= mean AHI score across tasks; Inhibition = latent inhibition score indicating ability to inhibit prepotent 
responses. The sample included 134 participants. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01. *** p < .001.   
  
Measure Hours Procrastination Intentions AHI Inhibition 
   Percentage .58** -.22* -.02 -.37** .12 
   Hours   -.19*  .03 -.20* .03 
   Procrastination   -.10     .47** .09 
   Intentions    -.06 -.01 
   AHI     -.02 
